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This thesis examines the concept of corporate control in Canadian and Chinese
business enterprises. Going beyond traditional studies of corporate govemance, which are
concemed ptincipdly with the reIationship between shareholders and corporate managers,

this thesis explores the ways in which corporate law in China and in Canada regdates and
arbitrates the relationships mong al1 corporate participants, in the context of the politicaI,
social, economic and cultural milieu in which corporate Iaw and policy in both countries has
evolved.
Through a comparative examination of corporate control issues under two specific
corporate Iaw regirnes - that of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), and that of
the Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China and China's Foreign Investment

Enterprises Laws (collectivety "China's Corporate Laws")

-

several key observations

emerge. The corporate control mode1 embodied in the CBCA represents a modified capitdist
mode1 of corporate control, whereas China's Corporate Laws represent an attempt to borrow
corporate control experiences from western countries, and to integrate those experiences into
the structure of Chinese corporations, whiie adhering to China's distinctive sociaiist political

and economic regime. China's Corporate Laws may thus be best understood as the product
of a modified socidist mode1 that adopts many western corporate law features without
sacrificing the principles of China's sociaiist regime.

This comparative study also i1Iustrates a more generd proposition: that regimes
designed to regdate corporations necessarily Vary across nations and cultures in order to
address specific conditions and s a t i e particular govenunentai objectives and cannot be
regarded simpIy as means of facilitating productive enterprise. The unique approaches to
corporate control in Canada and in China are rooted in the distinctively different politics,
economies, histories, statutory traditions and dtud values of these two nations.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The corporation, as a Iegd structure for organizing economic adVities, ha9 existed

in Western Europe and elsewhere for hundreds of years. Prior to the earIy twentieth
century, corporations (in partidar, business corporations) were not regarded as
signincant economic or politicai forces. The corporate f o m was initialiy adopted by
business people generally to facilitate the pooling of capital tiom numerous investors. It is
the relatively recent emergence of large multinational corporations and their predominant

position in a state's economk and political life that has Ied to increased concems about the
regdation of their activities.
Corporate law in any country is shaped by a cornplex interplay of extemal and
internai forces, which include the unique business, social, economic, politicai and cultural
values of that country. This thesis wilI examine this inter-relationship between corporate

Iaw and such forces through a cornparison of the corporate regimes in two distinctively
dEerent counuies: Canada and China This cornparison will focus in particuiar upon the

different approaches in these two counaies to criticd issues of corporate control.

1.1

The Concept of Corporate Control

The historÏcd devdopment of corporations fmommail corporations to large pubIic
corporations m a changing global economy has meant that the concept of corporate
controI has been in a state of flux. Research on corporate contml m the earIy twentieth
cenhiry was Iimited to shidies of the reIationship between investors and managers. The

issue ofcorporate control in te-

ofthe mvestorlmanager rdationship was first serioudy

addressed by Berle and Means in their treatise The Modern Corporattin and Private

~ r o ~ e r iiyn' 1932. Five major types of corporate contml were recognized in their work.

They were: (a) one hundred per cent ownership controp @) majority control (Le. over

nfty per cent ownership control)~(c) control through a legai device without majority
ownership (e.g the device of "pyramiding",issuing bonds or non-voting stock, or through
voting trusts):

(d) minority control (Le. through attracting scattered owner proxies): and

(e) management contr01.~ It was disclosed that in large public corporations, corporate
control tended to move fùrther away nom ownership and ultirnately Iay in the hands of top
managers.' Later, Mace's field research in 1971 illustrated the management control
phenomenon described by Berle and Means in reality: in large and medium-sized American
corporations, presidents, rather than boards of directon, wield the corporate decision-

making power.' Thus the concept of corporate control is no longer regarded simply as a

hnction of ownership of voting shares but inciudes the capacity for mobiiizing other
shareholders and/or the occupation of powerflll managerial positions in corporation^.^

'

A A Berle. Jr. & G-C. Means, The &fodern Corporation and Private Property (New York: nie
MacmiUan Company, 1932).

A A Berle Ir., "'Contrd' in Corporate Law" (1958) 58 Colruu L. Ekv. 1212 at L213. Reprinted in CE.
O s b m & AW.Schmua ed, Selected Articles ors Corporate Law (section of corporation, bankilng and
btcsines law) (USA: Anierlcaa Bar Association, 1977) 585 at 586-

A year after the publication of The M d m Coyoration and M a t e Property,

Rohrlich in his work Law and Pructice in Corporate ~ontrol,'~
studied the issue of
corporate control from the perspective of the extefnal controhg power exercised by the
state

and creditors over corporations," the relationship between majority and rninority

shareh~lders,'~
legal remedies available to the minority shareho~ders,'~
shareholders'
cornmunicatios I4 and the Fiinction of cornmittees (Le. the proxy-comrnittee, the votingtrust, and the proteaive committee)." The concept of corporate control in Rohrlich's

treatise therefore was broadly defined and moved beyond the narrow issue of the
relationship between shareholders and managers.

In recent yean, the term corporate control is more ofien undemood narrowly as
corporate intemal control,16 a conception relating to corporate intemal management and

10

C. Rohriich, Law and Pructice in Corporute Contrul (New York: Baker. Voorhis & Co., 1933).

-

" Ibid For the state, at 12 26; for the creditoa at 169 - 182. The term "controiiing power" might be
overstated, The power exercising by the state and creditors mentioned in Rohriichts üeatise over the
corporatebusiness isjust irrfIuencing..

-

l3

Ibid at 96 168.

l4

Ibid at 55 64.

-

-

I5 Ibid at 65 95. Protectke c o m m i m m Rohrlich's treatise., is used for enhancing the right of hoiders
of non-voting secirrities (such as bonds or non-voting classes of stock) to participate in corponte flairs.
The protathe cornmittee is "seIf-constinited, wiiIing itseff mto being." (fiid, at 72) Tommirte
members ne& not have any personaf Interest in the SeCLlfiiy or the corporation, and it wouid seem that
they may even have independent Ïnterests... E h t they may not make contracts for secret profits,,- The
pmtecthe cornmitte infonniiiIy brouat together takes its Iegai mus, h m the 'deposit agreement'." In
generai, the protective committee in Robrfich's treatïse is a fonn standing hdFivay b e m n the proxy and

the voting-tnrst,

"

See the organization in Kt. O'Brien, D.A E b d I & C C NichoUs eb Cmes mul iMuteriaIs on
Busines Associariorrs l;mu (VOLiI)(WiEax: FacnIty ofLaw &Dalhousie Universityf 1998-99) at 384.

equivdent to another term - corporate governance. It appears that the term "corporate
governance", addressing issues in comection with corporate objective, shareholders'
~ghts,relationship between the rnajonty and minonty shareholders, the role of the board
of directors, the powers and duties of directon and officers, oversight f'unction in the
board, and remedies, is wideiy accepted by the Canadian and US Iegal communities and
more popular than the term "corporate internai control". ''
In the 1990s, research regardmg corporate govemance was widely conducted in a

number of countries in order to improve corporate performance.
In 1992, the Committee on the Financiai Aspects of Corporate Govemance in the

United Kingdom (UK) published its report relating to the corporate govemance of public
corporations: Report of the Comminee on the Financiai Aspects of Corporate
G o v e m c e .I8

Since 1978, the Amencan Law Institute ("ALI") has initiated a projea of
researching corporate govemance. The fniit of the research campaign, AU'S 1994
Principks of Cuporaîe Govemmce: Analysis and ~ecommenrkrtom'~thoroughiy

examined corporate govemance mechanisrns in business corporations (particu1arIy publicIy
held corporations) in Amenca and raised constructive suggestions for M e r improving
corporate governance.
17

The tenn "corporate governanceW appears more o h than the term "corporate controlw in legai
fiteratUrestUres
18

Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Goveniancq Report of the Cornmittee on rhe
Financiaf Aspectr of Corparate Goventance ( a h calIed in some literanire, Cadbrrry Repart) (Londonr
Gee and Co., 1992).
AIS0 avairable o&e:
Emopean Corporate Govefnaace Network,
<httpI/www.ecgnuib.ac.be/ecgnldOCS/COdes/cadbrrry.~
(date a
d Iune 19,1999).
19 The AmeRcanLaw iastitute, PrincÏpIes of Coprate Govemance: Analysis and Recommendations (St.
Pa& Minrt: American Law Institnte Pubbhas, 1994)-

In 1994, the Toronto Stock Exchaage (TSE) Cornmittee on Corporate

Govemance in Canada dso addressed the issue of corporate govemance in as report,
Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Coporate Govemunce ("Dey
an effective corporate govemance systern for the aewardship of
~ e ~ o nand
" )proposed
~ ~

corporations in Canada

In 1995, the TSE passed a by-Iaw requiring corporations

incorporated in Canada and listed on the TSE to disclose their govemance practices in
their annual report or information circuiar and, to the extent those practices differ nom the
Guideluies, to explain why they differ.2'
In 1996, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Ministem at the meeting of the Council at Ministerial level requked a study of corporate
govemance. As a result, a report

- Corporate Governance: Improvcig Competitiveness

and Access to Capital NI Global ~arket?

- was submitted by

Advisory Group on Corporate Govemance in 1998.
organizations, Iike the WorId B

the Business Sector

Other non-governrnentai

e aiso developed research in the

1990s on the subject of

corporate contro~?

Toronto Stock Exchange Cornmittee on Coqmrate Governance in Canada, CYhere Were the Directors?
GuidelinesfirImproved Corportaie Governance in Canada (1994)
Online: European Corporate Govemance Nemork < h t t p Y f ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ u l b . a c . W e c g n ( d O C S / c o d e s / d e y . ~
(date acçessed: June L8,1999).

"

The TSE and Wmte of Corporate Dkctors h e d a press
on .June 17, L999 to a n n o m the
nrst officiai follow-up stady on how c10sely TSE listed mmpanieswere actnaIly following the Dey Report.
See Report on Corporute Coveniance, 1999: Fwe Yem to the Dey, Online: TSE
~http://tse.codmregs&dexhtmI~ (date accesse4: Angust 18, 1999), The study is based ou detaiIed
responses ftom 635 mefExecutÏve CIfEcers of TE-[isted companies,repfe~entinga SI pet cetrt response
rate.

" IM MiIIsteiu et aL, Corporate Governonce: Ihproving Cornpetifntenessmd Actes
(OEQ),

IO

Capital in

Aiso avaiiable onIine: Emopean Corporate Govenianœ Netwotk:
<http:/lPvww.oecdorg/newsewsanddevenWreIease/nw98-35ahtm>
(date accessed-June 19, 1999).

Gia6al Matkets

"

1998)-

See onIine: WorId Ba& "CorporateGmemnœw
~ h t t p J I w w w I w w w ~ o r f ~ o ~ a n V f p(chte
d / accessed:
p ~ t ~ ~Ime
r / ~18,1999)p

Legd research on corporate govemance in China, however, is not weiI developed.

Impeiled by economk reform, China in 1993 adopted its k s t national corporation law Corporatratroon
Law of the People's RepuMc of China (ccL).~~
For the firrt time in the
socidist People's Republic of China, the corporation, the legal creature of capitaiist
counuies, became recognized in law as an economic organization and a device to serve in
China's economic reform- But research regardhg corporate governance of Chinese

corporations is still in its infancy.
Since the concept of corporate control is in a state of fluctuation, there is no
uniform definition of the term "corporate control" in Canada or China [t will be argued
here that, though the corporate entity is a legal fiction, corporate control deals with
relationships among people. Corporate control can be defined as the power exercised,
directly or indirectly, by one or more penons, to exert a detennining/controlltig influence
over the policies or the management of a corporation, through ownership, position, tegd
devices, statutory rights and/or remedies.

The policies or the management of a

corporation in tum impose influences upon people who have interests in the corporation
no matter whether they are Ui the controhg position. On the other hand, such controhg

power over the policies or the management of a corporation is embedded in, Ulnuenced
by, and in tum influences the values of the society of whîch it is an integrai part.

This broad definition of corporate control denves nom the process of

See a h , the Corporate Goveniana site o h e : <httpYhww.corpgov.net/> (date accessed: Iune 18.
1999).

Corporation Law of the People's Repubiic of China, adopted at the Fifth meeting of the Standing
Comntittee of the Fghth National People's Congrm on December 29, L993 and & i e as of Iuly 1,
1994,
An English versÏon is avaiIabIe onlùie: Clinia inteniet Mormation Center China's Econorny and Ïts
Enterprises <httprlhuww.chmRo~clir>
(date accessedr hne 20,1999).

24

understanding confiicts among various corporate constituents stniggiing for controhg
power of the corporation in the Iight of economic theory regardii rational human
behavior. Gary Becker points out that alI intentionai behaviors of human beings cm be
understood as people pursuing goals as best they cm subject to the constraints of the
extemal world that is "constrained maximizati~n".~
Employing the theory of "consuained maximization" to anaiyze the behaviors of
corporate participants (that is. corporate shareholders and stakeholders), one can conclude
that the conflicting interests of these participants and the struggle for corporate control
among corporate participants &se from the iimited resources of a corporation that cannot
meet al1 wants of dl such interested people. Shareholders anticipate maximipng their
personai profits by receivhg dividends £tom the corporation.

Directon and officers

anticipate bigger remuneration packages or salaries or some other end. such as
professional ambition, prestige, or power nom the c~rporation.~~
Ernployees expect fkom
the corporation higher wages better benefits, better working conditions and job stability.
Crediton expea their debts fiorn the corporation to be repaid with interest. Customers
hope to receive better goods and services at lower prices. Local cornmunities anticipate

hcrease of employment and reduction of environmentai probtems. The expectations and
interests among the corporate participants maybe contlictbg and competing.

ui the

meanthe, the resources of the corporation are imtdEcient to satisfil aii these competing
demands. Corporate behaviors reflect either the dismetion of corporate participants who
-

AW. Katz. ed, Foundations ofthe Econmic Approach to Law (New Yodc Mord Univerrity Press,
1998) at 4.

Gary Becker was awarded the NobeL Prize in EconomÏcs in 1992 for his work extmding ecoaomic
analysis to the resear~harea of h
m behavior. For more detaùl of his worïq pIease dix to Ine
Economic Approach to K m Behuvior (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1976).
Supm note L at t 22.

have the determùiing1controIIing power or the compromise between decision-makers and
other corporate participants.

1.2

The Theme and Framework of This Thesis

The broady defked notion of corporate control covers almoa all areas of

corporate Iaw and aiso touches upon other bodies of Iaw, inciuding securities Iaw,
takeover law, tax law, and stock exchange regulations. This subject aiso invites an
understanding of the process of how corporations are managed in reality, as well as how
they ought to be managed in theory. The cornplex interplay of extemai and internai
forces, and the role of societd values in shaping corporate law can be cIearIy illustrated by
a cornparison of the corporate laws of two countries with disthctly different politicai,
social, and economic influences: Canada and China Limited by time and space, this thesis
wilI oniy examine corporate control issues in the context of two specific corporate Iaw
regimes: that of Canada's federd corporate aatute, the Canada Business Corporations Act

(CBCA)~', and that of CCL and China's Foreign Investment Enterprises Laws ( E E s
Laws) 2g (CCLand FIES Laws are hereinafter collectiveiy referred to as China's Corporate

The Canada Business Corporations A* RS.C. 1985, c C 4 . CBCA is a @te appropriate example of
Canadian corporate Iaw for this comparative stucfy since it is very oimilar to the corporate statutes round
in most of Canadian common Iaw provinces today and has been co~tsciousiyfollowed by many Canadian
provinciai corporate laws.
28

China's Foreign Cnvestment EnterprÏses Laws refér to

- tow of the People's RepuMc of China on Chinese-foreign E p i p Joint Ventures (adopted on Jdy 1,
1979 at the Second Session of the F i National PeopIets Congreo, aad ameaded p m s ~ a o tto the
P e M o n on Amendment of The Law of Lhe PeapIe's Republic of Cnioa on Chiiics-Torrign Eqairy Joint
Ventureswpasseci on A p d 4, 1990 at the Third SessÏon of the S N m t h National People's Congess) (EJV

Law);

- ImpIeme~tfngReguloioonsjor the L

m of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-firejgrt EEqty
Joins Ventures (pmmttigated by the State Co&
on September 20, 1983 and ame~dedby the State
CounciI on lamiary 15,1986 and on December 21,1987) (hpfemenring Regdations ofWLaw};

Laws) .
Given the signiticance of business corporations in a nation's economy, this thesis
will ody examine business corporations, that is, corporations with the objeaive of makulg

profit incorporated under the CBCA and China's Corporate Laws. It will not deai with
Canadian CO-operative corporations, crown corporations, purely Chinese state
corporations and administrative corporation^.^^ This comparative study of corporate
control, as broadly understood will be conducted from two perspectives: corporate
internai power distribution in business corporations incorporated under the CBCA and
under China's Corporate Laws and extemai public interest factors that affect corporate
decision-making.
To illustrate, the comparative study of corporate internai power distribution
comprises a comparative examination of corporate ownership structures, legal devices
available to the majonty and rninoriry shareholders, the role of the board of directors,

- Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Joeign Cooperutive Joint Venmes (adopted at the
Fint Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on Aprii 13, 1988, and pmmuigated by order
No.4 of the President of the People's Republic of Ch& on and &&ive fmm A p d 13, I988) (CNLaw);
Detail fmplementing Rules for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign
Cooperarive Joint Ventures (approved ùy the State CounciI on August 7, 1995. promdgated by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coaperation on and effective fiom September 4. 1995)
(Implementing RuIes of CJV Law);
Law of the People's Repu6lic of China on WItolly Foreign-owned Eirterprise (adopted by the Fourth
Session ofthe Sixth National PeopIe's Congress on A p d 12,1986) (WFOELaw); and
- Detailed lmplemenîing Rules /or the Law of the PeopIek Repblic of China on WhDlty Fureign-uwned
Firferprises(adopted by the State CounciI on October 28, 1990, pmxuuIgated by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade on December 1% 1990 and & i e fbm December 12, 1990)
(hnplementing Rdes ofWFOE Law)
It shouId be noted that in terms of Chiaese-foreign cooperative joint ventures, there are two forms under
CJV Iaw, that is, corporate joint ventures with legai person status and jomt ventures without kgai person
status. in this thesis, cooperativejoint ventures without Iegai person status are not subject to
@en
that they are not legai entities and got dinetent management structure from corporations.
PIease note that aithoagh Wong Kong was transfened to Chmaon Itdy 1,1997, the Iegaï system adopted
by Hong Kong, d o d y comected with British Iegai system, remains unchange& China'sCoprate Laws
111entÏonedin thls thesls do not indude corporation Iaw in Hong Kong

-

-

In addition, mle-shareholder carpcrations unda the CBCA wiU not be wnsÎdered kguse M y ,
China's Corporate Lam does not permit the existence of saIe-sbaretioIder corporatio~and secon-,

managerid otncers, and employees, as weU as the respective positions of corporate
participants withui the corporate intemal hierarchy in corporate theory and in the business
reaiity of Canada and China. With regard to e x t d factors that affect corporate
decision-making, I wiIi address the role of state, market, creditors (focusing upon banks),
courts and culture in ùifluencing corporate behaviors in Canada and China
The business corporation as a form of business association has been well

established in Canada for a long period. The study of corporate control under the CBCA
reveals a modified capitalkm mode1 of corporate control in Canada Using the CBCA as a

touchstone, through this comparative study, it d l be observeci that China's Corporate
Laws, which emerged during the age of China's economic refom aimed at building a

socialist market economy, borrow corporate control expenences h m western countries
and try to align western corporate expenences into the structure of Chinese corporations

within the political and economic regime of this socialist country. China's corporate
control experience, in particular the internai corporate control provided by the CCL,
refleas the merger of traditionid socialistic modeIs of enterprise management and the
modem corporate control mechanisms of western countries. The study of corporate

control under China's Corporate Laws demonstrates a rnodified sociaiisrn mode1 of
corporate control.
A section-by-section technicai cornparison of the provisions of the CBCA and of

China's Corporafe Laws wouid

be uicompIete and vimialiy meaninpiess because such

comparative work ignores the impact of extemai envkonments and thus E 3 s to recognize
the critical comection between corporate control and the poiitics, economy, history,

corporate contrai is not an issue in such corporations sirice the sinde shareholder effectivdy exercises di
corporate power,

and culture of a country. To avoid such unhelpful technical cornparison and
rather, a context, Chapter 2 includes a general oveMew of the Fieahires of
Canadian corporate Iaw in the context of Canadian economic development, and the
historïcal development of the CBCA Chapter 3 provides a generai overview of Chinese
economic development, its relationship with the development of Chinese corporations and
the historical development of China's Corporate Laws. Through the hiaorical survey, it is

observed that the CBCA was developed w i t b a stable social environment and has a clear
historicd relationship to British corporate Iaw, connected with Canada's early colonial
hiaory, as weii as a current inclination to parallel Amencan corporate Iegislation,
reflecting mon recent close economic integration with the United States. The appearance
of China's Corporate Laws however is dnven by the program of diversi@ng the
ownership of enterprises in China's transitionai economy.

Under the pressure of

attempting to prornote efficient management of business and the desire of maintainhg the
socialia regime in China,China's Corporate Laws embrace western corporate expenences
but at the same time preserve certain aspects of traditional socialist enterprise

management.
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively address the topic of corporate control nom an

Întemal and extemal perspective. The diagram attached as Appendix I illustrates the
structures outlied in Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 4 examines the law and practice of corporate internai control in Canadian

and Chinese corporations. Shareholders nominaiiy contd the corporation through the

ownership h c t i o n The comparative study of the corporate ownership structures in
Canada and China demonstrates that Canadian and Chinese corporations have highly
concenaated share ownership stnic~rres,and that cIosely held corporations dominate

Canadian and Chinese corporate markets. The Canadian corporate market is firrther
characterized by hi& overlapping ownership and directors ties.

Share structures

provided by the CBCA and the CCL reffect different social envkonments business
practices and statutory traditions in Canada and China The CBCA adopts a mode1 of
shareholders' democracy based on capital wMe pursuhg fiir treatment for the mhority
shareholders. CCL provides majority shareholders with extraordinary statutory nghts in
directing corporate business but neglects the protection of the minority shareholders.

Although CCL also adopts the concept of shareholders' democracy based on capital, it is
doubtfiil, based on an analysis of the provisions under the CCL,that Chinese shareholders'
democracy can be solidy established on the basis of capital. Chapter 4 tùrther looks at the
role of the board of directors in a corporation's internai control and at the board's
oversight funaion in Canada and China. Generaiiy speaking, the boards of Canadian
corporations have greater power than their counterparts in China in terms of corporate
management. Considering the directors' power of directin&corporate business, the CBCA

and CCL. both split the management and supervision tùnction, although they accomplish
this split in very different ways. In China,the division is made explicit by the adoption o f a

two-tier board system. In Canada, the division is somewhat more subtie, but is observed
nevertheless. Chapter 4 aiso addresses the role of managerid ofkers, particuIarIy the
chief executive officer in Canada and the generaI manager in China The chief e x e d v e

oficer of a large public corporation in Canada generally handes corporate strategic
matters and directs corporate management wNe the general manager in Chuiese
coqoraûons is usuaüy m charge of corporate daily management and operation.
Moreover, the comparative study of empIoyeesr collective power for coatrohg or
iduencing corporate management in Canada and China shows that under corporate laws,

Chinese employees generally have greater uinuencing power in corporate management
(particdar in the area of employee werare) than their counterparts in Canada

Chapter 5 examines the issue of corporate control from an extemal perspective.
Bnefly, this chapter addresses the role of the state, market, creditors, courts and culture in
Uifluencing corporate management in Canada and China. In terms of the role of the state

in corporate management, it is demonstrated that Chinese corporate business enterprises

are subject to more idluences nom dxect state intervention than Canadian corporations.
As to the role of the market in iduencing corporate decision-making, the thesis M e r

nibdivides the market infiuences, and specifically examines capital markets, corporate
contrai markets, p r o d u d s e ~ c emarkets, managerial service markets, as weii as the

fiinction of media coverage. It is shown that generally Chinese markets do not play as
great an iduencing role as Canadian markets in t e n s of corporate decision-making given
the uifant market systems in today's China Chapter 5 aIso examines the bank's role as a
creditor and how banks affect corporate control in the two couatnes. Briefly, the banks'
role in corporate control is Iimited in both Canada and China With respect to courts and
their influences upon corporate control, it is demonstrated that Canadian courts are
normalIy exerting greater innuencing powers upon corporate business than Chinese courts,
particularly through the use of spedic judiciai and statutory remedies. The reason for this

merence is attrriutable to different Iegai systems and Iegai traditions in Canada and
China As to the CU/tureysinnuence upon corporate controi, it is observed that the

capitalist culture adopted by Canada tends to favor protection of private property rights
aod UidMdualism. Canadian culture encourages a flexible business environment wahin

which business peopfe may seek to maximize their personai weaith through corporations.
Today's socialist culture in Chha accords weii with China's traditiond d t u r a i vaIues

embodied in Confiicianism A high respect for hierarchy, emphasis on obligations rather

than rights, orientation toward groups, and emphasis on d e by m

e rather than the law,

as embedded in Confùcianism culture, favor a socialist focus on protection of public

property rights and collectivism.
Chapter 6 concludes the comparative study of the corporate control practices in

Canada and China and points out that China's corporate control expenences merge
concepts of sociaiist enterprise management with western modern corporate control
expenences.

CHAPTER 2 T'Hl3 CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

The evolution and refinement of the CBCA, in a stable socid environment, have
been greatly iduenced by British company law and American corporate Iaw. The
CBCA's historicd relationship with British company law May be traced to Canada's
history, Erst as a British colony, then later as a member of the British Commonwealth. The

strong Amencan influences on the CBCA owe much to the increasing economic

integration between Canada and the US since the end of World War

[I, an

economic

integration that has been expanded since the execution and implementation of the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)~' and the North Amencan Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)," as well as increasingiy interdependent commercid relationships in
today's digital ec~norny'~
especidy in North Amerka.

Before Canadian codederation in 1867, the economy of colonial Canada was

resource-based. The rich resources, especidy the resources of cod,

fÙr

and tixnber,

'O Cmda-Un~ted
States Free Trade Agnemenl, December 22-23 1987-27 ILM 281 (enteted into force
Jarmrary 1 1989) Oniine: York University Lïbrary, Business and Govenunent Publications Lllbrary
<http:I/~~~.~yorku.ca/depts/gdas/ft~~ont,
h m (date accessed: August 8, 1999).
See aiso, Canada-UniteciStatesFree Trade Agreement Implementatiorr Act (1988, C. 65)
Online: Deparmient of Justice of Canada <http:/~canad;L.justice.gc.ca(FTP/EN/LawdChap/C/ClO06.txt>
(date accessed: August 8, 1999) (Iast modined: Aprii 30, 1999).

~VorthAmerican F m Trade Agreement Beîween the Goventment cf Canada. the Governmenr of
lbfèxicoand flre Govemment of the UnitedState~~
7 December 1992, Can T.S-1994 No.2-32 U289
(entered into force 1 Sanuafy 1994) Oaliae: NAFïA Net, <httpY&www.naftanet/~gre.htm,(date
accessed: A u g 8,1999).
~
iVortIr American F m Trnde Agreement ImplemenfafionAct, Oniine: the Department of Justice of Canada,
<http~/canada.jiIstice.gccaiftp/daWS/c6ap/dn0/dD23.8.~~
(date a d - Angust 8,1999).

*

Di@ econoxrty is an economy based on the dÏgÏtÏzatio11 of information and commrmication
infiastnrcture It is a h d of economy bas& on knowIedge, The digital economy niaialy consists cf
eiectronic commerce and the inforxnatiou technoIogy nidustries that make eIectronic commerce poss1'bIe
The digital economy is changing how people work, commtmicate, consame a d do busÏness. B appearr
that the tenu "digitai economy" ïs more often useci in the US-While in other countn'es- rike Canada,
another te- "electmnÏc econoq"is mare popular,

attracted European nations (in partidar, Britain) to expand th&
power in this land?

politid and economic

Corporations, as a form of economic power, appeared during the

development of Britain's overseas exploration efforts as &y

as the 1 4~entury.~'
~
The

growing need for establishing an economic institution for accumulating capital handling
credit, transferring h d s , and iimiting nsks cded for a more readiiy available corporate
form.

The first generai Act, the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act in the L[K, introduced
incorporation by registration, the method that has remained in dominant use in the UK
since then and subsequentiy became the standard mode1 of incorporation in most of the
~ornmonwealth.~'In terms of incorporation in Canada, the fist Act of incorporation for
indigenous commercial companies was passed in Canada in the 19" ~ e n t u r y In
~ ~1849,
the est generai Act appeared in Canada, consisûng of one Act for Upper canada3' and
another for Lower canada3' to authorize incorporation of joint stock companies for

See U.S. Department of Commerce, The Emerging Digiiai Economy ii (June 1999) Oniine: United State
Govenunent Eïectronic Commerce PoIicy <http~/~~~.ecommefce.gov/ede/chapterI.
h W > (date
accessed: August 8, 1999). In Chapter 1 EIectronic Commerce in the Digital Economy.

-

GD.Taylor & P - A BaskeMlIe, A Concise History of Business in Cruroda (Toronto, Oxford & New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 11-28 and 88.

33

34

L.C.B. Gower, G

d s Prtnctpies of Modem Company Law,

@ eci. (London: Stewas & Sons. L979)at

24.

7&8 WC.CCIIO& LIL. SeeLS.Ziegeletal.,Cc~sescurd~futeriaIsonPar~nemhipsondCmadim
Business Corporations,2& ed (Tomntor The C
d Company Limita 1989) at 98.
Howe~er~
the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act wïtbheid the pnviIege of limtmtted
iiabüity35

36

41 Geo. [L c l 0 CC. 1801). For a morp detded description, see B. WeEIing Corporate L m in
Cimada: me Gmerning Principles (Tomxto: Bntterworths. t 984)-

construction of roads and bridges. In 1850, a broader gened Act was passed.3g The
appearance of the generd Acts of incorporation responded to the needs of large capitai

intensive projects, Iike ship building mining, mechanical and chemicai business in Canada.

nie est Canadian generai incorporation Act adopted by the federal Parliament appeared
in the year 1869 and repealed the earlier pre-Confiederation legislation."
Corporate law in Canada is under vixtudy concurrent federai and provinciai
jurisdiction. Al1 Canadian provinces, except Quebec, operate under the common law

based on British Iegai tradition. The commoa Iaw recognized two principal forms of
incorporation.

One was incorporation by exercise of the royd prerogative,

usuaify

referred to as incorporation by letters patent, or royal charter, and the other was
incorporation by private or generai act of the legislature."

In addition to these fiindamental British corporate law roots, Canadian corporate
Iaw today also owes much to U S . models. The federal corporate law reforms in the
1970s proposed by Dickerson, Howard and Getz (Dickerson Cornmittee) in Proposaisfor

a Nov Business Corporutiun.s Law for ~anadir:~
Ied to signifïcant changes in the CBCA-

The Dickerson Cornmittee drew upon the experiences of corporate Iaw makers in the
Australian aates, New York, California, North Carolina and ~ n t a r î o .Discarding
~
the

Supm note 35 at 97. It is noted that foiiowing 1844 Joint Stock Compani=
"registrationnmodel a h aasted in Canada

4

"

Act in the

UK the

RW-V-Dickefsoxt, IL.Howard & L GeQ PropsaIsfir a Nm Bflst3ze.wCorporatioons Lmvfir CmaclQ,
VOLt (Ottawa,- Information Canada, 1971) (Diclcetson Report)

letters patent mode1 and endorsing "enablingisdu in terms of incorporation procedures;
providing mhority shareholders and creditors remediai safeguards for seKprotection;
elimuiating useless procedures, providing directors and otticers power to manage whiIe
imposing non-excludable obligations upon them, the CBCA paved a road that is workable
for business people in Canada. The founding p ~ c i p l e sestablished under the CBCA
corporate personality, managerial power, rnajority d e and maionty protectio~4"
demonstrate the style of corporate democracy and management effectiveness.

The reason that CBCA owes much to U.S. models lies in the fact of Canada's close
business relationship with the US since Worid War II.* It is witnessed that entering into
the Iate 1980s, the Canadian and Amencan economies have been even further integrated
because of the implementation of FTA, NAFTA and the arrivai of the digital economy."
The FTA, which came into force on Ianuary 1, 1989, mainly concemed the graduai
elimination of tarifts and reductions in non-tariff trade barriers on goods between Canada
and the US. The FTA was later incorporated into the NAFTA."' NAFTA, designed to

" B. Welluig, Corporate Law in Canada: The Guverning Principies, 2d ed. (Toronto & Vancouver
Bunerworth, 199 1) at 53.
46

16id at 102, The UK,sincejoining the Common Market in 1972, has began COmove doser to
continent. perception sin order to harmonize with other European countries. Monmer, it appears that
UK abandons some old 19" conception dower than American jurisdictioas. In addition UK la& an
North Amencan style of semrities commission, These aiI together may determine Canada's strong
inclination COAmerican jurisdrsdrction
in the mntemporary age.
n

S u p note 32.

a Deparment &Foreign Anairs and h t e m t i o d Trade, "TradeNegotiations and Agreements Oparing
Doors to the World, Canadars Internationai Market Access Pnorities 1999" OnIine: <http://www.Wm a e c i . g c . c a l t n a - ~ d d o o ~ ~ ~ o r 1 d1l O(date
k ~ . accessedr Angust 8, 1999).
The N m A did not afféct the phase-out of tarif& tmâer the FïA, which was compIeted on Jan1,
1998. To that date, virhially ail
on Canada-US üade in origÏnatinggoods were eIiminat&
Some tarifE remah in place for certain products In Canada's suppIy-manageci sectors (cg,dahy and
poultry), as weII as sngar, dajt, peanutsand Cotton in tne United States.

foster increased trade and investment between Canada, United States and Mexko,

expands the fiee trade fiom goods to other important sectors @ce hvestment, trade in
s e ~ c e s ,inteiiectual property, cornpetition, and the cross-border movement of business
persans). It contains an ambitious schedule for t a s elimination and reduction of nontariff barriers, as well as comprehensive provisions on the conduct of business in the fhe

trade area. Under the NAETA, North Amenca is increasingiy viewed as a sÏngie market.

The intemationd trade and investment fIows between Canada and the US since the
implementation ofNAFTA suggest that the NAFTA bas played a pivotal role in increasing

trade and investment between Canada and the US."

The ecoaomies of Canada and the

US are Uicreasingly interconnected given that Canada and the US are each other's larges

trading partners.'O
The rapid growth of the computer industry and the remarkabie development of

computer networking in recent years are Ieading Canada into an era of digitai e c o n o ~ ~ . ~ ~
Canada's ambition of beconhg a world leader in the development and use of electronic

Ibid It is not totaiiy accurate to exclude trade with Moaa>. Generaiiy speakrng, total trade and
investment between Canada, Mexico and the United States has Înaeased substantiay since the NAFïA
was implemented in 1994. Canada's totai K
U
trade witii the US and Mexico surpassed a haif a
trillion dollars in 1998. Two-way merchandise trade between Cimada and Mexico grew by 8.6 percent
reaching $8.9 billion in 1998. Canadian merchandise trade with the United States is up 11.1 percent over
the same pereachhg $505 billion in 1998.

"

Canada's exports of goads and services ceacheci $368.9 billion in 1998. Over 80 per cent of Canada's
exports go to the US.
See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, "TeamCanada h c Achievements
Report 1998-99" (Apd L999), Online: Department ofForeign AE&s and internai Trade
~http~f~~nfoexportgc~ca/Section4/<
(date accessedr Au8,1999).

Department of Foreign Affâirs and internationai Trade, T'rade Negotiations and Agreements: Openhg
Doors to the WarId, Canada's Intemational Market Access Rioritics 1999" O&: <htl;~Y/WwFK.&tm a e c i , g c . d t n ~ ~ d d o o f ~ ~ o r I>
I ~(date
O 4 ~acEessed:
. ~ ~ Augnst 8,i999).
Canada's merchandw exports to the United States done q p r t aver 2 million Canadian jobs, and
generate 30.4 percent of Canada's GDf, F a y 83-7percent &Canadian merchandlseexports are destined
for the United States. On the other han& the US aqortecî $234.2 bmonIIÎ goods into Canada
Supra note 32

commerce has been stated by the government o f Canada for establishg Canada Ïnto the
most comected nation

in the worlb"

With the assistance of advanced technology,

corporations will expand their signifïcance in the internationai economy by p r o m o ~ g

marketin& increasing production, reducing

COQS,

increasing communication, and

developing new services. It is very likely that in this environment, Canadian corporate law

and Amencan corporate Iaw will become even more closely aiigned.
in Canada, the sl@cance of the CBCA is growing with Canadian business. As

of December 3 1, 1998, there were 162,168 corporations uicorporated under the CBCA'~
Over 50 per cent of the Financiai Post's top 500 business corporations in Canada were

constituted in accordance with the CBCA." The CBCA fiamework has since been copied
by most Canadian provinces.'5 Other commonwealth jurisdictions have aiso been

innuenced by the CBCA?
The CBCA, then, may be regarded as a mature and sophisticated modem

corporate law, adopted within a stable social environment, and embodying prhciples

"

Eiectronic Commerce Task Force, "nie Canadian EIectronic Commerce Strategy"Onlïne:
<http://w.e-corn,icgc.ca/engiisMecom-mg*
(date accessed: August 8, L 999)According to an internet strategy finn's research, as of May 1999, 17t mifion people in the worId had
accessed to the internet, over haifof them in the US and Canada.
See also Supra note 32.

"The data was providedby Lee Duforci of Strategïes Client SeMces of industry Ca~adathrough emaii on

March 23, 1999. (Contact detail: 235 Queen Street, In Floor, East Tom, Ottawa, Ontano KIA OB,
Tel: 6 13 - 954 503 1, Fax: 613 954 1894; internet: hothe.senrice@c.gcca).

-

Y K G. OnenbreÏt & I. E
. Waiker, l e d g b m the Deiawafe Experimce: A Cornparisort of the
Canada Business Corporations Act and the Delaware Generai Corporation Law" (1998) 29 Can Bus, LJ-

364 at 366-

" I.S. Ziegel The CBCA - Twaity Yean Later Wnae Do We Go Fmm Here" in Faculty of Law,

McGiU University, Confaence Meredith Lechtres 1994195, Corporations at the Cmss~oacis(Montreal:
MffiiII University, 1995) 3 at 5.

" For mstance, New Zealand evai adopted a CBCA stgIe and mmrporated substantiai provigons of the
CBCA in iîs Companïes Act 1993. Compmies Act 1993 (commenceci on Jdy 1, 1994) û d h e :

found in the corporate law regllnes ofother leading Îndusb5aI n a î h w chiefly the US.and
the U.K. Moreover, the profotmd influences o f the CBCA, both withh Canada and
elsewhere, attest to its success as a modern corporate firamework and make it an
appropriate touchstone against which to consider the more ment corporate law initiatives

of the People's Repubiic of China

CHAPTER 3 CORPORA'IE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The appearance and development ofchina's Corporate Laws are dosely comected
with China's economic and political development and ideological transformation. It is

beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in d e t d the historical development of the
Chinese economy, politics and ideology and their association with China's Corporate

Laws.

This chapter, however, d provide a bnef history of the development of

corporations in the context of China's economic development and the historicai

development of China's Corporate Laws.

3.1

The Context o f Economic Development and Incorporated Companies

As outlined in Chapter 2, the histoficai development of the CBCA took place in a

stable economic and political environment and invulveci a process of IegisIative refom and
refinement in co~ectionwith a shift Eom primarily UK models to US models. The

appearance and evolution of Chinese Corporate Laws, however, took place in the mida of
~ i ~ f i c a n tshifting
ly
politicai and economic circumstances. The Chinese Corporate Laws

therefore unavoidably reflect these changes.

The People's Repubtic of China (PRC) was inaugurated on October L, 1949 after
the Chinese Comrnunist Party's victory in the clvil war agauist the National People's
partyartyn
The &stence of a powerfif neighboring &y, the Soviet Union (SU), dowed the

govemment of the Chmese Communist Party to follow the SU'Smodel in ds efforts to
Nationai People's Party, ni Chinese. Guo Ming Dong. Membefs of the NaîionaI People's P;ilty ffed to
their defëat in the cnnLwar,
Taiwan

buiId a socialist regime in China- Wth hanciai and technical assistance fiom the SU, the
Chinese govemment gradualIy established a Soviet-mode1 economic system. Through
centrdizing a planning economy, collectivizing agriculture, elirninating pnvate industry
and trade, and nationaiiig banks in the socialist transformation program, the centrat
govemment virtualIy cleared d market forces in the 1950s." There were no private
corporations pursuhg profits in mainland China &er 1956.'~Up to 1978, oniy two types
of entities, disthguished by ownership. existeci in mainland China: state-owned enterprises

and collectively owned enterprises.60
Rather than pursuhg profits, state-owned enterprises and collectively owned
enterprises under the planning economy were operated to meet production targets set by
the pvernment. The enterprises no longer cared about profits and losses since al1 profits

would be channeled to date revenue and al1 losses would be shoddered by the state. The
govemment exercised macro-control and micro-control to manage the enterprises. In

terms of macro-control, the governent controlied b d s and matenais that the enterprises
needed for production.

With regard to micro-controI, production and sales of an

The program of sm-distranslormation of i n d m and commerce in the 1950s was m e d through
formation of joint state-private enterprises (referred to as "state-capitaiist") to deal with private
establishments. in 1956. the h a i iranbonnation (or nationaikation) of such enterprises was
accomplished by assuring private businessmen a h e d interest payment (regardïess of pmfitabifity) in
exchange for their waiving ownership and control of theïr companies.
For a detail description,pIease d e r to C. Risicin, China's Political Economy; The Questjôr Dmeiopmenr
S'me 1949 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 93.
S9

P. Jiang & L E Fang, eds. New Edition of Course in Corporatio~L m (China: Law Publishing House,

1994) at 47.
At the end of

the 1940s and the eady 1950s, there were amrmd 1,300,000 private industnai and
cornmerciai associations in China They w a e registefed aaordllig to conrpany Iaw of the Republic of
China (iaw issued by the goverrunent of the National People's Party). Among th- on.@ LI298 were
registered corporations
1954 Corzstitution of the People's Repblie of China established the state policy of iimiting capitalist
ownership and "...graduaIIy ( q l a c i n g I capitalist ownennipwith o w n d p by the whole peophw
See Artide 10 of Comtitution of the PeopJe 's Republic ofchina (19.54,

Y-Q.
Zhao. "Tbe Co-

Law ofCIiinan(1996) 6 iab ht'i& Comp. L. RN. 461 at 462.

enterprise were connected with govemmentd directive

The goverment, as

the only representative of the whole people accordhg to sociaiist theory, through its
administrativeorgans, exercised decision-making power in the enter prise^.'^

Central planning, however, requires too much information. PracticalIy there are so
many unforeseeable factors and not dl information is obtainable. In the end, enterprises
were unable to rely on the central govenunent to allocate resources needed to carry out

aate plans. Accordingly, these enterprises began to pursue a strategy of self-reliance.

This led to the hoarding of materials and the duplication of productive operations in
10caliities.~~
Self-reliance became a state policy d u ~ China's
g
Cultural Revolution period

(1966-76)"
(1)
(2)

(3)

During this period, the self-reliance policy meant: 65

fiiU utilization of domestic resources, including labor and skill;
rejection of indiscriminate imitation of foreign methods in favor of
accumdating indigenous experience suited to Chinese conditions;
reliance on domestic s a h g to finance capitd accumulation; and

in Chinese. Zi Ling Ji Hua.

"The goverment ananges ali matters ceiating to the enterprises, mch as what to produ-

how much to
be produced, how to distribute, the sale priasTwhether to bomw money anci when to repay any loans.
CentraliPng pIanning econorny had its positive contribution to China's economic deveiopment, howevér,
[t allowed China to concentrate its cesources and investment on large-sde pmjects, whîch were necessary
for rapid industriai growth. WorId Bank studies showed that as CO net output, the r d m u a l growth rate
of Chha was mund ten percent for the period fiom t 957 to 1979 which was above the average of other
low- and middie-incornecountries.
For detaii, sec WorId Bank, China: Sociaiist Econonttc Deve?opm, vol. 1 (Washington. DC: WorId
Bank, 1983).

" C. Riskin, China's Political Economyi The Quesr for Deveiopment since 1949 (New York: Mord
University Press, 1987) at 7.

" Culturai RcMIutiou

(19664976) is a progtam for pmiçying the commuaiSt party and cleaning
capitalism and antidatisn, During th& pericxi, ciass strnggïe was part of everyone's Me.
For detall: Cfüna News Digest International, The Vtsnal Museum of the Cnltntat Revolutiou. online:
China News Digest IntcmationaI <httpfhvww.cndorg/CR> (date accesse& March 24- 1999).
The self-reiiance poficy caused CI- to a[ienate itself h m the international market_ One of the main
reasons for promoting a &reliance poficy was that durhg the L960s, cüplomatic relation between Chma
and the Soviet Union became worse due ta issues reiating to Tabaq c o a h m c e and border disputesThe Soviet Union withdmu its technid experts who had assisted Chinain estabiishing Chinese industry
in the 1960s. W?houtextenial asnStanœ,the Chinese goveniment i~tiated
self-reliaace poücy-

(4)

establishment ofa comprehemiveindustn'd system in China

Such policy emphasùed a reliance on domestic resources (naturd resources, funds

and human capital) to develop the Chhese economy. Simply put, China adopted a
"closed-door" economic poiicy during this penod.
The Third Plenary Session of the EIeventh Centra1 Cornmittee of the Cornmunist
Party of China in December 1978 (Plenary) was recognized as an officiai sign that China
bad Iaunched economic reform and opened up to the outside ~ o r l d . The
~ ~ Plenary

communiqué was deemed "political enabhg Iegislation" that made it possible to iiiemke
economic policy."
Since 1978, a widespread reform has been ongoing for establishment of a non-state
seaor economy (Le. private, collective, and foreign invested economy), adjushg the
distriiution system, attracting foreign capital, decenualizing centrai administration, reChinese Comrnunist Party's policy plays a leading rofe in dincmig Chinese economic deveiopment
Such source of power cornes from paragraph seven of the preamble of the Const~irutonof the Peopfe's
Repubk of C'tna (adopted at the F i Session of the E
lful NationaL People's Congress and promnlgated
for implementation by the Proclamation of the Nationai People's Congress on December 4, 1982, as
amended at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 12, 1988. and again at
the F m Session of the Eighth of Nationai Peopitfs Congress on March 29, 1993.) (1993 China's
Constitution)
It provides that, "Lfnderthe Leadership ofthe Coltfmunist Purp of C ' a and the pidance of Manam
Leninisrn and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of ail nationafities wiU continue to adhere to the
people's democratic dictatorship and the sociaiist road and to upho1d refiorm and opening to the outside
wodâ, steadiïy împrwe socidkt
institutions9 deveIop sociauat democracy, improve the sociaiîst legai
system, and work hard and seIf4antiy to moderniw the counay's indnstrp, agrinilture, aationai defëase
and science and tahnology step by step to bdd China into a stmng prosperons ctxitmally advanceci,
democratic socialist nation, (emphasis added)
An English translation of Constiîution of the Peopfe'sReMlic of China is aMilabIe oaline: Maryland
University School of Law,ChMaLaw Website
<hnp:/lwwwlwwwqis.netl~aw/IawtranIhtm,
(Date accessed: Iarmary 12.1999)
66

67

K Fukasaku.D. Waii & M. Wb China'sLong March to m Opur Econonty paris:OECD, L994) at 24-

The Communiquk of the mird Pfenaqt Srnion uf the ELkventh Centrai Cornmittee of the ConvMnst
1978) at 7 (Chinese
verg0n)The Chinese Communkt P;nty pmdaimed a shat b m dass stnrggk to economic deveiopmemt and
adopted a de-centraiïzationpolicy. The PImary commdqnk lùrther pmfOVfded
enterpnseS*th expanding
amonomy. The Plenary cormmmi@ did mn pmvide a d o m bIueprïnt uwtcad,it reqoirrdthe siate to

Pmy of C h h (passexi on DeDcmkr 22, L978) (Beijing: People's Publishing Ho-

orga-g

industries,promoting foreign trade, lifting pnce conirols, increasing enterprise

autonorny. improving the hanciai system and re-arranging the tax ~ystern.~~
The ongouig economic refom has led to rapid economic achievements in China in a relatively

short penod."
The reform program, with its focus on economic reform, had no solid theory to
support it at first. Wtth the polaicaI aad economic coliapse of the SU and the eastern

Ewpean s0ciaIis-t countries in the early 1990s, there was no precedent for the Chinese

f m on economic constnrction. Some open-minded and pragmatic people (like Deng Xiaoping and Chen
Yun) resumed power after thk meeting,
68

In 1978. the policy of Chinese Communist Policy was sbifted h m strict adherence to socialist state
ownersfüp to permitting private economy. The 1982 Constitution of the People's Repblic of China and
1986 Genertzf Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China encourageci the growth of the
private economy- 1988 Constihction of the People's Republic of China expressLy authorizes the
devdopment of a private economy (See Article t 1 of 1988 Constihrtion of the People's Repuiific of
China.)
The driWig forces behind China's refom campaign are 6inerent from that of eastern European sociaiist
countries or the fonner Soviet Union. Instead of king pushed to the road of d o m due to domestic
macroeconosnic crisis, China's reform campaign was more or l e s spontaneous and dosely connecteci with
domestic politid and economic factors, Two main factors codd explain why the Chinese government
initiateci the d o m wnpaign:
(1)
PoliticaIIy, d e r the ten-year "culture revolution", the Ieadîng party in China. i . e China
Communia Party (CCP)had to take immediate action to re-estabfish its prestige in the state and regah
trust h m the Chinese people so as to foster its Ieadership status inChina. The best and a h the oniy way
to achieve these goais was to enhanœ the staters productivity and improve the material Ieve1 of Chinese
people's Iives, so as to evidence that CCP is able to and wiII sa*
Ets promise to iead the whok Chinese
people to reach prosperity; and
(2)
EconomicaIIy, because of its isolation h m western admced technology, refiaming fiom foreign
capital and adliering ta a centrai pr;uining economy, the whole economic develaputent was Iagging behind
devefoped comîries. Irr order to be mdted into gobai economy, China has to open up to the outside worid
and Iearn h m other countries.
For a detailed description, See the World Bank, China: Reform and the Role ofthe P h in the 1990s
(Washington, DC: The World Bank. 1992) at 34,

"The growth rate of the reai GDF (46)of China from 19W to 1997 are: L990 - 1994: L0.7;

1995 10.5,
1996: 9.5, 1997: 8.8, As to foreign c b c t iwestment (US$ million), 1990-1994: 16,062; 1995: 35,849:
1996: 40,180; 1997: 44.236. For ot6er detaiied economic pronl.es, see Online: WorId Economic Fonun
~http~/www/www~efoniaorglpublioti~ns/asiacriecon~mi~~rofiles.~
(date accessed: Iune 26,1999).
See also NO interesthg articles Song Tmgming, "Two Decades af Ecanomic Refonn" on[ine: China
Today, ~ h t t p ' J ' . C h i n a T o d a p ~ c t 9 8 f c t 9 8 - 1 0and
- ~ T. G. Ekmki, "China's Ecanonry Wbat's
Next?It (Octaber 1998) ontine: ~http'Jf~~~~.pitt,ed~-tgraWcfiin=i.fitml,
(date
MardL 24+

-

1999).

govemment to follow in W e r bdding its socialist economy."' In the process of trial,
fdure and re-triai, the economic reform in China graduaüy developed its own
characteristics. The characteristics of China's economic refiorrn are: graduaiism, de-

centralization, and cornmitment to socialism. China's Corporate Laws developed during
the transitional economy, also retIea these feanires.

( 1)

Gradudism
Gradualism is refkcted in two aspects: timing and geography.

Usuaily, a

reforming policy is gradudy and nationally impiemented over a relatively long penod.7'
As to timing, the reforming perïod starhg from 1978 is miil ongoing With regard to

geography, some districts were circled out as testing areas for implementing reforming
policies.R m e r assessrnent and the resuit of experimentation were observed, the cenual

70

An oId Chinese m g appiies we[l under such circmnstances: feeling the stones to cross the river. The
oId saying was cited by Chinese Ieaders in descniing reforms rdated to establishg a socialist market
economy. Ct might be one of the reasons that Chinese govemment adopted a conservative and cautious
attitude in almost aIi reforming areas.

~raduaiismmkes China avoid s d d shock symptom and ensures a relatively stable uaasitioa
Transition cost therefore Iargely reduwd On the one hand, people get orientation pend: on the other
hanci, hpmvemen~innovation or c o ~ ~ can
o nbe made h m tÏme ta time in a relative long time
@O6
The disactvantages, howexer- are unequai cornpetition conditions ben~eendifferent m,
increased cost of enjoying growth attn'bute to d o m ; and tmpredictable economic environment.
For an illustration, please d e r to The WorId Ba.& C h i m Refitnz and the Rule of the Plan in the 1990s
(Washington, D L T6e World Bank, 1992)at 38,
There are exceptionalcases that canwt adopt gradiÿilisn and nqrrire an mimediate change. For instance,
cIarifYing rofe of centrai bank, distingaishnig fünctioasbetween commaciaï bank and non-bank h c i a I
institutions(Le, trust institutions).
For a brief summa~~
on d o m s of China's fTnanaaI system, see f . C H Chai, Chrna- Tramifion to a
Mwket Economy (NewYork Mord University PressInc., L997) at 118,

The pmcess of stabIishiog SpecM Economic Zones (SEZ) anbodiedthe graduafiSm,

In 1980, the ç e m t d g-ent
of China appfoyedfor opening S h d e n , Znahai, Shantou and Xamen,
the four Sus in the South Cnma üp to the 1984, the centrd govwmmt appmved anoher fourteen
cities as opening aties tor the refofmmg trials- The fourteen &es are: Da[ian, Qinghuangdao, Tirniin,
YantaÏ, Qingdao, Li-gang
and 8eiIiai,

Nantong, Shanghai, Ni~~gbF
Wenzhou, Fuzhoir, Guan&tboa, Zkmj~ang

governent then decided whether or not reforms shouid be extended to other areas.
Gradualism explains the current situation ofbusiness association Iaws in China: coexistence of enterprise laws that categorize entities according to ownership (e-g. ail people
owned enterprises," collectively owned enterprises, sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly
foreign owned enterprises) and the CCL which adopts shareholding corporate structures
borrowed fkom the western wortd.

(2)

Dacentrakation
De-centrakation of administrative control fiom higher level govemments to lower

level govemments is another feature of the refonn.

It is believed that lower level

govemments are able to respond to changes more effectively than higher levels since they

have superior information.
Accompanying the administrative de-centralization in the governmentai organs, the
split of administrative control and enterprise management in stateswned enterprises was
implemented.

Another distinct feature of the reform is the cornmitment to the socidist system
SEZ is a aimpromise saIution to the pmbIem of invoducing foreign capital, permitting foreign capitaiist
practices in China and protecting domestic industn*eses
Foiiowing the establishment of Shekou ïndustnal Park as a testing point in Iarmary 1979, five other SEZ
(Sheden, Zhuhai,
Shantou anci Hainan) were later set np. The spread of SU reflected centrai
govemrnent's idea of trial, spread and trial againAn discussion of SEZ can be fomd in G.T. Crane, The Politicui Economy ofChinu's Speckd Ecorromic
Zones (N.Y.:M E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990) and K FnkaJaky D. Wall, & M Wu,Cirina'sLong Mmd, to an
Open Economy (Paris: OECD,L994) at 42.
Qum Mbg S m Yott Zhi Qi Ye.
That k, the state-ownedmerprises. Sociaiisttheory on the state is that the aate represents a i i the people
Ur the muntry- Property owned by the state is the piopenp owneâ by all the people in the cotmtry.

and perseverance with sociaiist theory. It is cleady stated in China's Coastitution that
C b a is currently at the primary stage of soualism and concentrates on building socialism
with Chinese characterlstics." Correspondin&, the Chuiese government emphasizes the
dominant position of the publicly owned economy (Le. state owned and collectively
owned economy) within the national e c o n o ~ n ~ . ~ ~

One of the functions of the CCL, therefore, is to provide a legai bais for

incorporating state-owned enterprises.76 It is recognized under the CCL that the object of

CCL is

to "maintain the

social economic order and prornote the sociak market

e c ~ n o r n ~ .This
. " ~ policy goal is reflected in the corporate ownership structure h China
where state/public ownership plays a dominant role in Chinese corporations.

3.2

The Context of Ideologicai Transfomation

China is now at a crossroad, confronthg confiiaing ideologies in the process of
building a sociaiist market e c o n ~ r n ~ .Strugpiing
'~
with its own fith, a state-controned
economy, and pressure fiom the global environment to move toward a more Eee

S u p note 66 (1993 China's Constitution).
".AK
country is in the primary stage of socialism, The basic task befote the nation is the concentration
of efXiorts of sociatist modemkation constniction in accordance with the theory of buiiding sociaiism with
Chinese charactenstics-."

74

" AmCle 7 of 1993 China%Corntifutionpmides tbat the state-owned economyIi.e. the socialist aonomy
witfi ownership by the people as a w h o 1 ~is the Ieading force in the nationai economy. The state wüi

ensure the consofidationand deveïopment to the state-owned economy.
Considering that most of the stateowned enterprises are IoSng money but possess major Rate assets,
one of the reformÏx~gschemes is to incorporate state-owned enterprises and pash them to market so as to
increase their efEciency and ratiodiy u t i k e resaurces. Section 3 of Chapter 2 of the CCL provides for
the incorporation and the organization ofwhoily state-owriedccqorations.

"Artide I of C U . (emphask added)
AriicIe 15 of 1993 Chinu's Conrtihction pm-des that the state practices socialist marht economy.

econorny, fa-

the confiicting reality of socialist theory regardhg all people's prosperity

and the nation's present under-developed productivity, China has gradudy established its

own theory - sociaiism with Chinese chara~teristics~~
- which 1 will call "pragmatism", to
resolve the ideologicai coaflicts. Prapatism allows costistence of the conflicting
ideologies and permits China to b d d its market economy without rehquishing the belief

of Marxisrn. It permits Chinese people to bormw western corporate practices and
experiences without worrying about codïcting ideologies.

Such CO-existence and

resolution of conflicts have been deemed a m e r development of Marxism taking into

account Chinese reafiky."
Pragmatism recognizes that China is currentiy at the primary stage of socialism.
Socidism is the primary stage of commuoism8' AIthough the objectives of both socidism

and cornmunism are to buiid a prosperous, democratic and strong society, the primary
stage of socialism is under-developed. This explains why currently China's economy lags

behind tlat of developed countries. The task of a country at the primary stage of
socialisrn is to develop nationai productivity and the economy. Planned economies and
market economies, in spite of their codicts, both can be adopted so long as they are
favorable to promoting the growth of the productive forces in a sociaiist society,
increasing the overaii strength of the sotialist state and improving people's living
Supra note 66 (1993 China's Coastmition).
Wi

2. M Jiang, "Upholding the Great Banna of Deng Xiaoping's Theory on Building Soàaiism with
Chinese Characteristics, Seizing Currait Opportimities and Malrllig Bdd Explorations to Advance Onr
C a m to the 21st Century" 1997 (AU* 25 3 1) Bajmg
This was a speech d e M by Jiang Zemin,gcnaal secrdarg of the Chinese Communkt Party ou May
29, 1997 at the graduation canoony of an a h c e d s
t
u
a course for provincial- and maiiSteriai-Ievei
cadres at the Centrai Party SchooL

-

81

?nef Introduction to Some of Deng's Speech", 1993 (NOK
22 -28) Beijmg RNiew at 33.

standards." Either planned economies or market econornies can be socidist if they sewe
to advance socialism* As for pnvate economy, it is a supplement to socialist public
economy." Practically, as reform of stateswned enterprises has resuked in the Iaying o f
of a large number of employees, job-creating private businesses have become a bdwark
against mass ~nem~ioyment.~~

Responding to the ideologicd transformation, Chinese lawmakers meld the
organkationai structure of western private business and corporate management
experiences into Chinese corporations in the context of a public economy and a sociaIist
regime, notwithstanding that western corporate experiences are deeply rooted in private
property rights. Particularly in the area of corporate intemal control the praaices of CCL

reflect the merge between the traditional socialistic mode1 of enterprise management and
--

-

-

-

Wîth the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping as a Chinese Communist leader in 1978, he and his supporters
initiated reforms and opened China to the outside worfd and tried to integrate the Chinese economy with
the worid econoniy.

Z M. Jiang, "HoId High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an AU-mnd Advancement of
the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 2Ist Century - report deîivered at
the 15th Nationai Congress of the Comrnunist Party of China on September 12, L997" 1997 (October 6
t 2) Beijing Rwîew at 14.
S e aiso "Decision of the Communist Party of China Central Cornmittee on Some Issues Conceming the
Estabiîshrnent of a Socialist Market Economic Stnrcture" (adopted on November 14, 1993 by the ?nird
Plenasy Session of the 14th Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese Commtmist Party) 12 at 13-

ttz

-

-

"BridinVoductionto Some of Deng's Speech"Beijing M e w , Nov. 22 28. 1993 at 33.
84

Article 1 I of 1993 China's Constitution, This article was added to the amendment to Constitution of
the People's RcpubIic of Cbina (adopted at the F i Session of the Seventh National PeopIe's Congress
and promuigateâ for hpIementation by the Prodamation of the Nationai People's Congress on Apnl 12,
1988).

Recogninng the status of private cornpanies is a breakthrough given that following the 1956 socialist
transformationprogram, there was no private cornparilesin m;iinland Chma
8s

ït shouid be clarih.ed that aithough China adopts private economy, pubtic ownmhip (a concept opposed
to private economy) is the mainStay ofnationai economy.
".,, it is necessary to +Id
the principk of takSng the pubiiciy owned sector as the mïnstayZwMe
stnvmg for a sixnuitaneam devdopment of a i l ecoMmic sectorr, .-."
See 2, M. Jiang, "Decision of the ComrmmIst Party of China Centrai Committee on Some Lmies
ConcerrPmg the EstabIishmentof a SociaiÏst Matket Economic Stnrctnre" (adoptai on NoLQ, f 993

modem corporate govemance principles m western countries.

3.3

The History of China's Corporate Laws: An Overview

Development of China's Corporate Laws lags behind its counterparts in the
western world rnainly because C b lacks a fkee market and the correspondhg economic
and political circumstances for developing private business corporations. The adoption of

laws relating to foreign investment corporations at the end of the 1970s. in the 1980s and
1990s and the

est national corporation law in 1993 reflect a changing ùivestment

environment in China and Chinese law's positive response to its transitional economy.

The est company law in China was passed in 1904 during China's Qing ~ynasty"

This company law was drafted using Britain's 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act and 1862
Companies Act and lapan's 1899 Commercial Law Code as its principal models. in 1914,
the governent of the RepubIic of Chha adopted Cornpani-es Regdations based on Qing

Dynasty's company Iaw. In 1929. the govenunent of the Repubiic of China promdgated a
new company Iaw that has a great influence in today's company law in the Taiwan arean
After the establishment of the People's Repubiic of China, the PRC under the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party abolished aiI laws and regdations adopted by
the Republic of China hcluding the company law. hiring the period of transition to
by the Tnird Plenary Sesion of the 14th CenuaI Cornmi-tteeof the Chinese Commonist Party) 1993 (NOK
22 28) Beijing Review at 12,

-

P. rig,Neiv Editon of Corporate L m Course (China:Law PubIishing Hoose: 1994) at 15. ( C h h a
version, transIated by anthor)
in China. it appeacs chat devdopmaitof law aiways Iags behind that of business- For insiance, joint stock
enterprisesappeared fint with Iawsto regdate them appearing later-

socialisrn (1949 to I956), in order to regdate private companies estabiished under the oId
Iegai system, Intenm Regtliztfons on M a t e ~ n t e r p r i s e sand
~ ~ Implementing Rules on
Interirn ReguIations on Private ~ n t e r p r i s e swere
~ adopted in 1950 and 1951 respectiveIy.
Adoption of the two interim regdations guaranteed at Ieast the possibility of the existence
of pnvate compaaies in China during this period. Further encroachment upon private
cornpanies by the state appeared in the 1954 Interiin Regulaiom on Joint Operation of

Public and Private IndlstriaI ~ n t e ~ r z s e sBy. ~involving
~
state ownership in private
companies, the state graduaiIy controlied the operations of private companies. By the year
1956, al1 pnvate companies were transfomed into state or collective owned entitie~.~'

In 1979, with the implementation of the central government's "open-door" policy,
China began attradng foreign capital. in order to assure the sectnity of foreign capital
and enhance foreign investors' confidence Ui the Chinese market, a senes of laws speciaIIy
goveming foreign investment vehicles (that is, EEs Laws) were pmmulgated.92
Advanced technology, management and awareness of the growing market shares of the

foreign companies spurred Chmese domestic enterprises to reform their management
-

-

I. Fan, & D . X Jiang On Corpurate Law (Nanjing, C
at 68. ( C h e s e version).

.

-

-

m : Nanjing University Pubfishing House:

1997)

" si Yimg ~i ~e tuif i g Tiao Li
89

Si Yig Qi Ye Zan XÎng Tiao Li Shi Shi Barr Fa The fnterirn ReguIatiotrs on Private &terprises,
provided for five forms of companis, Le. unlimited Company (Wu Xian Gong Si); Iùnited Company (You
Xian Gong Si); Kommanditgeseffscbaft (German Ianguage) (Liang He Gong Si), which da to a
Company in which some sharehoIdetsare snbject to Uniimt-tedWility which others enjoy ümÏted tiabiïity
in terms of debs of the compaq. This fom of enterprise is simiIar to Canadian mted partnerships.
The fonn of company Iimited by shares (ga fen gong si) and KGaA (Kommanditgdschaik auf -en
(Germany tanguage) (GuFen Lian He Gong Si) which combines features of a comparry iixnited by shares
and a KommanditgeseIlschaR It is iike ajoint-stock hited partnership.

"Gong Si He Yhg Gong Ye Qi Ye Zan Xing Tiao Li
9'

For demil, refer to Supra note 86 at 16; and Supra note 87 (Fan & Jiang) at 89-

* See supra note 28.

mode1 in order for survivai. in the meantirne, the government reahed that a heaithy
cornpetition environment would benefit the country% economic development. Stateowned enterprises should not be the oniy fom of business organization in the market.

The year 1988 witnessed the adoption of two business association laws: Law of the
People's Repuolic of China on Public-owted 1ndirstrrii.f ~nte~prise?~
and Interm

Reguktions on Privme Enterprises of the People's Republic of hin na." Duruig the
course of diversimg ownership, joint stock companies appeared. In 1990, the Shanghai
Stock Exchange was opened.

A year Iater, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was

e~tablished.~~
The whole process of drafüng the CCL took Chinese lawmakers ten yean. The
State Economic Cornmittee and the State System Reforming Comrnittee began the

drafling work in 1983. Four years Iater, the two Conmittees gave up the idea of drafting

corporation law given that moa companies at that tirne were state owned enterprises. In
1986, the two Cornmittees began drafting two Standard 0~inions96which were finalized in

- -

--

" Zhong Hua Rai Min Gong He Guo Quan Min Suo You Zhi Gong Ye Qi Ye Fa (zdopted at the Fim

Session o f the Seventh Nationai People's Congress- and promuigated by Order No. 3 of the Chairman of
the People's Republic of China on and & i v e h m August 1, L988.)

" Zhong Hua Rm Min Gong He Guo Si Yhg Qi Ye Zan Xing Tiao Li (adopted by the Seventh Regular

Meetmg of the State ComciI on June 3, 1988. promnlgated by the State CoanciI on June 25. 1988 on and
effective h m Iune 1. 1988.)

95 Howevet, the securities law i
n C h k a was rot developedat tbat lime lt was eight years d e r openhg of
the Shanghai stock exchange that the Eirst nationai securities lm was îssued.
Securities Law of the People 'sRepblic of China (adopted at the Sixth Meeting of Standing Committee of
the National Peopde's Congress on Deamber 29,I998 and e f f i on Idy 1. 1999).
%

Under China's legai qstem, accor4uig to the Constitution of the People's Repubïic of china, the
Natioaal PeopIe's Congress (NPC)is the suplmie legiskitive organ in the PRC. It bas the power to enact
and amend basic laws and laws in association with the orgrankation o f stare organs. The NPC can a h
amuid the Constitution through a s
m
a
i pmcedmt. GeneraiIy speakmg, in addition to the NPC, NPC
Standing Cornmi-ttee, fhe State CounQl the people's congresss at provinaal IeveI and the people's
congrma of nationai autonomous regions al1 have anain aothority to make repiations The NPC
Standing Cornmittee may enact and amend ail ïaws except those which my ody k enacteci by the WC,
pmvided that the mppIanents and amendrnents do not contravene the basic princip1es of the origmal

1992: Standixrd Opinions on Limited LiubiMy

CO+

and S t m h d Opinions on

Joint Stock Company with Lhited LiabiIzty (Standard ~ ~ i n i o n s On
) . ~the
~ basis of local
experience in formdating corporate regulations, the Standard Opinions nationaiized

corporate provisions in chinag9 Wth the benefit of some experience with joint stock
corporations in China and with Chinese stock markets, Iawrnakers assimilated certain

western corporate management practices and officiaiIy introduced a number of
fundamental concepts of a corporation (üke share, shareholder, listed corporation and so
on) into China. The two Standard Opinions became the forenimer of the CCL. Based

laws. The State Council may enact administrative regdations in accordance with the Constitution and the
Iaws. The people's congresses at provinciai leveI (induding those of municipalities directly under the
centrai govement) and their standing cornmittees rnay emct local reguiations provideci they don't
contravene the Constitution, the laws and administrative teguiations. The people's congresses of national
autonomous areas may emct autonomy reguiations and q x d i c teguiations.
Standard Opinions w a e promulgated by the State Economic Commission and the State System Refonn
Commission under the State Council. The State Economic Commission and the State System Refonn
Commission, according to Article 90 of 1993 Comtitutiion of the People's Repu6lic of China, have the
authonty to issue orders. directives and regulatioxts within the jwisdiction of their respective departrnents
in accordance with the Iaw and the administrative rules and regulations, decisions and orders issued by
the State Council. The Standard Opinions are. in nature, directivs made by adminimative organs
97

You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si Gui Fan Yi Jian

Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si Gui Fan Yi Jian
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Like econornic reform in China which originated locaüy and experimentalIy, the framework of
Standard Opinions couid be traced to ïnferim Provisions of Shenzhen ~Municipalityon Corporations
Limited &yShores.
tnterim Provisions of Shenrhen Municipahy on Corporarions Limired 6y Shares (Shenzhen Shi Gu Fen
You Xian Gong Si Zan Xin Gui Ding) issued by Shexuhen Municipal Governent on Mhrch 17, 1992.
Later it was replaced by Reguiiutions on Corporation Lirniied by Shoresof the Shemhen Sgecia&Economic
Zone ( A p d 26, 1993). Guangdong Province pmdgated ReguIatiom on Corporatiom Limired by
Shares whkh was &&ive on Augost 1, 1993. Shanghai issu& lnterim Pmisions on Corporations
W t e d 6y Shwes of Shanghai~Mmicipaiiiiyon May 18, 1992.
It shouid be noted that on May 15, 1992, the Economic System. Restnrctrrriag Commission, the State
PIanning Commission, the Ministry F m = the Peopk's Repubïic of China and the State CorniQI
Production Office imLedShore System l3perÏmentaL Procedures of the People's Republic o / ç h n a
in order to ciear out doubts on the statns of Standards Opinions (some people did not think they had the
stam of a "Iawu or "regdation") the State Camd h e d a notice (State C o d Offiœ Notice
Concerning ImpIememation of the Standard OpInions
15, 1993) (Guo Ban Fa, No. 27, 1993)) to
cih t the Standard Opinions had the Hect ofministry-Ievei hw and regdation.

upon the experience of these shareholding companies, CCL was h d y issued in 1993.lm

Given China's transitional economy, China'sCorporate Laws are stiH in the stage
of transitionai development. The CO-existenceof FiEs Laws and the CCL is an example.
CCL now applies to foreign hvestment enterprises just as FIESLaws do. But where FIES
Laws and CCL have connicting provisions, provisions under the FIES Laws prevail.'OL

Summary

It is obsewed that the Canadian economy is developing toward a digital

economyLo2
and integrating with the economy of the US and ultimately, potentially, with
South Arnerica. In the meanthe, China is divenifying enterprise ownership structures

fiom pure state ownership to non-state and pnvate ownership.

Such different

development trends cm be Iinked to the different poIÎticaI regimes and economic
development models of the two countries. Economic development in Canada requires a
well-designed business vehicle that permÏts efficiency through a combination of
predictabiiity and Bemi%ty, with adequate Uivestor protection. The CBCA, in response to
this reguirement, faditates efficient management of business and requires management
accountabüity to investing property owners, and

Ït

has been significantiy uifiuenced by

Amerkm corporate Iaw. Maintaining a sociaüst regime in Chùia, especiaily under the

Irn
For a more detailed description, see Supm note 62 at 464, and G. L. Zhan& & M. Zhou,
Expainhg on CorporateLaw (Chma:PubLÏshing House of People's Court, 1993) (Chinese-on).

&.,

The pmcesr of drafting sCorporation Law refïects îhat in the a m of corporaie law. the Chmese
approach is to fomdate Iaw aaording to what is ha-g
or aiaïs in pactict
'O'

Article 18 afCCL.

lm

Supm note 32.

pressure of the collapse of the SU and socialist eastem European countries, requires the
abolition of long-stmding doctrines mandatmg pure state ownership and the creation of
incentives through property ownership. China's Corporate Laws, in response to these

requirements, establish an organization structure of business corporations that draws upon
corporate experiences fiom the western world By so doing, it is hoped that western-style

business corporation structures and western corporate experiences can increase the
eniciency of Chinese corporations and help attract foreign capital to meet the needs of
Chinese economic development.

CHAPTER 4 CORPORATE CONTROL: FROM AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

4.1

Shanholden - Control through Ownenhip

The brid historicd outiine in Chapters 2 and 3 of Canadian and Chinese economic
deveIopment and their relationship to the deveiopment of business corporations in both
countries suggeas that principally, the corporate fom was devised and developed to
satisfy the need for raising equity capital to facilkate the operation of business.'O3 1t is safie
to Say that fkom the outset,

corporations have been comected with capital. tnvestors are

capitalists. The rights and obligations of investon in connection with the corporations in

which they invest are property rights and obligations.
By transfemng property to the corporation and subscniing for shares, investors
become the owners of shares of the corporation. Shares represent the status, interest and

right that the investors have in the corporation and the liability that the investors have to

bear for the corporation.'" WhiIe hoIding the shares OP the corporation, investors are
'O3 See aiso I. B. B a s h & P. L Miranti, A History of Corporute finance (Cambridge & New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
in this book, Baskin and Miranti recognized how the eariy prefetence for debt financing graduai1 yielded
to equity financing. It shouId be noted, however, that B a s .and Miranti linked the rise of equity more to
the development of markets for trading equity than to the evohtion of the corporate f o r n

"A shan is the interest of a shaRholder in the company m e d by a sum of money, for the purpose
of tiabiliîy in the fkst pIaœ and of interest in the second,.,"
See FarweU 3. in Borland's T-ee v. Steel, [19011 1 Ch279 at 288.
Cited by L.CB, Gowet, see supr4 note 34 at 398,
With regard to the iiabiIity of sharehoIders, it is noted that in the early 2 0 cenatry,
~
isued s W capital
couid consist partiy of paid up capitai (repre~eatingthe total of the payments made in respect of the issued
sitami) and partSt of uncaIIed capitaI (repfeseating the balan- if any, between the amount aiready paid
ami the totaï nominaï or par vaiue of the issued shares), See mpra note 34 at 2 17 -218.
Under todag's CBCA, a s h m map not be issaed ontil the consideration for the share is ÇuIIy paid in
money or in property or pst seMces. See CBCA s25 (3), (4) and (5). The prmapal reasoa tmderiying
fiilly @d shares prwided by the Dickerson Report is protection of sharehoIders since sWoIders
ownÏng partIy-paid sbates cm become Iiable to make finthetpapments when "calIedl or suffer fod'eitme
of tfieir stiares, "gr Issiring p a ~ x f y - shares,
~a
a corporation couid thediore m i d Secltfities commission

shareholders of the corporation. Accordhg to the shares they possess, the corporate Iaw
of the relevant jurisdiction, and agreements they enter mto, shareholders exercise their
rights (or may not exercise their nghts) and shoulder limited business risks.
Since shares are so dosely comected with shareholders' status in a corporation,
before discussing shareholders' controlling/iiuencing power in Canadian and Chinese
corporate decision-making, it seems necessary to examine share structures under the

CBCA, CCL and in China's business reaiity.lOsThe following comparative examination of

share structures in Canada and China reveais that China on the one hand adopts corporate
share structures sidar to those found in capitalist coutries yet, on the other hand,

remains committed to a socialist regime by ensuring govemment monitoring of the amount
of private capital on the Chinese equity market.

4.1.1

Share Structures: Registered Shares and Bearer Shares

scruùny on what, in redity, is a fresh solicitation of money from the public. The shareholder is put into
the position where he cm be forced to put up more money aImost at the whim of the issuing corporation
or M e r the l o s of al1 or part of what he had aiready invested" See supra note 42 (Dickerson Report)
para. 1O4 at 104.
Io' The concept of "share"was not innodu& into FIEs Laws. The word conaponding to "s&"
under
FIEs Laws is "eqirity". in this context, the organization of sharehoIders' meetings is therefore not
provided for in the FIE%Lam.

For foreign investment enterprises in China, n o d y imrestors share profits and losses according to
imrestors' mpective capital conmiutions to the registered capitai of foreign imestment enterprises.
"Registeredcapital"refm to the amount of the paid up c a p M contributionsof ail imrestors as registered
with the company registtationauthorïty- See Article 4 of the EIV Law.
But the rule of "share profits and losses according to capitai contri'bution" as adopted in sino-foreign
equityjoint ventures may be contracteci ont ofby imrestors through constitutionai documents in the case of
sino-foreigri co-operativejomt ventmes. See Artide 2 of the C W Law.
A confiising phenornenon tmder C U is that the Iaw does not inciude the concept of "sharenin the case of
fimiteci ïiability companies (Le-cioseiy-heId corporations in the western mlld), but CCL directIy mpIoys
the concepts "sharehoIder" and *shareholders' meeting" In the &on
refating to &ted üabiIity
companies,

Thedore, when I discuss the &are structure in Chùtese corporations within this section, 1 refér oniy to
the shate structures iuChinesepubiÏciy heid corporations,

Shares of a corporation under the CBCA must be m registered form '06 Shares of
a corporation under CCL may be in registered or in bearer f ~ r m ' ~ 'Further, CCL
provides that shares issued by a corporation to promoters, aate authorized investment
institutions or legai persons'08 should be in registered form; while shares issued to the
public may be either registered shares or bearer ~hares."'~

There are differences between registered shares and b w e r shares in terms of
shareholders' power to vote and transfer shares.

As to votuig, a shareholder with

registered voting shares has a right to vote at shareholders' meetings without any fiirther

cornpliance with other legai procedures (except when voting by proxy). It is otherwise,

however, in the case of holders of shares in bearer form. Ln order to quai@ as a voting
shareholder, a hoIder of bearer shares, according to CCL, has to deposit hifier shares
with the corporation for the period cornrnencing five days prior to the shareholders'

meeting until the end of that meeting. "O
In reality, many hoIders of bearer shares in China (most of whom are individual
investors) do not deposit theû shares with the corporation in order to exercise their voting

CBCA s.24 (1).
'O7

Article 133 of C U .

'" According to Asticle 36 of 1986 General PrincïpIes of C M Law of the People's R e N l t c of China
(China's C i d Law), a legai petsan is "an organization that has capacity for ci* rights and capcity for
CM1 conducf and independentîy enjoys CMrights and assumes civil obiigations in accordance with the
law.'
Artide 37 of Cbina's CM1 Law hther provides conditions for qmQing a Iegai person: (1)
estabtishment in accordance with the law, (2) possession of the necessary pmperty or fiinkt (3) possession
of its own name, orgaukationand premiseq and (4) ability to independently bear civil [iabilityChapter 3 of China's C M Law categorizes Iegai persons into bmcIasses-.
are enterprise ie@ persans
(Le. legai persons with the purpose of making profit); second, are o f f i d organs, institntions and sociaI
organizations (Le, legai persons that do not have as th& objectivethe making oPa profit).
The tenir "1ega.iperson" m China's Corporate tawsrdiers to enterprise IegaI perrons,
109

Supra note 107.

rights mahiy because of a lack of interest in voting- Therefore, they Ieave the decision-

making power to the registered shareholders. If the registered shareholders are aiso
uninterested in corporate matters (as they may be in the case of large widely-held pubfic
corporations), the corporate decision power wilI be left with the management through the
proxy rnechani*~~."'As a result, the structure of bearer shares in modem corporations
wiII more easily lead to the phenomenon of a split between ownership and control. The

examination of individual shareholders' status in Chinese corporations in 4.1.4 B(5) is a
typical example of such split and its relationship with the bearer shares structure.
As to share transfer, the mobility finction of bearer shares is superior to that of

registered shares. However, bearer shares are less secure than registered shares. In terms
of mobility, once a holder of bearer shares delivers hidher share certificate to a transferee
(either directly or through a broker), the share transfer becomes effective.

Tramfier of

registered shares under the CCL requires endorsement and registration of the tramfier*.'"
Under the CBCA, registration of the transfer of registered shares is aiso required."'
Because of the mobïie nature of bearer shares, bearer shares are Iess secure than registered
shares. Physicd possession of share certincates does not matter to registered shareholders
but does matter to holders of bearer shares. In China, if a holder of bearec shares Ioses

'IL In China, the management of a corporation usuaiiy has the contact decaiIs of the registered
sharehoIders but not of the bearer sharehoiciers- Therefore, management is abIe to soticit xuanagement
proxies h m the registered sbarrhoiders. With respect to holders of bearer shares* public announcemcnt
(through newspapp) may be emptoyed for the soLicitatÏon.

Il4 CBCA s-76 (1). Howwefr CBCA s.48 (3) does IIso prwide that, except where its trander is rrstricted
and noted on a -ty
m accordance with devant statutory pcovisions (e.g CBCA n49(8)), a semnïty
(induding a share ceriificate) is a negotiabte Mstrmnent Pan W of the CBCA firtther provides
provisions on constraiaed &are corporations

M e r share cemficate, m order to prevent any property loss, a Iegd remedy provided by
ChÏnese civil procedure law mua be sought for a declaration declaring that the share

certincate is nuU and void."'
The long-term peaceful social environment and the absence of business practices
and statutory traditions favonng bearer shares might account for the lack o f a bearer share

structure under the CBCA Uniike Canada, China has suEered Eom foreign invasion and

domestic wars during the 19* and 2 0 ~entuies."~
~
Bearer shares were &st provided for

in China in the early 2 0 century.
~
The turbulent social Ncumstances at that time help
explain the preference for a bearer shares structure which offered holders mobility and
anonpity. The existence of bearer shares in China also indicates that the Chinese
governent either does not realize that tax evasion may arise when bearer securities are
permitted or is not concemed about any such potentiai tax evasion. A corporation does
not have a Iist of hoiders of bearer shares. Holders of bearer shares in China engage in
share transactions through brokers. UnIess China's tax authorities want to trace the share
transactions including receipts of dividends of holders of bearer shares through depository

lf5 Sec Chapter 18 of Civil Procedure Law of the People's Repblic of China (adopted on the Fourth
Meeting of the Seventh Nationai People's Congress on ApriI 9, 199 1 and promuigated by Order No. 16 of
the President of the People's Republic of China on ApnI 9, 1991 and effective as of April9, L99 1).
An Engiish translation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Repubiic of China is availabte oniïne:
University of Maryland ChinaLaw Website <http://wwwqis.net/chinalawfiawtran1.ht (date accessed:
June 30, 1999).

-

L'6 For instance, The Opium War (1839 - E842); Taiping Rebellion (1851 - 1864); The Hmdred Dags'
M o r m (June I f , 1898 - September 21,1898); Repubiican RevoIution of 1911: Anti-Iapanese War (1937
- L945); Civil War between Nationaiism and CornmimiSm (1920s - L940s).
For a detaiied iiiustrationof Chinese history, See Sondra Hamilton, "Wmdowsan Chinese History"
OnIhe: <httpYf~~~.q~111netl-jhamlchina/pageslCtiiaese-~ory~sites.h~
(date a c a s a k Imie
14, 1999) (iast modified: March 1999).
For thausands of years, China was niled by dynasty after @mty. In addition to those intenial stniggîes
and nots accomparrylng the change of dynastyp foreign invaders hclwhg Russia, Iapau and Bntain
controiled sÏ@cant parts of the countty, China h a ü y m
e a repu6lic country Î n 1912 But after
that, Chuiawas Unroived in WorId War II, engaged in territorial disputes with its neighboring countries~
and undement civil war.

institutions or d e s s holders of bearer shares voluntariIy report their share transactions to
the tax authorities, tax is more easily evaded through the structure of bearer shares than

through the structure of registered shares. The absence of bearer shares under Canadian

law may tmis refiect, in part, the Canadian govemment's recognition of, and concern over.
tax evasion problems in connection with the structure of bearer shares.
With regard to the special requirernent for Chinese promoters, state-authorized

uivestment institutions and Iegai persons to hoId registered shares, this may be seen as a
reflection of China's socialist ideology: intereas of the state or the collective are
considered more important than the intereas of individuals. Therefore, it is thought that
shares held by the state, institutions or Iegal persons should be more secure than shares
held by individuals under Chinese law.

4.1.2 Share Structures in Reality: A Unique Classification of Shares in China

The classification of registered shares and bearer shares is provided by the CCL.
in addition to this simple share classincation., another more complex classincation of
shares has been adopted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Sheiuhen Stock
~xchan~e,"'and the business communities in China This latter classification appears to
have more signiscance in determining Chuiese people's rÏght to purchase shares and seems
to have more "Chinese characteristics".

Chinese share ~Iassificationconnects shate structure with the nationaihies of the
hvestors and the jurisdiaion in which a corporation is Iisted, if its shares are Iisted on a

"?

The hanghai Stack Exchange and Shemhen Stock Exchange are the ody nationai stock exchanges in

China

foreign exchange. Shares are categorized into A Shares, B Shares, Red Chip Shares, L
Shares and N Shares.
A Shares refer to shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,

and represent ordinaty share ownership in a Chinese corporation They are available

excIusively to investors with Chinese citizenship, aIthough not to residents of Hong Kong.
B Shares have exactly the same beneficid ownership rights as do A Shares, but cm be

purchased (and held) ody by investors with foreign citizenship. B Shares are quoted in

U.S. dollar amounts on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Red Chip
Shares are tisted on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. These shares are issued by
corporations that are controiied by the Chinese govemment but that usually have been
incorporated in Hong Kong, rather than in mainland China. L Shares are shares of
corporations incorporated in mainiand China that have chosen to be listed on the London
Stock Exchange. N Shares are shares of corporations incorporated in mainland China that
bave chosen to lia on the New York Stock ~xchange."~B Shares, Red Chip Shares, L

Shares and N Shares are not tradable with A Share~.''~

The relationship between share structure, investor's nationaiity and the juns~ction
in which a corporation is Iisted (if its shares are liaed on a foreign exchange), appears to

reflect the fact China is subject to foreign exchange control. Foreign currency is not
negotiabIe in China China's currency - Renmingbi - and foreign currency are not fieeIy
convertible in China Moreover, the isolation between A Shares and the other categories

For a brief desCnption in En@4 see B.M. Vandegrift, W a b g Deah in China"
(N~vembef/Decemk L998) Onliner ABA Section of Boenes Law - Business Law Taday
<httpdhww.abanetorghusiaw/8-2chinshünb (&te accessed:Iune L5, 1999).
'19

B siiares, L Sbarrs and N Shares are designed to attract fore@ capital to imiest in Chinest
corporations. wide Red C6ip Shares play the role ofattractingcapitat h m Hong Kong

of shares derives fiom the government 's reluctance to d o w foreign capital to control the

Chinese equity market.

The capitai of those corporations listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges (Le. corporations with A Shares structure), is fùrther categorized into State
Shares (shares held by the state), Legal Person Shares (shares held by a Iegd person'20
established in China), Employee Shares (shares held by employees of the corporation)'*'
and Socid hiblic Shares (or Individual Shares, i.e. shares held by individuai investors

other than the employees of the corporation).'"

The classification of shares in China in accordance with hvestors' nationality
(Chinese citizen or foreign citizen) directiy refleas the govemment's cautious attitude
toward the privatization process and its concems over foreign capital in the Chinese
market. The m e r classification of A Shares depending upon whether the holders are the
state, legai entities, or individuais incikates the governmentrsanxiety about the relative
proportion of capital controlled by the public and private sectors in the market. One of

the features of socialism is that public capital (as opposed to private capital) should always
be in the rnajority position.'"

lm

Employing this cornplex classification method enables

Supra note 108.

"'

Employee S h e s are issued through intanal offerings and sold at a discount or may take the fom of
bonus shares without any charge to the employees, They are not tradabie in the secondary market.

'= UNally state shares and le@ person shares constitute the majority of the A Shares Lnarket

See Fang Liafang, "China's Corporatization Experimentn (1995) 5 Dnke h Comp & MIL. 149 ai 200

212.

'"

-

See paragraph L (2) of "Decisionofthe Communist Ekty of C h Central CommXttee on Some Issues
Concernnlg the Establichment of A Socjalist W
e
t Economic Structurew (adopted on November IJ,
1993 by the T M Plenary Session ofthe L4ih Centrai Commhe of the C6uiese CommWtiSt Party)- For
the En@
version, see (1993) 3 6 Beijing Review, No-47- 12 at 12 - L3,
Ttie sociaiÏst market economic structure is ünked wit6 the basic system ofsociallsm, The estabkhmmt
of thh stntctme aimsr at enab&
the market to play the fimdamentai mie in resonrce allocation urufer
maclpeconomic control by rhe state To tum this goal hto neaIity, it is necessary to uphoId the princrple

Chinese authonties to maintain a very cIear view of the stahis of public ownership m

China's equity markets.
Thus though CCL's provisions regarding share structures more or less adopt
western corporate expenences, the classification of share structures in China's business
realny moves away Eom capitalist countries' corporate practices.

4.1.3

Corporate Ownership Structures in Canada and China

By subsmiing for shares, investors become the owners of shares of the

corporation. The power of the shareholders to exert influence upon or control the
corporation &ses From shareholders ownership of shares.

In

order

to

understand

thoroughiy the shareholder's role in the corporation, and especialIy shareholders' statutory

rights provided by the CBCA and CCL, one has to examine current corporate ownership
structures in Canada and China. The following examination of corporate ownership
structures in Canada and China indicates both cornmon features and differences. Both

Canadian and Chinese corporate markets are dominated by closely-held corporations.
Both corporate markets have high ownership concentration. Moreover, Canada has high
overlapping ownership of corporations and that, ui turn, restdts in high overlapping
directonhips. In terms of employee ownership, though it is far fiom developed, China
seems to prefer to diversifl state ownership through empIoyee shares.

A

Common Features: Domuiance of Closely-heId Corporations and High Ownership
-

- -

of t a h g the pubIic@ ownedsector as the maïmîay, whilt striving for a simdtaneous deveiopment of aü
economic sectors, - --"(emphasis added).

Concentration in Canadian and Chinese Corporate Market

In the Canadian corporate market, the closely held corporation is the

It is

the same in the Chinese market.Iz5 Though publicly heId corporations may have certain

economic significance in both Canadian and Chinese nationai economies, the quantity of
closely held corporations no doubt outweighs that of publicly heid corporations.
It is also evident that one observes Ui both Canada and China the phenornenon of

high corporate ownership concentration in public corporations. But the phenomenon
arises Eom different causes in the two countries.

High ownership concentration is a distinctive feanire of Canadian corporations. lZ6
An examination of766 Canadian corporations conducted by Rao and Lee-Sing in 1996'~

demonstrated that 55.5 per cent of Canadian corporations are legally controlled (Le. one

shareholder or a smaii group of shareholders owns, direaly or indirectiy, more than 50 per
cent of the voting shares of a corporation); 21.4 per cent are effectively controiIed (i.e.

R Daniek & I. Macintosh, "Toward A Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law kgimen (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L,1.863 at 884.
According to the statistics of Shanghai Administration of hdusuy and Commerce, as of Decemkr 3 1.
1998, China had 1,189,684 closely-held corporations (Le. Iimited liability companies) and 235,073
pubIic1y-held corporations (Le-joint stock companies).
Data coliected by Mr, Zhao, Linyn ttom Shanghai Administration of Industry and Commerce in May
1999.

'"

Supra note 124 at 8&1.
Ody 14% of the corporations included in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index were wideiy heId in
1990. Of the femainderV60.3% were owned by a hgIe shareholder with kgal control (greater than 50%
of voting shares), 25.4% by one sharehofder with &ectnre controI(20 to 49-9% of voting sbares) or by
two or three shareholders haviog the ability to combine and estabhh Iegai or H i e controL
A typid example in New Brunswick k the e m p k ofK, C, lMng which bas around 300 companies and
generates about 25% of New B d c k ' s g r a s domestic product,
M a to R K Morck, "Onthe Economicsof ConcentrateciOwaefSfiipn (1996) 26 Can, Bus. L. J- 63 at 72,
In P.S. Rao & C. R Lee-SÏng, Governance Shwcture. Corporate Decision-making and Fim Perfonnmce
in North America (Tndusûy Canada, Workmg Paper Numbet 7,1996) at 6.

one shareholder or a smalI group of sharehoIden owns, directly or hdirectiy, 20 per cent
to 49.9 per cent of the vothg shares); and only 23.1 per cent are widely controlled (Le. no
sharehoIder or group ofrelated shareholders owns, directiy or ind*i.edy,more than 20 per
cent of the voting shares).

The existence of many individual or family controiied corporations in Canada has
been noted by many commentators. Some scholars have argued that endowment effects
rnight aggravate this phenomenon.'28 The endowment effea rnay make a single

controlling shareholder or related controlling shareholders more reluctant to part with
control, which in tum, increases the premium required to effect a transfer.'" Thus, the
endowment effea may make the single controlling shareholder or related controiling
shareholders decide to retain control of a corporation even though it appears economically
irrationai to do so."'
Canadian publicly held corporations aiso exhibit a high degree of ownenhip
concentration."'

A number of facts may account for the high ownership concentration

IZB

RJ.Daniels & P. Halpern, Too Close for Cornfort: The Role of the CloseIy Held RibIic Corpontion
in the Canadian Economy and Thc Implications fior Public Policy" ( I996) 26 Cm. Bus. L. I. L I at 20.
The endowment &ect Rfers to the phenomenon whereby an owner of pmperty is relunant to seli for the
price at which she or he was preparedto buy.
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Sid Wh& diverting corporate resources and corporate wealth enhancement are both actMties that
codd increase the wealth of conmihg shareholders. they may ratiouaily d i a ï r i b r u doing either since
the expendeci effort may outweigh the reaüzed benefits.

"'

See C.W. Rota "Concentration of ûwnuship and the Composition of the Board: An Examùiation of
Canadian Rrbticly-Iisted Corporations" (1996) 26 Cari, Bns. L J. 226 at 228 and 240,
[n Roth's sttxdy of 568 sarnple corporations, he found- 50%of the corporations arr tmder the ownership of
one or a snall gmup of sharehoIders, who hola directly or i n M y , 50% or more of the voàng sharrs;
26.7% are contmiieü by one or a small group ofshareholden owning direEtly or nidiredy, 20% 499%
of the voting ,
and oniy 22.2% are wibeiy-held
Ofthe 568 corporations in the sample, 503 were fisted on the Tomnto Stock Exchange. 29 wae listed on
the Montreai Stock Exchange, 14 were Iisted on the Alkrta Stock Exchange, and the remabhg BrIuded
10 over-thec~llnter
stock, 9 listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange and 2 Med on the Amencan Stock
Exchange.

-

observed in Canadian corporations. The emergence of Uistitrrtiond shareholders as
controlling shareholders in publicly-held corporations is one explanation. Rao and LeeSingts research shows that institutional owners control about 38 per cent of the dollar

value of shares in

Thus the dramatic increase of total equity holdings by banks,

life insurance companies, t w e e d pension plaw, trust and mortgage Ioan corporations and
investmem h d s over the past two decades in anad da,'^ has resulted in such institutional
investors becorning controllmg shareholden in large public corporations.13* Second, as
mentioned in chapter 2 above, the Canadian economy is resource based. A low value
added resource-based economy may require a high degree of consistent corporate policy

and management to retain the wlnerable value of the corporations."' The concentration

In

Supra note 127 at 9.

ln I. G. Madntosk "Institutional Shareholders and Corpomte Gowrnance i
n Canada" (1996) 26 Cari.
Bus. L. J. 145 at 147.
"Total equity hotdùig of banks, lifk insurancc companies, tnisteed pension plans, tnist and mortgage Ioan
corporations, and investment fun& grew (in constant 1986 dollars) h m W-7 billion in 1969 to about f 85
billion in 1990. Then: has been signrficant growth in equity hoIdings in soma sectors even since 1990.
For example. between 1990 and 1993 the constant dolIar value of equity holdings of investment h d s
more than doubledi More generally, the constant dollar d u e of institutionaI equity holdings has
dramatically in-d
over the past two decades.. .
Life insurance companies heId oniy 2.58% of their portfoiios in equities in 1963. Aithough there have
been ups and doms beîween 1963 and 1992, the proportion of the portfolio devoted to equities hit a high
of 19.7% in the bull market of 1992...The proportion of the aggregate portfolio of vusteed pension pians
held in Canadian equities increased fiom 17.9% in 1969 to 23.14% in 1990,,.Fortrust and mortgage and
loan corporations. equity hoIdings as a percentage of the totai portfolio i n d h m 2% in 1969 to just
over 2.5% in 19%. .. In 1969, 1.59% of the aggregate bank portfoIio was heïd in eqtiities, and in 1994,
1.32%. However. banic equity holdings went as high as 5,18% in 1980. Since 1982 there has been v e q
lit& change. "
134 In Cana& the aseu of pension and munial huids have increased more ihan 35 times in vahe since
the mid-70~- Pension h d s
the $49-bibn Caisse de Depot, the $53-bi&on Ontario Teachers'
Pension Plan Board, and the $30-billion Ontario Municipal Employes' Retirement Fuad), and mutuai
h d s are the biggest eqoity holders.
See TSE News Release, "'How and Wny Corporate Governana is Changing WorIdwideT- Toronto Stock
Exchange Resident RowCand Remiag remarks to the International Cotporate Governane Conference in
San Francisco - Iuly 9,1998" TSE Online:
~ h t t p : l / t s e . c o m / ~ g i - b i a / u n i ~ ~ c g i ? ~ 0 n t e ~ ~ n ~ - r e I / n e w(date
s ~ O 3accesseb:
6 ~ h ~ Apnf

23,1999)-

"'

Udike other corporations, for instance, smalI corporations ptoyiding services, may change corporate
poticy vexy often in order to keep paœ with constantly changhtg madcets or to kmk for high d u e addexi

of ownership within a corporation is more iikeIy to ensure a reIativeIy consistent corporate
policy and management. Third, Canada may have a reIativeIy Iow-cost debt system-136
so, Canadian controiling shareholders wodd be able to access capital &out
equity.13'

~f

the sale of

Fourth, the structure of non-voting shares or restncted voting shares allowable

under the CBCA"~and existing shareholders' pre-emptive rights to purchase equityl" aiso
may contribute to the high ownership concentration in Canada F i a in a country with

vast geographicd space and lunited populatios a politicai need for establishing an
integrated national economy rnay invite a high ownership concentration in the
corporation. "

In the case ofchina, accordhg to the statistics of the Shanghai Administration of
Industry and Commerce, as of December 3 1, 1998, China has 1,189,684 closely-held
corporations and 235,073 publicly-held corporations. in Shanghai, as of December 3 1,
1998, there are l2,8 19 closely-held corporations and 1,663 publicly-held corporations.14'
products andior senrices. Corporations in the resource sector usually are large enterprises. Consistent
corporate policy and management in these corporations engaging in low value added pmducts andior
seMces is more common than in maIl corporations.

'"

Supra note L28.
Professor Christopher C. Nicholls of Dalhousie Law S b 1 has suggesta tIUs is a c0ntr0v~a.lpoint
and, ultimateiy, one h t can onty be res01ved tbrough empincai researcb, The basic idea is that the
concentrated Canadian banking system facilitates monitoring of business. and therefo~.by ceducing
defauit nsk, Iowers the o v M cost of debt fllli~nce- if this concIusion is correct we wodd observe
diaetences between the capital structures of Canadian and US corporations. Specificaliy, Canadian
corporations wodd have more debt on their balance sheets than otherwise comparable US corporations.

13'

CBCA s.24.

13'

CBCA s28(I). Aithough pre-emptive rïghts a~ not obligation, they may k adopted by CBCA

corporations,

'" Supra note 128 at 33.
'*'Data collecteci by Mr. Zhao. Liayn from Shanghai Admiaisna
. - tion of Industry and Commerce in May
1999.

High ownership concentration k s t s in both closeIy-held corporations and publicly held
corporations.'"
Unlike Canadian corporations, Chinese corporations have a high statdpublic
Though there are few family controIIed corporations in
ownership c~ncentration.'~~

China, there are many wholly state-owned enterprises. One of the purposes of adopting
CCL was to "corporatize" state-owned enterprisedu and sel1 part of the shares of such
state-owned corporations to their employees a d o r the public with a view to increasing

the eficiency of most Ioss-making state-owned enterprises.'4'

Wtth statdpublic

ownership playing a predorninant role in the Chinese economy,'" it is not surprising to

find high statefpublic ownership concentration.
Further, unlike in Canada, institutional shareholders in China pIay vimially no role
in controlling corporations since investment banks, We insurance companies, pension
ninds and mutual h d s are d institutions that are stil1 new to the Chinese people.

Moreover, some of these institutions operate in China in a way that is totally different
fiom theu counterparts in the western wor~d.'~'

'"

More detailed information on ownership concentration is not available.

143

StatdpubIic ownership, as opposed to private ownership, cefiers to state ownership and coIIective
ownership.
t a

That k, tuniing stateilwned enterprks into sharehoiding companies so as to diverSifL the ownership
structure of the enterprises,
145

See paragraph 2 (6)of "Decisionof the Communist Party of China Centrai Cornmittee on Some Issues
Concerning the Estabhhment of A SociaIist Market Economic Stnicture" (adopted on November 14,
1993 by the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese Commnnist Party). For
Engiish version, see (1993) 36 Beijing Review. No.47, L2 at 15.

'"

-

-

See the chart Structurai hdiciftmon Nationai Ecommic and SoQaI D~rcIopment as shown in
4.1-4 B (5)14?

As to instinitioml imrest~rs~
professor Fang Lmfang descriaed insatutionaiimrestors as trade & o ~
the Commnnist Youth Leaguq or the Women's Federation with b d s taised h m its members, a
conception totaIIy dfnerent h m Canadian commercial institutionai imrestors. AccordÏng to professor

Consider the example of pensions. The Chinese governent is now trying to
establish a multi-pillar pension system which, according to the State Council's 1995 The
Directive on Further Reform of the E n t e m e Pension System, involves fiinds contniuted
by the state, employers, and i~tdividuals'~~
to resolve the problem of offering pension

benefits to Chinese employees left by years of a planned economy in C

h The pension

is managed by the socid insurance departments of provincial govemments and s u p e ~ s e d

by the Ministry of Labor and its delegated bureaus. The pension fiind is now only investing
in government bonds (rather than equities) in the Chinese capital markets. Accordingiy,
the composition and operation of pensions in China are totdy dEerem nom those of
Canadian pension fûnds which are more in the nature of private hnds and private
investments.

In addition to the Eicts of histoncal economic development as descriied in Chapter
3 above and the business reality in China as disdosed in 4.1.4 B (5) above, this country's

socidist ideology also contributes to the phenomenon of high statdpublic ownership
concentration because according to sociaiist theory, public economy (rather than pnvate
economy) should be in the dominant position in a soQalist country.

Moreover,

cornpetition with large companies fiom other countries in the giobal market is dso a factor
that contniutes to a high state/public ownership concentration in China The idea that
Fang, mider the name ofthe institutions (Letrade tmions, the Commist Youth League, or the Womeds
Federation) corporationsthat are not qnalined to make pnbIic ~Eeringson,indirectfyr issue theu shares
to individuais other than their employees.
See supra note 122 at 207198

Fuads h m employers and empIoym toge* conaïtute about 10-20 per cent of an anployee's totaI
wages. Ofthis IO - 20 percent, employgs have ta conaiboteabout 2 - 5 percent of their own wages
By the third qyuter of 1995, about 81 milIion wodrcrr and 21 miIlion retireesin C h î had
~ particÏpated
in the pension scheme.
J. bb morid Bd), "China's Ecowmic Reiom in the 1990s" (lantiary 1997) onime:
<httpY/members.aoLmd~ew/cfiapLLhtm>
(date accessed- Iuoe 26, t 999).

Cbese corporations should be large in order to compete with other large foreign
corporations coupled with the fact that the Chinese equity market is undeveloped so that
the state is the major source of corporate equity capital results in high statdpubiic

ownership concentration in China.
Mixed-ownership corporations (that is, corporations with a hi& degree of
statdpublic ownership and a Iow degree of private ownenhip) represent a compromise
between socialism and a fiee economy. In the words of Dirnock commenting on Canadian
mixed-ownership corporations, such corporations represent a "compromise between

kzissez-fàire economics and so~ialisrn".'~~
The CCL emerged Eom and reflects China's
transitional economy

-a

sociaiïst market economy whkh is based on a compromise

between two confiicting concepts: market economics and sociaiist ideology.

The

partnership of public and private capital within a singe business organization and the
resuiting, the stniggie to achieve a bdance between a corporation's social hction and the

profit-maxirnization god affects the rnodel of corporate controi in China.

B

DEerent Features: OverIapping Ownership in Canadian Corporate Market and

Employee Ownership in Chinese Corporate Market

In addition to the common features of Canadian and Chinese corporate markets,
(Le. domination of closeIy-Md corporations and high ownership concentration in public

corporation^)^ there are different charactensttks between Canadian and Chinese corporate

markets in tems of overlapphg ownership and emphyee ownership.

'"

MBSnB1IDimockVsworcited by S. B r o o k Who'sUr Charge? Thp Maed Ownemhip Corporation
in Cmada (Caoada: The Institute for Resean& on Riblic Po.iicy. 1983) at 11.

The Canadian market is characterized by highIy interconnected corporate
relationships due to signincant inter-corporate ownership patterns in Canada. This, in
nini, leads to a high degree

of overlapping directorships in anad da'^* Overlapping

directorships raise issues regarding the accountability of corporate boards. This issue will
be addressed in 4.2 befow.

In terms of employee ownenhip, although the concept of employee share

ownership pIans originated in North ~menca,'~'
Chinese refonners were attracted by this
concept and believed it could offer hope of improved corporate performance. The
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges require d l listed corporations to disclose

employee ~hares.''~ The use of intemal employee shares has become one of the measures
for refomhg and reorganizing state-owned corporations, since it ailows corporations to
borrow capital fiom their emp1oyees.'" share ideas and information with employees and is
an incentive device for the corporations to enhance employees' cornmitment to their
. -.

--

'" Supra note 124 at 888. "Ofthe top one hundred most profitable companies in Canada in 1987. dose to

45 per cent heîd IO per cent or more of the voting shares of ariother Company on the Lia..296
. of 1023
directors M d two or more appointments. 71.1 per cent of thcse [one hundred most profitabIe cornparilpariles
in Canadaf board appointments were held by directors with oniy one appointment, 17.5 per cent by

directors with two appoùitments, and I 1.4 pet cent by directors with the threeor more appointments."
See a h , S. D. Berkowitz cf aL,Royal Commission on Corporare Concenmiort St@ lVo.17: Enterprise
Structure and Corpome Concentration pî Technical Report) (Ottawa: Mininet of Suppiy and Services
Canada, 1977) at 15; and
J. C. Bailfie, "Cornments of a Business Lawyer on Rufes Governing Boards of Canadian Ribiic
Corporations" (1996)26 C m Bus. L. J. 127 at 128,

'" The employeestockownership pIan concept was devdoped in the United States in the 1950s by Iawyer
and irrvestment banker Lotis K e b , who argued that the capitaIist system wodd be snonger if aiI
workers, notjust a few stockhoIders, couid rharP in owning capital-produchg assets. ui L973, Keko
convinceci Senator RusseII Long chairmanof the tax-writing Senate fi~liinceCornmittee, that tax bendits
for the empioyee ~ o d ownership
c
pian shootd k pennitted and encouraged under empfoyot ben&< law.
See "A Short Elhory of the ESOP" Ooline: The National Center for Employee Ownership
<httpJîm-nceo.orgflibracy/histoty.
(date a c d A p d 22,1999).
'%

~

eto ~ru p m
note 121.

This is vny cormnon EmpIoyee shares have not oniy kenaccessed €ymanagers but aiso by othcr
workers and staff

corporate ernployers.
But the development of employee ownership in China is fa from mature compared
with similar instiMions in North henca.'"

Currentiy, in China empIoyee share

ownership plans are used maioly as a channel for corporations to raise capital since it is
costiy to borrow capital in Chinese capital markets.

ui North America, such plans are

use& instead, for creating a work force of emp~oyee-owners;"5buying shares tiom

departhg shareholders of a closely-held corporation; creating an ernployee benefit
divesting or acquiring subsidiaies; buying back shares 6om the market; and as a takeover
defen~e.'~~
In Canada, most provinces have promulgated legisfation providing substantial
tax credits for investment
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in employee

Associations have been established for

Canadian statistics in respect of empioyee ownership are not avaiIable.

IS5 "A Brïef Introduction to Employee Owncrship" OnIine: The Nationai Center for Employee ûwnefship
<http:/fwwwnceo.or~hfary/Ir'brary.html~(date accessed: A p d 22, 1999). There arc about 15,000
companies in the U.S. that share ownership broadIy with employees. Over 10,000 of these are ESOPs
(Empfoyee Stock h e r s h i p Plans).

In "An Owrview of ESOPs, Stodc Options, and Employee Owaershipn Online: The National Center for
Employee Ownership <hnpdf~-nca>.o@%rary/werViewhmit> (date aaessed: Apriï 22,1999).

"* -Growth of Employee Ownership Aderates Rapidiy in U.S. and Ab& (May 1997) Onhe: The
National Center for Emphyee Owaership, ~httpYiwww.nçeo.orgfi'bcary/growth,htmi~(date accessed:
Aprü 22, t 999). For instance, the governent of Manita encourages empIoyee owc1ership. PIease see
"Economic D d o p m e n t Boardr Framework for Economic Growthm0-e:
Goverumem of Manitoba,
Canada<h<tp://www.govmbb.caiboar&(date acassxt Apni 22 1999). For Bntish CoImnbïa, pIea~ese
'EmpIoyee Share Ownenhip Program GuidehemOnliae: ~http~/Www.kb.sb.gov.bc.ca/~p~&h~
(dateaccessed- ApriI 22, L999)-

researching employee share ownership in anad da.''^ But nationdy, there are no federal
laws or regulations at the time ofwriting that specincalIy encourage the deveIopment of
employee share ownership. Chinese authorities, however, recentiy have signded the need
for caution in M e r ùicreashg employee share ownership since significant employee
share owaership in a corporation means that if a corporation fds to survive, the
employees rriight lose not only their jobs but dso th& savings.

4.1.4 Voting through Shares at Shareholden' Meetings: The Majority Rule

The above sections have presented comparative examinations of share structures
and corporate ownership structures in Canada and China

Notwithstanding that

shareholders' controlling influence power over corporate policy and management

m ses

tiom their ownership of shares, it is through votuig that shareholders exercise their rights
and exen their power.

The right to vote is the most essential right by whkh shareholders participate in
and control the c~r~oration.'~'
The number of votes that a shareholder has is determined
by the type and number of shares he/she hoIds. Through voting, shareholders are able to
register with the corporation their views about the conduct of the corporation's business.

in Canada, such nght is regarded as a kind of proprietary right and, in the case of federdy

' 5 9 For instance, Employee Share Ownership and investment Association; and nie ESOP (EmpIoyee
Share Ownership P h ) -ation

'"

Chma Secnrities Regdatory Cornmittee on November 25, 1998 isued a notice to local peop1e.i
goverment to cestn*ct the issnanœ of imemat empIoyec shares withui public corporations- Onlùle:
SecurïtiesTimes, ~http9/www.Secuntiestimes.mm.Cn/zcf~-L991US.htmD (date a
m Ime 2 1,
1999) in Chineseversion

incorporated corporations, it is specificdy rmgnkeci by the C B C A ' ~ Though China

has not clearly defîned the cight to vote as a propnetary right, nevertheless, shareholders'
Bght to vote is legaiIy protected. '63

A

CBCArsMajority Rule: Democracy Based on Capital

(1)

Shareholders' Statutory Power under the CBCA

Under the CBCA shareholders, through shareholders' meetings and by voting,
have the power to elect and remove directors;'@ approve fbndamentai corporate changes
including (but not limited to) amendments to articles and amalgamation,'6s a continuance

a change in the by4aws,'" a sale of aIi or
under the Iaws of another junsdi~tion,'~~

substantiaily ail of the assets of the corporation;

and to appoint and remove auditors.'61

Directors must, at the annuai meeting present shareholders with the annual
financid statements."O Relyïng on the financiai reports, shareholden review the corporate
performance, the perfomance of directors and other corporate agents.

'" CBCA

S.

IJO (LI.

'" Articie 106 of CCL.
'" CBCA rs.106 (3) and 109 (1).

'" CBCA gin (1) and 183.
166

CBCA ~ 1 8 8 .

'* CBCA s,103.
CBCA r189 (3).
169

CRCA ss. 162 (1) and 165 (1).

'mCBCA s.155 (1).

In addition, CBCA sharehoIders dso have the right to make proposais relatùig to
the articles or by-laws, or any other matter in cornedon

with the business and a f f i s of

the corporation to be discussed at shareholders' meetings,"' to appoint pro>cy-ho~ders,'x
and to access certain corporate idionnation'"

The right of each shareholder to make a

proposal d1ows shareholders to initiate discussion and express their concems with the
corporate management. Proposais cannot be easily ignored by managers since the CBCA
requires that proposais be heard, considered and voted upon by the constituency of
shareholders. '74

(2)

Voting: One Share, One Vote

Shareholders most frequentiy exercise their statutory power as discussed above
for conuoliing the corporation or registering their preferences through voting at
shareholders' meetings. The generd d e of voting in CBCA corporations, unless the
articles provide otherwise, is one share, one vote,"' a rule that effectively establishes a
shareholder democracy based on capital. Because the CBCA p e r d s a corporation to
have diffierent classes of shares with different vothg rights (Le. voting shares, non-voting

shares, or super-voting shares subject to provisions in the article^),"^ Canadian

'" CBCA ss. 137 (1) and 103 (5).
'" CBCA S.148 (1).
CBCA s-2L (1).

CBCA S. 137.

'" CBCA S. MO (1).
'76

CBCA S. 140.

corporate decision-makm have the opportmity of raising a large amount of equity

without fosing controt. ln

(3)

The Majority Rule

SharehoIders v o ~ operates
g
on the basis of majority de, a concept stemming

nom political democracy practices. That means shareholders with a majori~,of voting
shares govem the c~rporation."~Majority ntle is a doctrine based on the theory that
corporations are capitaIist institutions and shareholders are property owners of shares.

In a widely-held public corporation, shareholders' democracy cannot be realired uniess

members of the shareholder group become active participants in corporate We. In a
public corporation with hi& ownership concentration and in a closely-held corporation,
the majonty mle relates more to the discretion of the controiiing shareholder or a smaü

group of controIIing shareholden.
However, majority nile under the CBCA is not absolute. It is mitigated by a

Voting rights within a dass, however. must be eqpai. See Bowater Canadiarr Ltd v. R L- Crain hc.,
(1988) 62 0.R(2nd)752 (CA).
in this case Houiden J.A said "if the= was no equdity of rights within a class of sharehoIders, there
wouid be geat opportunity for fraud,,,".
WiUi regard to some fiiadamental changes (e.g the sale of aiî or substantiaüy ail the property of the
corporation), each share cam*es the right to vote regardles of whether the share is normaUy a voting
share- See CBCA S. 188 (6).
Moceover, such changes may hâve to be approved separately by the hoIda ofezicfi üass by a majority of
not less than two-tfiirds of the votes cast in respect thereof: See CBCA S. I89(3).

'* This cootnbutes to the high concentration of omership in Canadian çorporations. m e r factors that
account for this phenomenoa M u d e Canada's cesource bas& economy, a potiticai need for estabIiching
an Inregratai national economy in this country owÏng to the combination of its vast geographicaï spaœ
and hiteci population, and the:emergence of institutionaishareh01ders~
See4.1.3 B (1) in this thesis.

number of statute-based minority sharehoIder protection rernedies, such as cIass veto,17'
the appraisd remedy,lm voting protections for minority shareholders (such as cumulative

voting and class-elected directors), 18' derivative'"

or personal actions and the

oppression remedy.'"

(4)

The Reality

Shareholders' power in controiiing a corporation in reaiity depends on the type of
corporation, provisions under corporate law and the artides or other contraaual
documents. Since the CBCA dictates that the directors shodd manage the business and

affin of the corporatioR1" Canadian shareho1dersypower in controlling the business of
the corporation is Iargely reduced particularly in the case of large widely held public
corporations (see Appendix II - A). Most shareholders in large widely heid public
corporations are rnînority sharehoIders and are uninterested in corporate affairs given the
s m d amount of weaith they Uivea in the corporations. Thus, corporate controlting

CBCA S. 176.
160

CBCA s.190. The appraisai remedy p e d t s dissenthg minority shareholders to opt out of the
corporationand teceive fair compensation.
IgL C d a ù v e voting assures that minority shareholders can hase s a w representation on the board For
a description of cumulativevoting, see CBCA s IO? and supra note 42 (DidersonReport) pm.76 at 216.
For dass voting, see CBCA ss.i 1I(3) and (4).
In order to prevent majority shateho1ders from hpugning the cumulative votïng and c k voting rights,
CBCA S. 107(g) and t09(1), (2) pmvide backup roies for enfiorcing these rights by minonty

shareholders.
CBCA s.239.

'"

<IBCA s.241. The definition of "Comph.ümtnin s.238 of the CBCA guaramees sharehoidersthe ng6t
to commace a derÏvative and oppression action.

CBCA S. L02 (1).

power more often lies in the han& of corporate management. The chief execufive
officer, depending on Wher specinc d e in such corporations, very oflen becomes the
defacto corporate governor. AIthough a more flexible management structure is alfowed

through a unanimous shareholder agreement7 such a device is Iimited to closelyheld

corporation^,'^^ &en that it is hardIy possibIe to get a unanimous agreement among
numerous sharehotders.
In the case of a public corporation with high ownership concentration, which is a
distinctive feature of Canadian corporations, a relativeiy small group of sharehoIders or

perhaps a single controlling shareholder may legaily or effectively hold a majority of

voting shares and so be able to exercise decision power. Even shareholders who o w

directly or indirectly as littie as 20 per cent of the voting shares of a corporation can
often exercise considerable power in the absence of other major controlling shareholders
(see Appendk iI - B).
In the case ofc1oseIy-held corporations7sharehoIders are able to direct corporate
business simpIy because shareholders more otten are wilIing and eager to become the
corporate management memben given that most of the shareholders' wedth Îs typicaily
put into such corporations (see Appendk II - C).
An examination of the three types of corporations in Canada Ieads to the following

conclusion: fiom the shareholder's perspective, the more concentrated capital (represented
by voting shares) that is contriiuted mto one corporation, the greater the corporate

decision power that can be obtained in such corporation. The corporate controlhg power
is cIoseIy associated with the amount of equity capital Ïnvested.

Supra note 42 (Diclterson Report) at 70.

( 1)

Shareholders' Stahitory Power under CCL"~

Compared with the CBCA, CCL vests shareholders with more extensive powers.
It is clearly stated under CCL that the shareholders' meeting is the most powerful organ in

a corporation.'"

In terms of shareholders' statutory power, CCL provides that the

shareholders have the power to decide business policy and the investment plan of the
corporation;'8s to examine and approve the annual financial budget plan and final accounts
plan;1" to adopt resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds;1g0to adopt resolutions on

rnerger, division, transformation, dissolution and ~iquidation;'~'to adopt resolutiow on

increase or reduction of the registered capital of the corp~ration;'~~
to arnend
constitutional documentation;lm and, more notably, to examine and approve plans of

Ig6 It shotdd be noted that FIEs in China do not have the institution of shareholders' meetings. The board
of directors is the most powerfUlorgm in FIES and statutorily has the right to decide ail corporate matters.

Articles 37 and 102 of CCL.

'" Article 38 (1) of CCL.
Ig0

Article 38 (9) of CCL.

19'

Article 38 (1 1) of C U .

M d e 38 (8) of C U . Reginenxi c a p h i of a limiteci EabiIiiy company cefers to the amount of the
paid-up capitai contnhtion of ait of its shareholders as registered with the state company registration
authority (see Article 23 of CU). Registered capital of a joint stock Company r e f i to the totaI amount of
the paid-up capital as registereâ wÏth the -te company registrationanthor@- (see Article 78 of CCL).

distribution of profits and recovery for 1 0 s s e d ~ Many
~
of the shareholders' statutory

powers as listed above are reserved for management in a CBCA corporation
Shareholders' power over managerid matters also includes the power to examuie
and approve reports of the board of directors and the supervisory board"' and to elect and

remove members of the board of directors or members Eom the supervisory board who
represent the shareholders, and to set their remuneration.'%
In the case of a closely-held corporation (i.e., a Limited Iiability corporation
incorporated according to CCL), share transférs to outsiders (that is any third party other
than the shareholders of the corporation) mua be approved by the shareholders'
meeting. IW This provision has recognized the reaiity that closely-held corporations are, to
some extent, more like partnerships since tn~st between corporate members largely
decides the fate of such corporations. Such share transfer restrictions are an e f f i v e
means for shareholders to controt closety-held corporations, maintain a corporation as a
close corporation and ensure continuity of the corporation.lg8

(2)

Voting: One Share, One Vote

Shareholden of corporations incorporated under CCL exercise their natutory

'" Artide 38 (IO) o f C a

"

It is noted tbat restrictionon transfers of sbares in a dosefy-heId colporation is also anticipateciby the
CBCA See CBCA S.6(I)(d), 49(8), and 173. nie CBCA Rpoircs any limitation on the s h a transfér
~
to be included in the articles of incorporation or artidesofil~~lendment,

power as mentioned above through voting. Like the concept of shareholder's democracy
adopted by the CBCA, the general voting d e under the CCL is aIso one share, one
vote.lg9 Adoption of this principle uidicates that the Chinese government and Iawmakers
recognize capitalism in the context of corporate management and are prepared to abotish
the traditional sociaiist enterprise management model,

characterized by aate

administrative intervention in the management of enterprises. Moreover, CCL permits
shares to carry different voting nghts. In this regard, Chinese corporate decision-makers,

Iike their counterparts in Canada, are able to raise certain equity without sacrificing
control position

(3)

The Majority Rule

Majority rule is aiso recognked under the CCL.~''

Though practicdy the aate

and business community have provided for a unique classincation of shares as descnied in
4.1.2 above, theoreticaily, the legai commmity in China prefers to categorize shares into

ordinary shares and preference shares, a classification similar to that of Canada. Ordmary

shares constitute the residuary class in which is vested the right to receive dividends and
the right to receive distribution of the assets of the corporation upon a winding up or

uisolvency after the speciai rights of other classes, if any, have been satisfied. Within
ordinary shares, distinctions might be drawn by dividing them into different cIasses of
shares with different nghts. But generaiiy, oniy ordinary shareholden can have voting
ArtÏde 1O6 of C U ,

rn ArticIes 106 and 107 of CCL,

rights and vote on al1 rnatters presented at the shareholders' general meetings. The voting

is operated on the basis ofmajority d e . In case of hdarnentai changes, nich as merger,
division, dissolution, or amendments to articles of association (correspondhg to articles of
incorporation under the CBCA), not Iess than two-thirds of the votes are needed.*O1
Preference shares are types of shares that coder on the holden some preference over
other classes in respect either OP dividends or of repayrnent of capital or both. Preference

shareholders can ody have rights to vote in relation to matters that affect their rights (e-g.,
the corporation fding to pay dividends as presmbed by the corporate constitution) or

after the occurrence of specified events.
e
Politicaiiy or economicaily, majority nile is often deemed a democratic p ~ c i p l in

both capitalist and socialist countries. Shareholdersrdemocracy, however, is largely based
on shareholders' abaity to comprehend hancial reports of the corporation. If most
investors are not able to grasp the meaning of corporate information, majority nile will
have its drawbacks in tems of emphasizing "quantity rather than qudity".202The fact in
China is that most Chinese individuai investors (most of them are household investors)

may not have the abiIity to understand fiindamentai hanciai terms. Therefore, they rnay
not be able to make reasonable decisions even if they are presented with full, accurate, and
timely corporate idormation. Of course, it is aiso not clear to what ment individual

Canadian hvestors cm actuai1y understand corporate information or make reasonable
informed deùsions when they are presented with compIex corporate thanciai information
However, even assuming b a t most Canadian mvestors are not able to comprehend

K I. Glaskelç Wemocracy for Corporatiomc Corporations A m DemocraqP in Facuity af Law,
MffiiIi University, Conference M d t h Lectmes 1994195, C ~ r p o r ~ oatmthe C ~ O Q(Uontrealr
&
McGiII University, 1995) at 500-

corporaîe financial information on their own, Canadian investors at ieast have readiIy

avaiiabIe assistance from professionai investment advisors; and thus majority d e can be
exercised in Canada of a relatively high quality. The absence of professional investment

advisors in China, however, very Iikely results in the exercising of majority nile on the
basis of "quantity rather than q ~ a i i t y " . ~

(4)

SociaIism Embracing Capitaiism?

It seems that China acknowiedges capitalism in corporate decision-making since

CCL accepts the notions of "one share une vote" and majority d e . But it is doubtfiil that
Chinese shareholders' democracy cm be solidly and purely established on the basis of
capitalism. As a socidist country, the economic reform and free market meamres adopted
by the Chinese govenunent are different tiom those that prevaii in a western

fm market

economy. Employing the wording in China's Constitution, this country is adopting a
"sociaiist market economyIr .204 Simply put, Chha is making efforts to reduce state
administrative intervention in economic iife (including in corporate Iife), while still

emphasizing aate contrai in the country's economy. The control is typicaily reflected in
the predominant position of state ownenhip in China's macro-economy.

The socialist

market econorny is a state policy that embraces codicts. ReflectÏng on corporate Iaw,

ArticIe 15 Of 1993 Comtiîutiorz of the People's Republic of China- (Adopted at the F Ï Session of the
F i Nationai People's Congress and Promuigated for ImpIementathu by the ProcIamation of the
Nationaî People's Congresson December 4,1982, as amendedat the F
rrst Sessionof the Seventh National
People's Congress on ApnI 12, 1988, and again at the Fmt Session of the Seventh National People's
Congresson March 29,1993) Enis adkhie onlnie, ûnihx Mqtand University School of
Law, China Law Website ~httpf/Www.qjs.aet/chinalawhwtranLhtm>
(date aCCeSSedCCeSSed
Ime 16,1999)-

Article 4 of CCL offers an example of such conflicts. ArticIe 4 provides thaf

"'

The shareholders of a corporation shali, in their capacity of
contributors of capital, enjoy nich rights of ownen as benefiting
from assets of the corporation, making major decisions and
selecting managerial personne1 in accordance with the marni of
thezr respective capital investment in the corporation.
A corporation shall enjoy the nght fo the entzre property of the
Iegai person formed by the investments of shareholders and shaii
possess civil rights and bear the civiI liabüities in accordance with
the law.

The ownership of state-owned assets in a corporation SMvest in
the state,
(emphasis added)
The codict contained in Article 4 is obvious. ArtÏcle 4 on the one hand provides
for shareholders democracy on the basis of the capital invested by shareholders and
specifies that a corporation is a Iegal person enjoying the property right of the corporation;
on the other hanci, it clarifies that state assets in a corporation belong to the state. If the
state has titie to the assets (Le. the assets have not been soId or othemise transferred to
the corporation for consideration), how cm they be the property of the corporation? One

of the consequences of incorporation is to establish an independent legai personality. That
is, incorporation enables the property of the corporation to be clearly diainguished from
that of investors (Le. shareholders), and the investon have no direct propnetary rights to
the corporate property but merely to thek shares. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 cIearly

recognizes the independent personafity of a corporation. But paragraph 3 is in obvious
connict with the preceding two paragraphs.
PS Article 4 of CCL (En@,&

vcxsion) is axaiMIe onliat Please see China laternet Information CenterChina's Economy and its Enterprises - Economic Laws and Reguiations, < h t t p ' J / w w w . ~ o r g ~
(date accessed: Jtme 17, 1999).

Article 4 of CCL provides a specific example of China's Corporate Laws
borrowing modem corporate doctrines fiom western countries; and trying to ahgn western
corporate doctrines into China's socidkt regime. The aim of paragraph 3 of Anide 4 is
likely to mistrate fiaudulent transfers of state assets into the private sector. But it causes
considerable confiision as to the theory of independent aatus of a corporation and such
corporation's ownership of its assets. If protecting state assets cornes at the expense of
disregarding independent Iegal personality of a corporation, it is not clear that market
credibility can be f i d y established in this country. If China decides to embrace capitalism
in respect of shareholders' democracy, Chinese lawmakers should consider arnending the

sociaiist doctrine where mch doctrine is in conflict with capitalkt doctrine. One of
socialism's hndamentd doctrines regarding public property, as provided in China's
constitution is, "sociaiist pubIic property is inviolable".206 Thus, paragraph 3 of Article 4
might find its origin in this principle.

However, inviolable public property can be

protected by other means (e-g., by penaluing corruption, reprimanding the unlawfùl
transfer of aate assets, etc.), rather than through impairment of the founding principles of

mcorporation.

(5)

The Redity

The praaice ofCCL in ternis of corporate management is to spiÏt the business and
affairs of a corporation into corporate strategic matters and matters in the ordinary course

206

Anide 12 of 1993 Comtihition ofhe People's Repblfco p i n a .

of business. Shareholders, through shareholders' meetings, control the former and the
board of directors handes the latter (see Appendix III - E). Where corporate matters
require specific business skills, or types of matters reqyire fiequent decisions to be made,
or certain business matters must be handied with greater speed, the board of directors and

managerid otiicers are expected to make the decisions. In the case of more strategic
corporate matters or matters concerning greater economic significance, shareholders are

more IikeIy to make decisions themselves.
In reality, whether shareholders can have the power to direct corporate &airs
largely depends on the type of the corporations as well as particular provisions under the
laws and the corporation's articles. With regard to public corporations in China, individual
shareholders can never be controlhg shareholders because of regdatory prohibitions in
China in China, under current regulations, individual investors are not pennitted to
purchase more than 0.1 per cent of Listed public corporation^."^ Therefore, the state or
other legai persons hold the majority of voting shares in every Iisted public corporation.

In the case of a public corporation where the state holds a major@ of the voting shares
(Le. state shares occupy the dominant position in the public corporation), the state,
through its delegates who manage the corporation, exercises the ultimate decision power.

State policy is more often refleaed in the decisions of such corporations (see Appendk IIi
- A).

Other shareholders, including other companies or individuai shareholders, may be

hstrated if they want to register their dissent given that minority shareholders in China
are @en few Iegd weapons to Eght against the rnaj~rity.~~'
Artide 46 of M g 3 A&irzistrafion of Ihwinng ond Trading ofsirares TentativeRegulatiom (GuPiao Fa
fi Yu Jiao TIZan Xing Tiao Li).
See also F L Fang, "Comments:Chinanin (1997)28 L. & PoL"yt1 Bus, 897 at 897 898.

-

In the case of a public corporation where other legal persons20ghold a majority of
the voting shares (Le. Iegal person shares occupy the dominant position in the

corporation), such Iegal persons may, through their management, exercise the con~olling
power by voting and dkechng the corporate business (see Appendùc DI - B).~" But the
aate, as a minority shareholder, cm very Iikely register its opinion with the corporation
given that Iegai penons dways want to keep a good relationship with local or centrai
govenunents. Accordingly, Iegal persons usudy pay special attention to the concems of
the state. As to individual investors, they are in a disadvantageous position given that they

have neither the political influence of the state nor any effective power under the CCL to
keep the majonty shareholders in check.
In practice, shareholders' decision-making very Iikely relies on the inFormation and
recommendations provided by the board of directors and manageriai officers since most
shareholders either do not have any interea in corporate management, or lack managerial
expertise, enthusiasm or commitment to the corporation (pdcularly

when the state or

Iegal persons have diversified podolios in various corporations).*"
In the case of udined public corporations (see Appendix III - C), shareholders

usuaiiy indude the state, Iegai persons and employees. Such corporations are fiequentiy
incorporated Eom oId state-owned enterprises.

The process of privatintion typically

tums employees iato shareholders. The consequence of such an incorporation is that the
corporation can raise h d s from its employees at low cost. In addition, ernployees wiii

"Supra note 108.
"O

FOCa description of Te@

person in China, sa note 108, supra.

"' For an interesting perspectiveon these issues*sa fiang Hezi, "Annuai SharehoIders' Meetmg: The
PIaœ that SharehoIdersDisappointed", Onu'ne: Secmities

have great cornmitment to the corporation

The corporation, however, with nrch

diversified owners, often encounters competing interests. But generdy, the nate has the
greatest innuence upon corporate matters partly because of a long-term tradition and
tendency carried over Eom the management mode of state-owned enterprises.
In the case of closely-held corporations, such as sino-Foreign investrnent
enterprises (see Appendk III - D), though the FIES Laws provide that the board of
directors is the highest organ in the c~rporation,~'~
in realiw, before making major
corporate decisions relating to strategic matters, the board memben appointed by dEerent
investors aiways submit such matten to the investors.

The above anaiysis in respect of shareholders' controliing power in Chinese
corporations reveals that currently individud shareholders do not play a significant role in
corporate affairs notwithstanding the tact that shareholders generdly are given extensive
statutory power in corporate decision making by CCL. The discriminatory treatment of
individual shareholders under CCL is aiso reflected in the share structure of bearer shares
held by i n d ~ d u dinvestors. The weak position of individual shareholders arises from the
regime of China's politics and economy and culture. The sociaiist system is a regime in
which public ownership domina te^.^'^ Pnvate economy in China cannot predominate as
long as the Iaw prohibits individuds fiom becoming controlhg shareholders. In addition,
most Chinese people do not exercise their rights as investon. The notion of individual

legal cÎghts originating kom private propeay is a new concept in the Chinese culture (see

<httpYIwww-&tiestimes.com.cn/
1999) (Chinese version)

I999O6l t 8Ifwzc- O

6 14059-dzx?t htmD (date a

m : fune 18,

"'See 4.2. L .B of thisthesis- See also Artide 3 4 of Intptementation Regdations of UV Law and ArticIe
24 of ImpIementation Ruies QFCN Law.

"'supra note 123.

5.5.2 beiow). It is EeIy to be a Iong time before China's indbidual investors may be

expected to pIay a material role in controlling or infiuencuig corporateaffairs.

The reason for focussihg here on mixed ownership corporations, rather than pure
(100 per cent) private business corporations, is that in China, in terms of business

corporations (that is corporations with the objective of pursuing profits), nich mked
ownership corporations are the n o m during the nirrent transitional economic reform age.
The following chan cited from 1997 China Smistics Ye&uok

reflects the general

econornic structure of China. StrictIy speaking, references to "corporations" oniy include
the shareholding units as shown below. However, considering the private sector nature of
foreign funded enterprises, 1 have dso included reference to the convol situation of
foreign investment enterprises established according to FIES Laws in this thesis. Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan investment companies in China aiso follow the FIES ~aws,*"'
and such companies are incIuded in my discussion of foreign investment companies.
Private enterprises, that is purely private economic institutions, however, do not fall into
the shareholding structure and are not governed by China's Corporation Laws. Among
the shareholding economic units, pure pnvate business corporations (that is, corporations

without fùnds from the state) are few.*I5

Structurai uidicators on National Economic and Social ~ e v e l o ~ r n e n t : ~ ~ ~

"'ArticIe 57 of hplexnentationRules of CN Law; and Artide 85 of ImpIementing Ruia of WFOE Law.
Aithough no simirar artidesare provideci by EJV Law or hpIementùig Regdations of WV Law,
practicaUyvE N Law and Impiementing Regdations of EJV Law appiy to equity joint venntres between
Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan Inmitors and ChMese investors.

''' Howevec, 1do not have detadeci &ta on this point
216

Note: % of GDP. Cited h m chapter 2 "GeneraI Survey" of 1997 ChinaStatistical Yenrbookv(Mine:
China Statistid Miormation Network < h t t p ' I ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ s t a t s ~ g o v ~ ~ m f o r m a t i o(date
alnj97~3I~~
M y 13.1999).

Stmctun by Ownership
State Owned Units
Collective Owned Units

Joint Owned Units

Forer'Pn Funded Units

Funded by Enterprisesfrom
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan

Other Economic Units

Private Entemrise
Individual Industry
And Commerce Household Units
Fam~sEngaging in Farming,
Forestry, Animai Husbandry
And Fishing

4. I -5 Minonty Shareholders' InfIuences on Corporate Control

Although the corporation is an economic structure and majority shareholders can

more easi1y register thek discretion with the corporation, this does not mean that minority
shareholders have no influencing power over corporate business.

A

Under the CBCA

China StatÏstÏcal urformation Network <httpJ/www/wwwstats.g~OVcnliaf~rmati~a/nj97~03
IILEM)> (date
accessed: M y L3? 1999).

Notwithstandhg that the CBCA provides majority shareholders a high degree of
power to control the corporation, it dso offers muiority shareholders legal devices to
express their wilI and protect their interests in the corporation The treatment of majorityminority shareholders' relationships under the CBCA reflects a deveiopment in corporate
Iaw from an unmnrnrtigated
application of the p ~ c i p l eof majority d e to an emphasis upon

protection of minorïty interests on the bais of equity and fairne~s."~
In general, minonty shareholders have the rïght to make a proposal;2x8to

requisition a shareholders'

nee et in^;^'^

to a class veto;ZMto apply to a court

for an

investigation or inspection of the corporate affair~;~'
to dissent and appraisal;m tO initiate

a derivative actionm or personal action;n4 to clairn for an oppression remedy;"
propose the voluntary liquidation and dissolution of a

and to

In addition, the

design of cumulative voting under the CBCA enables minority shareholders of
corporations that have adopted such voting provisions to have a greater voice in the

"'Sec an analytis of the majonty-minority shareholders' relatiowhip in an early case Nmh- West
TransportafionCo. Ltd v. Beafry (1877), L2 k C. 589 (P.C.),

"'

CBCA s.131.
sW o l d e r .

That is, a sha~holderproposal. This right can be exercised by any registered

CBCA s.143. A pre-condition is that the sharehoider who intends to exuEise this right shotdd hold
not Iess than 5 percent of the corporation's voting shares.

=19

ro CBCA S. 176.

CBCA s.229.
~ 2 CBCA
2
S. 190. A dissenting sharehoIder may, under certain statutory terms and conditions. Rpuire the
corporation to pay him the fair value of the shares heId by him in case the corporation makes a major
change.
~3

CBCA ss.238 and 239-

2.24

Pender v, Lushingtort (Iâî7), 6 Ck D,70 ( C A ) ,

225

CBCA 5.24 t .

CBCA

eIection of direct or^.^
This thesis however does not purport to go through dl the rÏghts that minority
shareholders have under the CBCA for striking a baianced relationship with the majority.
Rather, it will deai with few specinc Iegal devices provided by the CBCA for protedng
mhorÏty shareholders' rights (and in some cases the interests of other corporate

stakeholders) which are particularly foreign to the Chinese people.

The CBCA appraisd right, based upon New York's Business Corporations Law,

paves a new way for bdancing the relationship between the majority and minority
shareho~ders.~
It enables shareholders to get the corporation to buy their shares at fair
value upon the occurrence of certain events which hndamentally change the corporate
constitution, such as a sale of dl or substantially ail of the assets of the business; removai,
addition, or dteration of restrictions on the business or businesses the corporation may
cany on, or of the right to transfer shares; aiteration of the terms of outstanding sectrities;

continuance in anotherjm-sdiction; and amaigamation.
The purpose for including the appraisal right, according to the Dickerson Report,

was this:
...

Instead of reIying on common Iaw standards to reshict the
conduct of majorÏty sharehdders who propose to make a
fundamentai change, the provisions in this Part confer upon a

"Supm note 42(Dickemn Report) p a i a 206 ai 73.
CBCA s-190.

"J. G.MacIntsh, The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Criticai R e a p p m w(1986) 24

OsgoodeHdI L,I, 20L at 204.

shareholder who dissents fkom the fundamental change the
pnvilege of o p h g out of the cotporation and demendhg fair
compensatirionfor his sharesS ... Mead of plachg the minority
shareholder at the mercy of the majority, these provisions p e e t
the muiority shareholder to withdraw fiom the enterprise and, if
enough minority shareholders are affecteci, to bar the proposed
change. NevertheIess, the majority shareholders can, if they go
through the proper fonnaiities, and if they pay any dissenting
shareholders effect almost any fundamentai change with impunity.
The result is a resolution of the pmblem that protecfs rnihority
shurehoIdeersfrom discrimination and at the same time preserves
flnibikty within the enterprise, pennining it to adapt to changing
business conditions.. ."O (emphasis added)
Therefore, the hnctions of the appraisal right, in the view of the Dickenon Cornmittee,
are anti-discrimination, presewing "flexibiiity",and making the CBCA "self-enforcingW."'
Moreover, the appraisal right is non-exclusive of other shareholder remediesB2
This "opting out" remedy is especialIy significant for minority shareholders of
closely-held corporations with a restricted market for their sharesD3and for dissenting
shareholders of corporations whose shares trade in iliiquid markets. To shareholden of a
broadiy traded publicly-held corporation, the appraisal right as a means of exiting the
corporation is of little value since they c m generaiIy se11 out their shares at relatively Iow
co~t."~But the vast bulk of Canadian pubtic corporations do trade in thui markets, that is,

"Supm note 42 (Dickerson Report) para 347 at 115.
Ibid para 476 at 158.
32Supra note 229 at 205. "it was designed to suppletnenf and not s u p p h t altemathe remedies COwhich
the sharehoidermight have resofi"

"

A Bnnm & M Lansky, "The Appraisai Rernedy for Dissenthg Shareholden in Canada:
EîTéctive?"(1978) 8 Man, L, 1.683 at 685.

Is It

~4 Supra note 229 at 218 - 221.
mchtosh has argueQ titing M. A Eisenberg, that in the case of public corporations with deep eqmty
markets, large sharehoIciers who are forced to seII out shares qticiciy to escape fimdamentai changes mag
realize an infcrÏotpria in the market b u s e of the hurried liquidation d the large btodc Fnrthennore,
sharehoIders may onIy be able to 0 6 t h a price for their shares that afready rdects the market's

their secinities are inactively traded."'

A risk oftrading in a thin market is that the market

pnce of securities is more readily subject to short-nui fluctuation. In such Ncumstances,
shareholders in thin markets are in greater need of the protection that is provided by the
appraisai right .D6

Though the appraisd right has certain weaknesses which will be observed in 4.1.7

B ( 1) below, given the benefits that the appmisd right offers to rninority shareholders it
has been widely adopted in the corporate statutes of moa Canadian provinces as we11 as
the CBCA.

(2)

Derivative ~ction*'

The derivative action permitted under the CBCA provides minority shareholders,

as well as other aakeholders, in Canada an effective means to initiate an action on behalf
of the corporation against directors, managena1 officers, and other third parties to redress

wrongs done to the corporation.238The legd device of the derivative action addresses the
problern that arises Eom the conflicting theories of mdependent Iegai personaiity of a
corporation and shareholder majonty rule. The availability of derivative actions promotes

anticipation of the eEect of the fundamentai change. TheMore, for shareholders of such pubiic
corporations, the appraisai right serves as protection against the cost of sale of a Iarge blo&

D.I. FowIer. C X Rorke & V. M. log, Thin Trading and Beta Esrimation Problems on the Tomnto
Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 1. Bus. Admin, 77.

~3'

z36

Supra note 229 at 2 14.
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CBCA ~~2,238,239,240,
and 242,

ra CBCA s.239,
CBCA s-238pmvides a broad defhition af "compiaÎnant". There are certain pmoadifom that a
"comglainantn has to meet More initiahg a derivatthe action

manageriai responsibiliw and accountabüity because it ensures that sharehoIders can
enforce rights to which the corporation is entitled or recover property belonging to the
corporation where managers or the directors refùse to take action partidarly in the case
of corporate mismanagement.
The derivative action is different fiom personai actions by shareholders against the
corporation. Personal actions invoive direct claïms by shareholders for damages d e r e d
by them (arising for example, tiom hadequate disclosure in an information cirdar, or

violation of proxy rights) caused by wrongdoing by the corporation. Denvative actions,
however, generdly involve claims of the corporation against third parties directed at
obtaining or retaùiing a benefit belonging to the c~r~oration."~
But the denvative action is seldom used in

The reasons are that

wrongdoing by the management of a corporation can be dficuIt to uncover when the
wrongdoers are in control of the corporation, and in any event, there may not aiways be

significant financial incentive to commence a derivative action shce the relief granted in a
mccessful derivaiive action generaIIy flows to the corporation rather than to the
complainant.

(3)

Oppression Remedy

239 McCarthy T&trau.it.,
Directors ' mrd ODcers' Duties mid Liubilities IR CMO~Q
(Toronto & Vancouver
Butterworths, 1997) at 7 1.

' ibid However, CBCA 6240 (c) fùrt21er prouides that the court may make an order dirsrmg that any
amouut adjudged payable by a defiadant in the action shouid be paid (in whoIe or in part) directIy ta
former or present secnrity hoIdersof the corporationÏnstead ofto the corporation-

The oppression remedy provides muiority shareholders in Canada with access to
the courts in cases where they have been oppressed by the majonty shareholders a d o r
corporate management. Thus, the minonty shareholders have the power to protect
themselves against the majority and so to challenge the basic tenet of corporate law that
the will of the majority mua be respected (with certain exceptions Iike f r a ~ d ~ ~In
~ )the
.
meantirne, the legislators put teeth h o the section by giwig the court the power to make
aimost any kind of order to remedy an oppressive or unfairiy prejudiciai act or use of

power. The device of the oppression remedy facilitates courts' intervention in corporate
management through potentiaily expansive interpretation of vague ternis under the CBCA,

"

such as "oppressive", "unfair" or "prejudicial".

The philosophy underlying the

oppression remedy is to allow the courts to "continue to develop the cornmon law of

The majority mie was set out in the case of Fosr v. Himbonle (1843).2 H m 46 1.67 E. R 189.
Foss v. ffurbottle mainly estabîished two propositions: f i a shareholder Ems no locus srandi to sue on
the Company's behaif where the brcach complained of was a wrong done to the company (this point is
beyond the scope of this section of the thesis); and second, majority shareholders ingenerai meeting, have,
both at common law and by the terms of incotporation of the company,power to bind the whoIe body and
dtimateiy control the destiny of the company.
See aIso SM. Beck, "An Anaiysis of Foss v. Harbotfle" in J.S. Ziegei ed Sîzidies in Cmadiian Company
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 545.
The exceptions to the so-called "ruie in Foss v. Harbottien were iisted by Jenkins L.1. in EdwcrriS v.
ffalliwell, [I950]2 A11 E X I O 6 4 at 1067 (CA):
"It has been noted in the course of argument that in cases where the act complained of is whoiiy ultra
vires the company or association the ruie lus no application.because there is no qpestion of the transaction
being c o n f i a i by any majority. It has been fiirther pointed out that where what has been done amounts
to what is genenlly caüed in these cases a/rrmd on the minor@ and the wrongdoers are themseives in
c o n r d of the company, the mie is relaxed in favor of the aggrieved minority who are ailowed to brhg
w h t is known as a minority shareholders' action on behaif of themSeIves and all others, The teason for
thïs is that, if they were denied that rÎght, their @evance codd never reach the court b p s e the
wrongdoers themseives. k i n g in controi, would not N o w the company to sue, -., There is a fllrthw
exception, ... the d e did not prevent an individual member fiom suing Ï f the autter in respect of whkh
he was siring was one whidt could validiy be done o r sanctioned, not by a simple majority of thé members
of the company or association, but only by some speczai mojorify,as, for instance, In
af a =ted
c o m p a . unâer the Companies Act, a specM tesolution dnly passed as su&
... the rule has no
application at di, for the individuai members who are suhg me,.,. in their own right to protect h m
invasion their own Ïndividual rights as members," (emphasis added)
CBCA s.241 (2) d&nes an o p p h act (or conduct) as any act or condnct "that is oppresWe or
dairiy prqudiciai to o r tbat d i L y disregards the interests ofany SeCrrnty hoIderTcreditor, directors or
officerTthe court may make an otder to rectifjr the matters compfaineû af"

responsibüity of corporate management unharnpered by the legai men created at a tirne

when courts were preoccupied with edorcing 'dernomtic' structures" &en

that very

broad quality standards can accommodate corporate Iaw in a very "fluid"

It

appears that in modern Canadian business society, it is the courts that decide many
questions ofbusiness ethics.
Such standards set by the CBCA have been the subject of criticism. It has been

argued that the application of the oppression remedy ailows the courts to violate
previously cherished tenets of corporate law, ignoring the corporate penonq extensively
re-ordering corporate affairs relying upon the judge's own assesment of the business, and
giving remedies to othen for wrongs once regarded exclusively as the corporation's
o m . 24s

It seems that a policy of laisser-faire is not acceptabIe in Canada in the latter part

of the twentieth century, and equity has gained the upper band? The disadvantage that
the oppression remedy bnngs is potential uncertainty and unprediaability in corporate

affairs. However, though the CBCA casts the oppression remedy in vague terms, the
more the oppression remedy is used by compiainants, the more it wüi become clear what
behavior is or is not acceptable to the ~ourts.~''

t44

z45

Supra note 42 (Dickerson Report) para477 at 159.

-

M A Waidron, "CorporateTheory and the Oppression Remedy" in (1981 82) 6 C m Bus. L.J. 129 at

130.

'* D. Kaafinan, "Oppression Remedies Recent Deveiopments" in L. Sama ed. Corporute Sîrucchue.
Finance and Operations (voL3) (Toronto: The CarsweIi Company Limited, 1984) 67 at 101.

'* This conchsion howeveq is based on the assumption Inat courts wilI strict@ foiiow precedent and on
art asstllllption that they wiü endeavor not m pwdc coitfïÏctÎng~dgexnents.

Cumulative Voting

(4)

Cumulative voting is a device which provides for minonty shareholders to be
represented on the board of dire~tors.*~*
As the Dickerson Report explaineci,
The purpose of a d a t i v e votuig system is to enable minority
interests to obtain representation on the board of directors by
permitting them to multiply the number of shares they control by
the number of directors to be eIected, and then to concentrate the
total nurnber of votes upon a single candidate or group of
candidates, and thereby secure the eleaion of thW n ~ m i n e e s . ~ ~ ~
In order to prevent the cumulative votuig system fiom being defeated by other devices

(such as reduction of number of directors), the CBCA further provides class vote*' and

Since cumulative voting is a device that seeks to suike a balance between the

interests of minorky and majority shareholders, it is very suitable for corporations with
high ownership concentration."

' 4 S For a derailed descriptio~
see supra note 42 (Dicicenon Report) para216 at 76 and S.G. Mackinnop
rrie Protection of Dissenthg SharchoIders" in II S1 Ziegei ed. Shcdies in mad di an Company L m
(Toronto: Butter~ortfis~
L96T)vol. t 507 at 540.

Supra note 42@idcenon Report) para 206 at 73.
CBCA s.176 (1).

"

However, the o ~ ofcumalative
e
v o h g provisions by CBCA corporations isvery rare, prrsmaably
because most coutrolIing sharehotcfersare ductant to sharethe power to e1ect the boardwÏth minority
shareholders,

(1)

The Lack of Legal Protection for Minority SharehoIders

CCL does not provide suBiCient statutory rights for the protection of minority

shareholders comparable to those provided by the CBCA Minority shareholders in China
are not equipped with statutory protection such as appraisai rights, an oppression remedy,
or cumulative voting. But a shareholder of a Chinese Company does have the nght to sue

for an uijundon and damages in case a decision of the board or shareholders' meeting
violates laws, administrative niles, or invades the legd interests of the shareholder."
CCL does not specie, however, whether the shareholder's nght to take action for

redressing wrongdoing is based upon a personal right or a derivative tight,
notwithstanding that theoreticaily the two differ significantly as analyzed in 4.1.5 A (2)
above.
In the absence of comprehensive aatutory protection for minonty shareholders, in

addition to taking a legd action, the oniy IegaI weapon Iefi for China's mùiority
sharehdders is the super-majority rule. That is, if there is a fimdamentai change to the
corporation contemplated, a super-majonty shareholders' approvai must be ~btained?~
The absence of sufficient Iegal protection for minonty sharehoIders is not
€ortuitous in China TraditiondIy, the Chinese are directed that where personai interests
are in conflia with the interests of the state or the collective, one should comply with the

Article 1I L of CCL
LU Anides 39 and 40 of CCL for dosely heId corporariox1s~
ArticIes IO6 and 107 of C U for publidy Md
cocpotati0Ils-

interests of the state or the ~olIective.*~Applying such doctrine to Chinese corporate ii£é
where individuai sharehoIdersrinterests are competing with the interests of the state or of
legd persons, the interests of the state or the legai person shouid prevaiLa6 As anaiyzed
in 4.1.4 B

(9,the state or legai persons aiways occupy a majority position in Chinese

corporations, wMe individuals are aiways in a rninority position. Thus, application of this

doctrine to Chinese corporations leads to a situation where the majority will aiways be
weii protected.

(2)

Applying CBCAtsMinority Shareholder Protection Devices

in the short-term period, it appears unlikely that China's Corporate Laws will be

reformed so as to enhance legai protection for minonty shareholden. It is unliiely
because of certain Chinese cuiturai values, involvhg disrespect for private interests,
coupled with the business reality that state and Iegai persons are invariably in the position
of majonty shareholders. ui any event, certain rights provided by the CBCA for the
purpose of protecting minority shareholders. Iike appraisai rÏghts and the oppression
remedy, are not applicabIe in China for the t h e being.
An effective appraisai right and forced share buyouts (which are the most

Requentiy granted oppression remedies under the CBCA) both require the court to make a
deteenation of the fair vdue of a holderk shares. The problem is how to assess fair
market d u e of shares in the absence of a mature market systern in China W
th few
sS The sequence Ïs that the interests of the state are *or
to the interests of the collective and to those
of indMdaatS. The collective interests are snperior to wd&i
mterests. This perspeEave is deepb
mted in the consciousness of the Chinese people who Erne recelvedcommllst edncatioa

zs

See 4.1.4 B and Appndùr ID.

sophisticated judges in China,do Chinese courts have the capacity to m e s s the fair value
of shares held by dissenting shareholders? As for derivative actions or personal actions, in
a country where people traditionaüy adopt mediation and negotiation tu senle disputes

and shy away fiom Uiitiating actions, to what extent can the availabiky of such actions
help to relieve unjust treatment imposed upon minority shareholders?

4.1.6 Summary

The above sections have examined the role of shareholders and their
con~olling/influencingpower over corporate business under the CBCA and the CCL as
well as in the business reality of Canada and China. Corporations as capital institutions
facilitate business for the capitalkt shareholders. Shares represent the interests and iiability

of shareholders in a corporation. A comparative examination of share structures under the
CBCA, CCL and China's business reality indicates that share structures are closely
comected with a nation's socid environment, statutory tradition and business redity. The

unique classification of shares in China wfiich connects shares with an Uivestor's identity,

coupled wÏth a share structure simüar to other western countries under the CCL
demonstrates that China on the one hand has sought to integrate western corporate
experiences into China's Corporate Law, yet on the other hand preserves a sociaiist regime

by caretùlIy monitoring the amount of private capital in the Chinese equiiy market.
Shareholders exercise controiiing/irnfluenciag power over corporate business
through ownership of shares. A comparative examination of Canadian and Chinese
corporate omership structures shows that Canada and China both have hi& owuership

concentration and that cbsely-heid corporations domniate Canadian and Chinese

corporate markets. Moreover, Canada has a high degree of interlocking ownership and
directorships and China is now taking cautious steps toward developing employee s

h

ownership. The common characteristics of Canadian and Chinese ownership structures in
corporations may mean that each country wiU be able to leam lessons fiom the other in
fiiture.
Shareholders exercise their statutory rights for control1ing corporations through
voting. One share, one vote and majority rule are the pnncïpaI features of democracy
based on capital. Through examuiation of three types of corporations in Canada, it is
evident that when capital (represented by voting shares) is concentrated in the hands of a

few shareholders, such shareholders are the true governon of the corporation
Shareholders in China are granted extensive rights to participate in corporate
strategic management. Through adoption of the p ~ c i p l e sof one share, one vote and
majority rule, it seems that China is embracing shareholder dernocracy on a capitalkt basis.
But the socialism deeply moted in China appears not to completely ernbrace capitzt[ism.

Provisions under the CCL in respect of protecting state assets reflect the fact that
sociaiism is strongly protected during the diversification of Chinese corporate ownership.
Examination of four types of corporations in China demonstrates that individuai
shareholders (Le. the capitalists) are discrùninated against by both China's Corporate Laws

and Chinese business practices. Such discrimination is associated with certain features of
China's current economy and the phüosophy adhered tu by the Chinese people.
[t is without doubt that

sninority sharehoIders in Canada are weil protected by the

CBCA as compared with CCL's indiaerent attitude toward minority sharehoiden in Chiaa
Canadian corporate experiences in respect of protecbng minority shareholders on the basis

of f h e s s and eWty may serve as a valuable lesson for Chinese corporate Iawmakers in
hture.

4.1.7 Outstanding Issues

As abserved in Chapter 1, corporate control is associated with relationships among

people. Proper corporate control shouid maintain bdanced relationships among corporate
participants. This section intends to address a number of issues that need to be noted
while appmaching bdanced intra-corporate relationships in Canada and China

A

The CBCA

(1)

DBenng Treatment for Closely-held Corporations and Publicly-held Corporations

Aithough the vast majonty of corporations in Canada are closely-held corporations
and Canadian corporate Iegai theory makes a cIear distinction between cIoseIy-held and
publicly-heid corporations, the CBCA does not provide a corresponding definition or

MerÏng treatments of the two types of c o r p o r a t i ~ n .The
~ reason for this approach in
the CBCA, as explained by the Dickerson Cornmittee, was that it was thought more

appropriate for distinctions to be made between public and private corporations on

=CA ss.6(l)(d), 49(8) and 173 deaï onïy with share
restnctioas For a dhssion ddinaing
treatment for cIOSeIy-hefd corporationsand pnbiic corporations, see F.IacoGucci, U L. Pikington, & J. R

U7

S. Pnchn& Canadian Business Coptutions: An Anabsis of Recent LgÏsIative Developments
(Aghcomt, Ont;: Canada Law book, 1977)-

"finctiond rather than on doctrinal grounds."z'

Rather than making a broad distinction

between public and private corporations for ail purposes, then, the CBCA defines

corporations in diierent ways in dEerent sections?
It is very clear that, as a pracûcd matter, corporate decision making in closely-heId

corporations is very daferent fiom that of publiciy-held corporations. Even in public
corporations, there are major differences between widely held public corporations and
public corporations with high ownership concentration. Shareholders of cIoseIy-held
corporations are more ükely to be involved in managing the corporations and have more
cornmitment to the corporations than sharehoIders of publicly-held corporations given that
shareholders of closely-held corporations conmiute most of their weaith to the
corporations. Therefore, the CBCA provides shareholders of closely-held corporations a

more ffexile business structure, which can be similar in ways to a partnenhip with limited
liability.O'
As for public corporations with high ownership concentration, a single controUing

shareholder or a smdl group of controiiing shareholders are more commined to the
corporate business than their fellow shareholders given their more signincant investment in
the corporation. Because a single controlhg shareholder or controIIing shareholders of
mch corporations are often dso the directors a d o r managers of such corporations, they

are very Iikely the decision-makers. Under such circumstances, there is a great need to
-

-

SUpra note 42 (DickersonReport) pam 36-38 at f 0-1 1.
'W

For instance, some corporations are not requlred to soücit proxies h m thek sbanhoIdas. See CBCA

S. 149 (2).

"It is noted that the (IBCA in some respects aiïows ddy-heid corporations to avoid much mrporate
formaCism, by, for example, allowing signed resofutions h Liea of m g s (see CBCA r 111). and by
pmviding ciosely-heid corporations the opportimity to adopt a more flexi'bie management stmcbrre [sec
CBCA S. L02(i)).

protect minonty shareholders' hterests.
With regard to shareholders of widely-held public corporations, most, if not a&

shareholders of widely held p u b k corporations tend to consider themeives as passive
hvestors rather than active participants in the corporate business."'

Muiority

shareholders of high ownership concentration public corporations also have the same
tendency. One reason is that professional managers, by wtue of their knowIedge and
expertise, are usudiy better qualified to make manageriai decisions than shareholders.
Another reason is that for an investor who owns shares in a large number of companies,
panicipating in the affairs of one typically wilI not be worthwhile since the contriiution of
any singIe corporation to the overd value of his or her portfolio is probably going to be

trivial. In case mismanagement does becorne a serious concem, mch an investor might

think that selling the equity is a much quicker and Iess costly solution than trying to turn
the corporation around by attempting to marshd enough support fiorn other minonty

sharehoIders to have a materiai effort on corporate management. Moreover, an investor in

a public corporation (in particular, a widely-held public corporation) with a relatively srnaII
proportion of personal wealth inwsted in the corporation is more Likely to reLy on other
sharehoIders to oversee corporate performance. ActuaIIy, many other investon wiII have
the same thought. The resuit is a "freeriding" phenornenon. The fact that a shareholder

enjoys limited Iiability fùrther reidiorces sharehoIders' indwerence to corporate decision-

making.262 Professionai managers wield controhg power d o u t intemention Eom
shareholders. Under these circumstances, the pestions of how to improve corporate
S u p note 45 at 458.

FIL Easterbroak and D.R Fischef, "LimiteciLiabiIity and the Corporationw(1985) 52 U. C h i L. Rev.
89 at 94-

intemd control and management's accountability to the corporation and shareholders
become very important. Given the Werent business reality in respect of corporate
management in closely-field corporations, high ownership concentration public
corporations and widely-held public corporations, the CBCA needs to be fiirther refined to
deal with the very different business needs of these types of corporations, and the current

CBCA "one size fits ail" approach, abolished.

Fiduciary Duty Owed by Majority Shareholders

(2)

As discussed in the above section 4.1.3, Canadian corporations tend to have hi&

ownership concentration. That is, the will of the majority shareholden can be more
readily refiected in the corporate decision-making process. In other words, dominant
shareholders might pursue their interests at the expense of minority shareholders.
Nthough minorïty sharehoIders have certain Iegal rights and remedies under the
current CBCA,'~~
Canadian courts. historically, have seemed to have a strong sympathy
toward the majority shareholders and are reluctant to find a clear fiduciary duty owed by

the majonty to minority shareholders or to the corporation. In the case Re Jury GofdMine
Devefopment Co., 264 MiddIeton I. aated that
If [the minority shareholder] chooses to risk his money by subscrîbing for
shares, it is part of his bargain that he wiIi submit to the will of the
majonty. In the absence of fiaud or transactions ultra vires, the majority
must govern, and there shouid be no apped to the Courts for r e d r e s ~ . ~ ~
'53
264

Rekr to 4.1.4 ofthe text.
Re Jury GoidMine Deveiopment Co,, [192814 D L K 735 at 1736 ( 0 . C . k )

See also Brant ImesbnenLs Lfdv. Keeprite Inc (1987). 60 O R (2d)737. w b the Ontario
Court of Appeal hdd that majority sharehoiders in Canada do not owe a fiduciary duty to miuonty

266 I6td

sharehholders.

Such antipathy of the courts towards minority shareholders has its mots in the "intemal
: ~ the
~ "seifish ownership d e "
management d e " developed by Lord ~ a v e ~ and
~ dtunateiy traced to Foss v.
developed in the case of Pender v. ~ u s h i n g dand

~'ottie.~*

Therefore, historicaily, Canadian courts have adhered to the notion that controlling
shareholders owe no fiduciary duties to fellow shareholders or the corporation269 ifmost
Canadian public corporations were widely held, with no controlling shareholder, contlicts
between controlling shareholders and mino*

shareholders wodd be rare. However,

Canadian markets are characterized by a high degree of concentrated corporate
ownership. This business fact gready increases the potentiai confiïcts between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders.
The business reality of Canadian corporate markets requires Canadian judges to
Iook beyond common law precedents Uihented from a century ofjurisprudence, that have

See a h the comments of J. G.Machtosh, " The Role of Institutionai and Retail Imestors in Canadian
Capital Markets"( 19%) 3 1 Osgoode Hall L. I. at 2371.

Eark (L902), A L . 83 (P.C.) at 93.
Tt is an elementary principle of Iaw rdating to joint stock companies that the Court will not interfere with
the internai management of campanies acting w i î h h their powers? and in fact has no jurisdiction to do
'66 Burhdv.

Sb."

"Pender v. Lushington (1877),6 Ch. D.70 (CA) at 75.

"Where men extheir rîghts of property, they exefcise their rights h m mue motive a-te
or
hadequate, and 1 have aiways considered the law to be that those who have the rights of property are
entitïed to exercise them whatever theu motives be for snch exeruSerusen

"Svpm note 242.
Roberts v. P e f h g (198 L), 130 D L R (36) 76 I,16 B U 150 (B.C.S.C.).
B m Imesîments Lrd v- KeepRite Inc (1987), 60 OJ1 (2d) 737, 42 DL&
suppiemenîary reasons, 6 1 O R (2d) 469, 43 D I A . (4th) 141,

(4th) 15, (ELC-J-),

found that shareholders owe no fiduciary duties either to their feilow shareholders or to
the c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n . ~

In the 1970s, the Ontario Court of Appeal appeared to move fkom the majority
rule to an equity and faimess mie and began to consider minority shareholders' interests in

the corporation. The Court of Appeal appeared to be prepared to impose a fiduciary duty

upon majority shareholders. In the case, G o l ' Mines Ltd v. Revill, n1the Court of
Appeal stated that
The principle that the majority govems in corporate affairs is
fiindamentai to corporation law, but its coroiIary is also important
- that the majority must act fairly and honestly. Faimess is the
touchstone of equitable justice. and when the test of faimess is
not met, the equitable junsdiction of the Court can be invoked to
prevent or remedy the injustice which misrepresentation or other
dishonesty has caused....
in the Canadian legai cornmunit-, whether majority shareholders today have a

fiduciary duty to the mino@ shareholders or the corporation is a matter of some
controversy. Some Canadian scholars argue that the oppression remedy under the CBCA
rnay provide a way of imposing directiy or indirectiy a fiduciary duty on majocity

"

In addition to the importance of common Iaw pcecedence. Machtosh, HoLmes and Thompson provide
other possible explanations as to why Canadian judges may be refuctant to impose fiduciary duties upon
conuoIhg shareholders. PIease see I.G. Macïntosh with f. HoImes & S. Thompson, "The M e of
ShareholderFiduciq Duties" in (199 1) 19 Can, Bus. L.I. 86.
in this artide, Macintash, Homes and Thompson seek to expIain why7 in the face of more widespread
inter-investor con£Iictsof interest (@en high degree ownership concentration in Canadian corporations),
the Iegai doctrine in Canada has not fo&y
adumbrated fiduciary standards of conduct for controUiag
shareholders. whiIe the Amencan courts have. Three possibIe expIanations &d by them are as
FoIIows:
Fust,since controiiing shareholders are often aiso directors or officers, they are subject, in their capacity
as offices or directors, to fiduciaq duties, in arry event (at 100 - 105). Second, minority shareholders
have been protected to a relatively great extent by the existence of widdy cast power of review wbch has
aliowed the administrators and courts alike to test the fairaes of the majonty7streatment of the nrinority
(at 105 129)- Thirb ddopments under the statutory opp-ou
rem* which have reduced the
pressnre to impose fiducia~~
duties on shateho1de.r~(at 130 - 134).

-

I"

G o l k Mhes Ltd v. Reviif (I975),7 O X (2d)216 ai 224.

shareholders to either the rninority shareholden or the corporation.m It seems that
Canadian courts will have to M e r clarify this issue.

(3)

Institutionai Shareholders in Publicly-held Corporations

As analyzed in Seaion 4.1.5 above, instmitionai shareholden, especidy pension

fùnds, life insurance companies and mutual funds, hold large equity positions in big and
more iiquid publicly-held c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n According
s.~
to the Task Force on the Future of

the Canadian Financial SeMces sectoqn4
..many of Canada's financial institutions own investments in
public corporations throughout the country that may, panicuiarly
in special circumstances, enable the hancial institutions to
inauence manageriai decisions of the public corporations. This is
particulady the case if investments that are not directly owned by
the institutions, but are owned by pooled funds (Le. mutua1 funds,
pension hnds and segregated funds) that are managed by the
institutions, are taken hto account.
.

Montgomery's survey demonsvates that today's institutional shareholders in

Canada are more likely to take actions for improving corporate performance rather than
simply "vote with the feet" (i.e. by seliing their shares)."

Such increased institutionai

shareholders' participation in corporate management challenges controlling shareholders'

"

J.S. Ziegel et al., Cases and Materiais on Partnerships and Canadiart Business Corporuttions.2nd ed
vo1.2 (Toronto: The CarsweIl Company Limited, L 989)at 691.
rn

KE. Montgomery. "Market Shift - The RoIe of Institutionai Investors in Corporate Govenianœn

( 1996) 26 Can, Bus.

t. J. 189 at 196.
The nwey was mmpleted by over 100 Canadian institutions, maidy public and prNate pension h d s and
Ïnvestment counselors,
274

T& Force on the Future of the Canadian Fihanaai Semices Saor, T a k Force on the Future of rhc
Canadian FinanciaL Services Secfor DiscumOn P q e r (Toronto: Task Force on the Future of the
Canadian F~tlil~~cia
Sector,
i
L997).

"Supra note273 at 192-

power in corporate decision making?

For example, in the case of a corporation with a

controlhg sharehoIder, the provisions of the CBCA regarding special resolutions for
fiindamentai corporate changes could permit an institutional shareholder to defeat a
special reso~ution.~

(4)

Shareholders' Communication in Publicly-held Corporations

Shareholder democracy provided by the CBCA can oniy work if shareholders can
be "reached, persuaded, and galvanized to active participation in corporate ~ a e . ' ' ~ ~
Without facilitative shareholder communication devices, shareholders' power to coaaol or
influence corporate rnatters wiU be hstrated. Shareholder proposals under the CBCA
provide a platform for registered voting shareholders to bypass the corporate management
and place an issue before a shareholders' meetings. As such, a shareholder c m participate

directly in corporate business and inform other shareholders to take action.
However, the sharehoIder proposa1 scheme provided by the CBCA is not d o u t
defects. Fust, the ability of beneticiai shareholders whose shares are registered in the
name of a depositary or other nominee is ~ u r b e d . Some
~ ~ reformers have advocated

imposing Iegai obligations upon intermediaries regarding communication between
36

Supra note 133 at 172.

"

This wouïd oniy be me, however, if00 the con~olIingshareholder had l e s ihan 213 of the shares and
the instituîionai sharehoIder, together with otbers opposed to the tesoIutioa, togeher hold as Ieast 1/3 of
shares present and voting at rhe reIevant meting.

"Supra note 45 ai 456.
n9 S. Kaz*
"Canada ShareholderProposaIsnonluie: Oder Hoskui & Harcourt (Bamster &
Solicitors, Patent and Trademark Agents)
< h t t p f / ~ - o s l e r ~ ~ ~ m ( p u b I f c a t i o n s / B O a r d m O m - P ~ d n(date
~ h t-am l ~
June 18, t999),

beneficial shareholders and the corporation under the C B C A . ~Second as criticized by
Professor Welling, though the CBCA provides that individuai shareholders have the right
to bring a proposal before the shareholders' generai meeting, the CBCA fails to clarify the
power of the generd meeting to nile on the matter of the propo~al.~~'
In other words, the

CBCA specifies the procedure of initiating shareholder proposais but neglects to give the
geneml meeting substantive power to deal with the shareholder proposai.2s2

One way to overcome the limitation upon kneficiary sharehoIders woId be for such a shareholder to
purchase a singie share, register it Ur his or her m e , and submit the proposal fier that.
The case of V e r h v. Toronto-Dominiorr Bank, [ 19961 3 SCRSSO raised an issue regardhg whether the
appellant (J.R Verdun), a s a bencficiai shareholder of the cespondent bank (Toronto-Dominion Bank),
was entiticd ta have his shareholders proposais included in the respondent's management proxy circuiar.
in order to submit a proposai, a person must be "a shareholder entitied to vote at an annual meeting of
shareholders of a bank". The Suprcme Court had to determine whether a beneficiai shareholder is a
"shareholder entitled to votewwithin the meaning of the Bank Act,
It was held that a bendicial shareholder is not entitied to submit a propod. lacobucci J. stated that a
shareholder is not without recourse however since he or she rnay submit a proposai through the registered
holder or the benficiai holder may have one or more shares registered in hisher own cight.
ft is dso noted that as a generai matter some of the shareholder communication problems arising h m
shares held by a depository or othcr nominee have b e n addressed by Secufities regulations. See e.g
Nationai Policy Statement No.41 - S W o I d e r Communication (1988/03/18) 1L O.S.C.B. 1242 (NP#41).
Under M I , an issuer must q e s t and obtain fiom depository institutions the names of the beneficial
shareholders (or other secmities holders) on whose behalf the depository institution or other norninee
holds the securities More an upcoming meeting of securïty holders. NP#4I m e r provides that the
depository institution or other nominee must let non-registered s e d t y holders know their rights under
NP#Jl, and request written instructions as to whether they wish to receive materials about annuai or
special meetings of security holders from the issuer.

The issue of shareholder communication between benefiicai sbareholders and registered shareholden
has attracted considerable attention fiom Canadian commentators and Iaw refomers. The Standing
Senate Cornmittee on Banking Trade and Commem, chaired by Michaet Kirby, made 27
recommendations in its report in August, 1996, induding recommendations that registereâ shareholders
be furnished, at a h e d pcriod of tirne, a Iist that ÏncIudes ait benenciai shareholders. But Intermediees
wouid be permitted to withhold the names and addresses of beneficiai shareholders who have requestd in
writing that their fnformation not be teleased Such a list could be used to enhance the communication
among shareholderswith regard to the business and a f E n ofa corporation,

"' Supra note 45 at 475.
szdid at 468 - 480. Professor Chnstopher C. Nicholls of Fanilty of Law of DalhoUge Univenity bas

presented anouier view of this apparent Itdefin: if the CBCA providecl that any shareholder proposai
presented, and passed, at a sharehotders meting of a public corporation requhd the directors to act in
accordance with such a propasal, it is possliIe tbat s6arehofders couid appme d o m e d proposais
since the sharehoIders do not have acçess to decaileü business Mormatioa Indeed,shareholders couid
never be given access to mch information because, in a p u b k corporation, information providecf to

s W o I d e r s i~ by its nature, pubiic information CommeraaIy sngtive mformation, accordin&, must
be withIieid, subject to continnous disclosme rcries. As a cesui, sharehoidhs simply do not have sutfi:cient

Further reform of the CBCA may have to address the problem of shareholder
communication within public corporations in order to improve shareholders' democracy.

The CCL

Protection of Minority SharehoIderst Interests

As discussed in section 4.1.3 above, Chinese corporations have a high

concentration of aate/public ownership. The extraordinary rights enjoyed by shareholders
with respect to corporate management (see 4.1.4 B (1) above) may permit controllhg

shareholders more easily to pursue group interests or political aims at the expense of
minonty shareholders.

In China, most of the minority shareholders are individual

shareholders. Individual investors are already in a disadvantaged position relative to the
state shareholders or other Iegal penon shareholders in terms of information resources and
expertise in anaiyzing corporate information. For mhority shareholders in China, who
dislike the way management operates, there are only two choices: keep silent or sel1 one's
shares.*" Selling shares requires a liquid market. The Chinese secunties market is not as
Iiquid as the Canadian market. On the other hand, there are fewer iisted corporations in

China than in

which means Chmese investon' oppomuuty to diversify their

intorrnation to make inforneci decisions on detailed business matters For tbis raison, the argument goes,
the CBCA m o t requirr direaon to impkment aiI sharehoIder proposais. and sa at best, they cm k
precautoy in n a m .
'83

PIease note that C U does not pmvide appraisd rights tu dlssenting sharrhoIders.

At the end of 1998, there wue 454 corporations Iisted on Shanghai Stock ExcZiange, and 43 1 Iîsted on
Shenzhen Stock Exchange,

holdings to reduce investment nsk is largely restricted. The infant Chinese market system,
an absence of a "lawmaking " fùnction on the part of the China's

courts^" unsophisticated

Chinese investors, and a shortage of professional investment advisors and professional
experts, iike auditors and lawyers. make Chinese investoa more dependent upon
corporate law (rather than contractual arrangements) to protect their interests and express
their wishes to corporate management. If corporate Iaw does not provide sufficient legal
remedies to the minority shareholders and allow them to protect their own interests?
eventuaiiy China will Iose capital support fiom the private sector.

Reforms in Canada have dready alleviated the problems associated with the
generai nile that shareholders holding more than 50 per cent of the voting shares cm elect

or remove 100 per cent of the board of directon and othenvise pass shareholder
resolutions. The solutions are cumulative voting, class veto and separate class resolutions.

CCL, however, lacks similar provisions. Chinese law-makers should similarly move Eom
the simpIe majority rule to a mle ernphasizing faimess and equity so as to enhance the
credibility of its capital market.'*'

In so doing, Canadian experiences in protecting

minority shareholders can serve as good examples.

a

Cumulative Votinç

Sec Onlhte: Securities Times <h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t i e s t i m e s . c o mI998fshzb.
c n l n b h t m (date accessed: Iune
18, 1999) in Chinese version,

See 5.4 infra.

"

China d w not h;Nc a ease law systcm. Iudges are mt pennitted to make law. Generaiiy, thy can
on& appiy Iaw accordiag Co specific fans. Therefoce, the oniy power to d o m law rests with the
IawmakerS.

As discussed in section 4.1 -5 A

(9,
a cumulative voting system ensures minority

shareholders have representation on the board of directon. Examining the business reality

-

of Type A and B public corporations as demonstrated in the Appendk III A and HI - B,
individual shareholders in China very likely encounter the situation that state shareholders
or legal penon shareholders holding jua over 50 per cent of the voting shares are able to
elect IO0 per cent of the directors.
If Chinese lawmakers want minority shareholders to be represented on the board, a

cumulative voting system is a technical provision that can be borrowed from the CBCA.
If cumulative voting were adopted however, CCL would aiso need to address the

possibility that a simple majority of shareholders codd easîly remove a "minority" director
originally elected through the exercise of cumulative voting since CCL States clearly that
shareholders have the right to remove a director. Thus, the technicd provisions under the

CBCA relating to class veto" and separate reso~utions~~~
as weU as the CBCA provision
that deals specifically with this "minority director" issue would also need to be taken into
account.*"

b.

Appraisal Right

As andyzed in section 4.1-5 A(1), the appraisai right ailows shareholders to

protect themselves against being forced to participate in a corporation that has undergone
a &damental change 6om the time they initialIy investeci in the corporation.

CBCA rl76 (1).
xm

CBCA a I76(6).

"CBCA S. IOXg).

The

appmisd right is Iike an "exit" door to dissenting siiareholders. Shce the appraikd right
has certain value for protecting minonty shareholders of cIoseiy-heId corporations, and

minority shareholders of public corporations with high ownership concentration or whose

shares trade in thin capitai markets, it appears that the appraisai right is weU suiteci to
China. This is so because,

fht, C b a has a

vast number of closely held corporatioas;

second, because the Chinese equity market is not highIy liquid; and third, because China

has a high ownership concentration corporations' market.290

For shareholders of Chinese closely-held corporations and Ininority shareholders of
high ownership concentration pubIic corporations, the chance for withdrawing tiom the

corporation and receiving fair compensation is ~united.~'The provision under the CCL
requiring that fundamental changes to the corporation must be approved by a supermajority of shareholdersm is a device that may effectively protect muiority shareholders in
Chinese corporations.
Introducing appraisal rights into CCL would no doubt enhance the ability of
rninority shareholders to protect their own interests. Further, appraisal rights couid serve
to protect against unwise or opportunistic findamentai changes faditated by a
management-controlled proxy mechanism in a corporation where the majority of
shareholders are uninterested or apathetic. However, at this stage in its developmem,

Refer to 4.1.3 A above and 5.2,L B belaw,
Artide 35 of C a provides that in a k t e d Liability company (th* is a doseiy hdd corporation) when
a sharehorder intends to assign its capitai contributionto persans who are not sharehofders, the consent of
over haif of aii the shareholderr must k senned Those shareholders disappmving the assigmnem W
purchase the capital c o n a i i o n to be assigneb If mch shareholders do aot make the pmdmse, dey are
deemed to have consenteci to the assignment
29 t

Arcides 39 and 40 of C U Tor cIosely held corporations. Artides 106 and 101 of CCL for pubtic
corporations.

China c a ~ oborrow
t
the Canadian version of appraisal rights suice the pre-conditions for

effectively exercising the appraisal right (such as, the cultural values, the development of a
market economy, sophistication of the courts, etc.) are not satisfied in China as discussed
in the section 4.1.5 B (2) above.
In addition, the Canadian experience with appraisd rights raises some serious

questions about the value of nich rights to Canadian sbarehoIden in any event. China
wouid need tu consider these concems about the appraisal remedy before adopting it. The
concems raised by the appraisd remedy under the CBCA include issues relating to tax
coas, brokerage costs, delay coas, procedurd hurdies, the expense of exercise,
adjudication tisk and cos to the corporation as analyzed by Professor ~ a c l n t o s h ? ~Tax
cost refers to the fact that the election of the appraisai option by a dissenting shareholder
may trigger a taxable event for that shareholder.

The fiindamental change dissented from

may or rnay not aIso result in a taxable event for a non-dissenting shareholder. The
decision of whether to elect to exercise the appraisai right may be influenced by the
relative tax treatment accorded dissenting and non-dissenting shareho~ders.~~~
It is
suggeaed that, irrespective of the rationaie and ciraunstances under which the right is

claimed, the appropriate tax treatment of dissenters shouid be the same as that accorded

non-dis sen ter^."^ Brokerage costs issues arise on the assumption that

the dissentient

shareholder rehvests the proceeds arkng Eom the appraisal, so that brokerage fees or

-

-

1. G. MacIntosh, The Shareholders' Appraisai Right m Canada,- A Critical Reappraisalw (I988)13
Canada-United States Law J o d 299 at 344. The artide fint appearrd in(1986) 24 Osgoode AaII L. 1.
20 L.
L93

other reinvestment costs wouId be added to the appraised value of ~hares?~As in the
case of tax costs, the objective shouid be to ensure equai treamient of dissenters and non-

dissenters in order to eliminate any a r t i f i d incentive to claiming or not claiming the
appraisai right. Delay cost is the cost that may arise Eom the time Merence between the
date of a resohtion adopting the hdamental change, and the date on which a cash payout

is made to the shareho~der.~Procedurai hurdles refer to the fact that the exercise of
appraisai rights requires shareiioiders to foUow detaiied technical procedures under the
CBCA?'

The expense of exercise relates to the expenses arising nom hiring experts to

appraise share value.

Adjudication risk arises in comection with the considerable

uncertainty connected with the current mode of the appraisai remedy under the CBCA."
Cost to the corporation refers to the fact that the exercise of an appraisal ri& is beyond

the predictable expenses of the corporation and so might deter value-added fundamentai

changes.300 Moreover, beneficid shareholders are not entitled to invoke the appraisd
remedy since only "a holder of shares of any cIass of a corporation"3o'(in other words,
only a registered shareholder of shares as indicated in the corporation's share registry) may
-

--

-

-

ibid at 348 349.
It was recognized by Profcssor Maclntosh that added cost at most indudes the vaiue of curent brokerage
costs Iess the present vaiue of the curent brokerage costs that wodd have been incuredon a Citture sale in
the ordinary course ofevents.

Ibid at 350 - 35 L. Madntosh acplained that the shareholderwho dis~entsloses a i l 6is or her rights as
a shareholder, incfuding the right to ceceive cibidemis, genedy withiri about one month fiom the date
when the resoiution adopting the fiindamenta1 change is appmed by shareholders. The date when the
action appmved by the resoIution is &ectiVe couid conceivabIy be much latex than the date at which the
dissenthg sharehoider's capitai Ioses its wrning power,
Ibki at 351 - 355. For instance a Iitany of notices, counter-notices, and deadhes.

dissent under the CBCA.)"

c.

Oppression Remedy

The oppression remedy (as addressed in 4.1.5 A(3) above) gets courts involved in
Canadian experience with the oppression remedy requires toms to

corporate &airs.

interpret what consthtes "oppressive", "udair" or "prejudicial". However, an oppression
remedy would not be viable in China for the tirne being.
First, as discussed in 5.5 below, Chinese traditiond culture is a culture
characterized by disrespect for private property rights and respect for hierarchy and the
Chinese people are non-iitigation orientated. Without consciousness of proteaing their
private property rights and their hterests in the corporation, rninority shareholders in

China are very Iikely to remain subject to the discretion of the majonty shareholders and
might not be expeaed tu make significant use of Iegal actions to protect their interests

even if such legai remedies were avaiIabIe. Second, a chilling fact in today's China is that
legd education and training has not been developed so as to cultivate sophisticated judges
who comprehend corporate bus in es^."^ Thus, the oppression remedy, relying on courts to

-

B ~ u and
n LaasLy argueci that, ifthe registereci shareholders lcfuscd to disent on behaifof a buicficial
owner, the benencial shareholder wouici have no appraisal rem- under CBCA, but wouid perhaps be
able to get an order based on equitabIe principles cornpehg the cegistemi sfiareholder to compiy 1vît.h
the terms of their tnrst arrangement
See note 232 at 689, suprtr.
m3 LegaI edocation in China is totaiIy d i n i t h m that of Canada In China Iegai educition may be
conducted by schoois of Iaw in Iarge umversities or by poLitics and Iaw insattutes. Law schools and
politics and Ianr institutions provide regdisr le@ courses for fbU-tirne students admitteci tbr0ug.h aïïChina UnivetSities and CoUeges EmoLIment Examinations (one tÎme per year). Schook of Iaw are
nipeniised by the MkÏstry of Ed~~cation,
wbile politics and law institutions are under the mpenrûion of
the Mb&q of Justice. The Ministry of Instice ais0 operates the Central Sch001 for Politics and Law
Management Cadtes?the Centrai Scfiool for Labor Reform Management Cadres* and schwls for thc

interpret and provide remedies to the "oppressed" shareholders accordhg to vague terms

under corporate law, rnay not find its setting in China at the moment.

(2)

Fiduciary Duty of Majonty Shareholders

Though CCL provides for closely-held corporations and publicly-held corporations
in different chapters and offen specific definitions of these temis, the provisions relating to
shareholder power in closely-held corporations and public corporations are almost the
~ 'discussed
~
in 4.1.4 above and shown in Appendk UI, it is
same in both ~ h a ~ t e n .As
apparent that majonty shareholders in China legally and practically have too much power

and they can effectively direct corporate business even at the expense of minority
shareholders' intereas, particuiarly individual shareholders' interests. Therefore, it may be
advisable to provide for a fiduciary duty owing by majority shareholders to minority
shareholders and to the corporation in the CCL as a means of moving from simple

majonty nile to the fair and equitable n i ~ e . ~ ~ '

training of judiciai cadres. In ordcr to sati* people's interest in snidying Iaw, some institutions also
provide evening courses or correspondencecourses.
For an introductionto the Cliinese le@ system and Icgai education, please d e r to C. Cheng fie. "The
Legai System in China", onïine: Legai Fonim,
<http://www.enstarnstarnet/chin~aw~-&CI-9.
h W (date accessed: Juiy 3, 1999)
nu Anide 38(10) of CCL.
The only diffixence between sharehoIders' rights and responsibiiities in a cIoseJy-heid corporation and
those of sharehoIders of a pubIiciy-held corporation relates to the assignment of shares. For sharehoîders
of c10seiy heid cotporations, share transfi to outside investors must be appmed by ail mSdé
sharehoIders of the corporation,

It is noted ihat therc is a controversy here If the existene of Iegai media such as the oppression
rem@ wouid not work ia China becauseof the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the provision
of a fiduaary dnty may also not work at ail for mùiority sharehoiders in
305

CCL borrowed the concept of shareholder proposais nom the West, but CCL's

genenc provision in respect of shareholder proposais does not seem to effectively ensure
that shareholders can actudIy exercise the proposai right. it states that shareholders of

public corporations have the right to propose suggestions relating to corporate business.306
The law does not fiirther dari& whether such a proposal is to be submitted to
shareholders' generd meetings or to the corporate management. Nor does the law provide
a specific procedure that shareholders should follow if they want to exercise the
suggestion right.

The shareholder proposal is an important legal device to aliow

shareholders to bypass management and enhance shareholder communication.

It is

therefore advisable to provide a more detailed and operable provision regarding
shareholder proposais under CCL.
This section has provided some generd recommendations for fùrther refining
corporate intemal control under the CBCA and CCL on the bais of stnking a balanced
relationship arnong shareholders in Canada and China. The shareholders, who bear the
greatea economic tisk within a corporation, are the people that one cannot negiect while
addressing corporate internai control. in addition to shareholders, however, one must also
consider other corporate participants Iike directors, mangers, and employees when
studying the subject of corporate internai control. They are to be addressed below.

Article 1IO & C U :
"SbehoIdexs shaiI have the right to examine the articks of association of the Company, the m i m e s of
the sharehoiders' g e n d meetings and the h c i d and acconnting statements, and to make suggestiom
o r inquiries about the burintss operation of f i é company." (emphasis added)

306

4.2

-

Board of Duectors Control through Statutory Power

4.2.1 Power of Directors in Law and Reality

A

Under the CBCA

Theoretically, the very existence of the board of directon and the statutory power
that the CBCA confers upon the board of dire~ton'~'make the board the corporate
decision-maker. This actual decision-making role for the board of directors is a reality in
the case of closely held corporations or public corporations with high ownership

concentration, but may not be the case in widely-held public corporations.

In reality, as Appendix LI-C shows, the board of directors is the corporate decision
maker in Canadian closely held corporations given that the role of shareholder, director(s)

and managerid officer is ofien pIayed by one person or by members of a single controhg
farnily. In the case of public corporations with high ownership concentration, as Appendix
CI-6 shows a single sharehoIder or a srnail group of controlling shareholden are able to

elect themselves or their nominees as directon and mangers.

Therefore, those

shareholder-directors will be in a position to direct corporate business.
However, the board of directors of wideiy-held public corporations usudy is not

the dtîmate corporate controlIer. As Appendor II-A shows, the Chief Executive Officer,

for al1 practical purposes, very Iikely holds the dtimate decision power.

The role actudy played by the board of directon in wideIy held public

"CBCA S.102(I).

corporations is considerably circurnscnied because the board is more likely to lave
corporate management to managerial officers, a fact confirmeci by Professor Mace in his
field study in the 1970s.~~'

In modem public corporations, the role of the board of directors has been defined

as that of a monitor, rather than a manager, of the corporation An example is the TSE's
adoption of a set of suidelines in 1994 - Nhere Were the Directors? Guidelines for
Improved Corporate Governnnce N, Cana&

corporate govemance in

("Dey Report")

- designed to

enhance

The roIe of the board under the Dey Report is defined

as
. . .adoption of a arategic planning process; the identification of the
principal risks of the corporation's business and ensuring the
implementation of appropriate systems to manage these risks;
succession planning, including appointing, training and monitoring
senior management; a communications poiicy for the corporation;
and the integrity of the CO oration's intemal control and
management information systems.%O

The recommendations made by the Dey Report reflect that in the business reality

Supra note S.
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Supra note 20 (Dcy Report). The TSE corponte governance guidelines relate to a nuaber of
Zgnincant governance issue. inciuding thc proper role of the board of directors, the structure and
composition of the board and its reIattonships with sharehoIders and with management For commentary,
please see Smith Lyons (Bamsters B Solicitors* Patent and Trademark Agents), 'Commentary: TSE
Report on Corporate Govcrnancc0*.Online: <http~lhvww..miithlyotl~.calcomment/~.hmi~
(date affessed:
Aptir 25, 1999);

EA (Ward) SeIIers, "Final Repon of the Toronto Stock Exchange Commr-tteeon Corporate Governancew
Ouiin= ~http:I/~~~.law.cornetI.edu/tnjftse-htm>
(&te accesse6: Aprii 25, 1999); and D. W-Dnnkwater
& R L Nathan, -NewCorporate Govemance Disdosure Standards of &nadian Stock Exchmges B e c m e
Enectiven<http:/hw.oslcr.com/R~urces/BoardS~f1l~2~htmj~
(date acased: A p d 25,1999).
Sinœ Jme 30, 1995. corporations Iisted on TSE have been repuirrd to pmfOVtde
th& shaietiolders with
discIosure of th& corporate govcniance pranices with teference to the guideluies ofthe TSE cornmittee
on Corporate Governana in Cam& On lu@ 10, 1995, the Montnal Exchange adviad Iisted
corporations to comply with its corporate govcfnance guidelines and discIo~uzereq-ents
&iiar 10
the TSE's.

of large publicly-held corporations, directon, other than inside directors, usuaiIy devote
Little time to corporate daiIy management and do not have sufficknt information to make

corporate decisions. The board therefore Iargely relies on the senior ofFcers, auditon, and
advisors to make decisions. Since the board usually meets a few times per year, this
makes it essentiaily impossibIe for the board to exercise continuhg govemance.31' The

Dey Report therefore recommended that the responsibility for the day-today conduct of
business belongs to the management and that the CBCA should be revised to eliminate any
possible misinterpretation that directors are responsible for managing the daily operation

''*

of corporations.

Accordingly, the different business realities of widely-held public corporations,
public corporations with hi& ownership concentration and closely held corporations invite
reform of the CBCA provisions which provide uniform standards for the powen and
responsibility of boards of directors of ail CBCA corporations.

B

Under CCL and FIES Laws

CCL provides the same statutory power to the board of directors of a closely-held
corporation as to that of a publicly-held corporation though these provisions are listed in
different chapters of the CCL. According to CCL, the board of directon of a corporation
should convene shareholders' meetings and report to the shareholdm about the
perfiomance of the corporation; cany out the decisions reached by the sharehoIders'
E K Neam, "Organïzationai Economics and Directors' Conuol" (1996) 26 Cari Bos. L. 1. 106 at
118-i 19.
312

Supra note 20 @ey Eteport). See also C. Corner, Canadiun Directomhip Practice 1995: A New Ero in
Corpomte Goventance (Canada: The Corrférenœ Boardof Canada, 1995) at 19.

meetings; &cide the corporute operation and investment pl-

f o d a t e corporate

annuai hancial budget plans and final accounting plans; formulate corporate profit

distribution plans and a plan to sati* any budget defi& make needed adjustments to the
arnount of the registered capital; formulate plans for the issuance of corporate bonds; draft
plans regarding mergers, splits or dissolution of the corporation; appoint and remove
corporate management, including the generai manager; and fomiate the coporate
finuhentaal management system .3 l3
As listed above, most of the responsibilities that

CCL vests with the board of

diredors involve making recommendations for the shareholders' meeting to consider in
reaching decisions concerning corporate strategic matîers.

Therefore, the board of

directors has a strong idiuential power in directhg corporate strategic maners. As to
corporate daiiy management and operation, they are also aatutody in the control of the
board of directors. This phenornenon has a close relationship with CCL's two-tier board
structure which d l be addressed in 4.3.2below.
Widely-held public corporations are rare in

In ternis of public

corporations with high ownership concentration, as Appendix iil-A, DI-B and HI-C show,
in each case, the board of directors is not the ultimate controiIer. As a controiiing

shareholder, the state or the legai persons3'5register their discretion (ofien through their

nominees on the board) directiy with the corporations.
Wth regard to foreign investment companies, FIES Laws clearly recognize that the

"'Anicles 46 and 112 of CCL (emphasis added).
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Tt is partiy because the Chinese peopCe are used to Saving money rather than makllig imrestments.
Moreovervhi@ nsk in Chinese equity marketsdiscomages peopfe h m putting money mto thas marIrets.
Supra note LOB.

board of directors is the bighest authority wiuùn a foreign investment company.316 The
board of directors of a foreign investment enterprise thus Î n theory has the power to

decide al1 matters of the Company. However the business reaiity of ETES is that investon
(Chinese and Foreign investon in the case of sino-Foreign jomt ventures or foreign
investors in the case of wholly foreign enterprises) together make final decisions if they
concem corporate strategic &airs.
The difference in the respective roles of the board of directors of Chinese public
corporations and Canadian public corporations derives fkom the dEerent corporate
management models followed in the two countries. In Chuia, the vast majority of boards
of directors in theory and in practice never redy make a move beyond the operational role
of managing (i.e. daily management) toward the strategic role of directing. Strategic

directing is an inteilectuai and reflective process rather than an operationai one. It requires
directors to consider how to ailocate the basic resources of people, money, physicai
property, intellectuai property, experience, research and development and to achieve longterm and short-term goals. During China's pIanning economy period, an enterprise is Iike
a machine that runs on rails dt a speed and to a tirnetable set by the aate and so the need
for strategic thinking on the part ofthe corporation's directors is non-existent. This is why
China's socialia society equates the director with a production manager and equates the
manager with a production engineer. Duectors are never to engage in the strategic
Article 34 of ImpIementation Regdations of E N Law and Artide 24 of LupIaoentation Mes of CN
Law. WFûE Law d o a not provide internai management organs. It seans that to IO0 per cent fore@
firnded companies in China, the Chinese Iawmakm leave all corporate mattas with the foreign investors

planning but merely to irnplement k3"Aithough CCL adopts the f o m of the corporation
fkom capitalist countries, CCL basically adheres to the management mode left by China's

planning economy and requires directors to handle corporate daily management. 'ïhat is,
though CCL introduced the structure of the board of directors3" in its form of
corporation, the oId management mode left by China's planning economy is still adopted in
practice. CCL merges elements of a modem corporate structure with China's traditional
enterprise management. But one cannot give direction if one is "head down", managuig
business day-to-day and hour-to-hour.

The neglea of policy and strategic issues by

directors in China, in favor of ongoing involvement in day-to-day operations, can not be
addressed if China's Corporate Laws do not change the corporate intemal govemance

structure and Iegal framework of property rights.

4.2.2 Duty of Directors

A

Under the CBCA

On the one hand, the CBCA delegates corporate management power to the board

of directors; on the other hand, it imposes fiduciary duties and duties of care, diligence and
ski11 upon directors to ensure their accountabiIity to the corporation.3tgThe fiduciary duty
under the CBCA requires directors to act "honestly and in good faith with a view to the

317

B. Garratt, V W n g and the Learning Boardmfn LU
Boisot, East-West Bmness Collaboration: The
Challenge of Governmce in Post-sociaiist Eitferprises (London and New York: Etoutiedge, 1994) 7 at1T
318

In stateiiwned enterprises and colIectiveIy owned enterprises diiring Chnia's pIanning economy, no
structureof board ~CdÏrectorsis pmided by enterprise Iaws-

best interests of the corporation.J20 Duties of care, diligence and skilI requUe that
directors in exercising their powers and discharging their duties should exercise the care,
diligence and skill that "a reasonabiy prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstancestr .321 In addition to these duties under the CBCA, diiectors of Canadian
corporations are subject to other obligations under other laws B e taxation laws,
environmental laws, and laws relating to occupational health and ~ a f e t y . ~ ~
Canadian directors' personal liability in the area of environmental Iaw, workplace
safety, wages, amounts withheld for income tax purposes, etc. has aiready prornpted
concems fiom the Canadian business commuaity. It is argued that heavy personai iiabiiity
for directors causes competent persons to be reiuctant to sit on boards. It aiso results in
the use of scarce corporate assets to purchase directors' and officers' insurance3" or in a

number of cases, to create tma fiinds for inducing hem to remain in office.n4 The
Standing Senate ComMttee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in Canada recomrnended

in August 1996 (Kirby Report) that directors should be released fiom liability for wrongful

3x1CBCA S. 122 (1) (a).
ni CBCA S. l î 2 (1) @).
"

C. S. L. Hoffmann, "Board Stewardshipw in L. Sama e&

Corporote Structure, finance and

Operations, VOL 10 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 32.

Directors' and onicerS insurance is costly, Iimited in scope and subject to hrge deducn'bIes.
PIease refér to
Danids and SM,Huttorr, "The Capricious Cushion: The Impiications of the Directors'
and Offïcers' Insur;uieLïabiIity Crisis on Canadian Corporate GovefnanceW(1993) 22 Can, Bus, L, S.
182. and R 1. Daniels, "MUSBoards Go Overboard?An Econornic Analysk of the Effects of Burgeoning
Statutory Liabiiity on the Roie of Directors in Corporate GoveniacrceW(1995) 24 Can Bus. L. 1.229.
Wesfar Mining Lrd (Re) (1992) 14 C S R (3rd) IO 1 at 105.
"An order was made mider the Companies' Cieditors Arrangement A d whkh permitteci the debtor
company to maintain a $4 miIIion trust fund to cover the Iiability of directors under the EinpIopent
StmdardiF Act (B.C.) and for mtpaid source deductions. The debtor çompany subsecpently apptied to pay
a m e r $3-7milIion to the Director of Emplopent Standards for the payment of vacation pay owing to
its employees." (the appIicatÏon was disinissed)

III

unpaid wages3= and breaches of dut.)n provided that

payments by the corporation3:

they have exercised the degree of care, diligence and ski11 that reasonably prudent persons
wodd have exercised in comparable circumstances to prevent the w r o n g . a ~ t . ~ "In
order to provide directors an effective due diligence defense, the Kirby Report M e r
recommended that reliance, in good faith, on financiai statements, on the reports of
experts and on information presented by officers and professionals be included as an
element of the due diligence. The present CBCA does offer such a defence in certain
cases.329
Further refinement of directofs duties under the CBCA needs to be addressed by
the Canadian legd community and business community together. On the one hana
directon' duties under the CBCA should ensure directors' accountability to the
corporation; on the other hand. director's duties should not discourage competent persons
from sitting on boards.

B

Under CCL and EEs Laws

CCL imposes fiduciary duties to the corporation on directors (as welI as

32s

CBCA S. 118.

3t6

CBCA s, L 19,

327

CBCA s-122.

Supra note 279. See a h Osier. Ho*
& Warcourt (Baflisters & Solicitors, Patent and Trademark
Agents), "Boardroom PeapeanieS Corporate Goveniance Update: Kirby Cornmittee Report Reieasedn.
<h~~~~~~.osIercodpubIications/Boardroom~Perspective/kirby.
htmP (date accmed: Ime 18.1999).

-

JZP

CBCA S. 12.3 (4)@).

s u p e ~ s o r and
s oficers) and subjects them to Iiability for b r e a ~ h ~But
~ ' the CCL does
not mention the directors' duty of care, diIigence and skill. In addition, fiduciary duty
under the CCL, although it appears similar to the concept under the CBCA, is vague and

difEdt to assess. There is no legai explanation as to what "faiWly peform" means.

Moreover, the limitation on judges' function in explaining laws under the current Chinese
legai system leaves the implementation of directors' duty in an uncertain state. With
regard to FTEs Laws, no provisions ded with directors' d ~ t y ~ ~ '
In addition, a distinctive feature of CCL regarding directors' duty is that CCL
provides detailed administrative sanctions332and criminal KabiIities for directors (as weii as
s u p e ~ s o r sand managers) if they violate rules, duties or requirements under CCL."
Administrative sanctions apply to directors who represent the statdpublic interests. The
heavy penalties provided by CCL (and other laws like criminai law334)constitute a
deterrent against potentid illegai corporate decisions. But the negative tone set by

CCL,

at the same time, may discourage good faith nsk-taking activities in China.

4.2.3 Chair of the Board
-

-

j30 Articles 59, 123 and 128 of CCL providc that the directors, nipe~sors,
and managers shoald comply
with the articles of association, fiiithhilly pcrform th& duties and maintain the interests of the corporation
and shotdd not takc advantage of thcir position. fitnctions and powers in the corporationto seek personai
gains.

But since adoption of CCL. the provisions of CCL aiso applying to FIES determine that directors of
sino-foreign joint ventures or whotiy foreign owned corporations are subject to the same fiduciary duties
as provideci by the CCL.
nt

'3~

"AdmiMstrative sanctions- in Chinese is Xng Zhen Chu Fa
See chapta LO of CCL

rw See d o n 3 of chapter 3 of Criminal Law ofthe Peopie's Repuolc of China (Adopted by the Seîond
Session of the F i Nationai PcopIc's Congress on IuIy 1, 1979 and amendeci üy the F i Session of the
EÏghth Nationai People's Congress on March 14, 1997).

The above comparative examination of the power of the board of directors in
comection with the direction of corporate business and the duties of directors in Canada

and China hdicates that though China introduced the structure of board of directors in the

CCL and FIES Laws, China's Corporate Laws have not, however, vested in the board of
directors the same broad decision-making power as the CBCA does.

Moreover,

administrative sanction, a type of Iiability for the head of an enteq~rise~~'
during China's
planning economy. remains in the CCL. The distinctive provisions for personal liabilities

of the Chair of the board (i. e. the Iegal representative, Fa Ding Dai Biao Ren, see 4.2.3 B
below) under the Chinese laws is an interesthg part of China's Corporate Laws and
reflects a different corporate intemal control pradce in China.

A

In Canada

The power of rnanaging the business of the corporation is vested with the board of
directors. The chair of the board is not given any speciai managerid power by the CBCA

The chair is considered an officer of a corporation336and his or her duties umdy include

presiding at meetings of the board of directors and possibly of the sharehoIders and such
other finctions and powers as may corn time to time be assigned to h i d e r by the board

For an English version, p t w e SCC Online: Maryland University Schooi of Law, ChinaLaw Website:
<http:i/~~~.~s.netlchxmIa~vAa~vtmn
1. htm> (date accessed Juiy 3,1999).
nsWead of an enterprise" in China is a k n caiied "Chang Zhang".
336

K Sutherland, Fraser S Hamibook on Canadiart Company Lmv (8" ed)(Carrwelfr Toronto, 1994) at
272-273.
JH.Jenkins, Condita of Canadian Meetings (Toronto: Butterwocths, 1983) at 15.
See

of direct or^.^ The chair is usualIy a director and, if that is the case, of course the duties
of directors provided by the CBCA would also b e applicable to the chair-

B

In China

It is provided under

CCL and FIES Laws that the chair of the board is the legal

representative (Le. Fa Ding Dai Biao Ren) of the corporation.ns The Iegai representative
of a corporation under Chinese laws is the person who takes charge of and exercises
authority on behalf of the corporation according to the constitutionai documentation of
the c~r~oration."~
The c h a s statutory responsibiiity includes taking charge of convening
the shareholdets' meetings and ensuring that corporate business is properly conducted. In

addition, the chair has to convene and preside over the meetings of the board of directors,
examine the irnplementation of board resolutions; and sign the shares and bonds of the
c~rporation.~"in practice, as long as actions of the chair are in relation to the business of

lbid (H. Sutherland) at 273.

Articles 45 (forcfoseiy-hefd corporations) and 113 (for public corporations)of CCL.
Article 37 of the hpiementation Regdations of WV Law and Artide 3 L of ImpIementation Rules of CJV
Law.
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a9~rtide38 of the Generaf Principls of Civif Law of the People 's Repu6lic of Chino (adoptai at the
Fotrrth Session of the Sixth Nationai PeopIe's Congress and effective a s of fa1, L987).
An explamtion fiom Supreme People's Court m
e
r defined the term "Iegd representatXvetr(fa ding dai
biao ren) in detaiî:
a
chiefexecntives such as the president or manager or chahmn of the board of d î r e c t o ~ ~
b.
where the chef executivek position is vacant, the vice presÎdenî or vice chabman or vice
manager as the case may be who fs actuaiïy tesponsibIe for the administrathemrk afthe company,
cwhere the above positions are a i i vacant, the persons that are actnally in charge d a Iegai person
PI- see R R Zhen& Chha's
and ConunerciaI Law (Hong Kong llntterworths, 1988)at 3 12,

the corporation, mch actions are deemed corporate behaviors."'

By introduchg the

concept of legd representative, China's Corporate Laws personake corporations.

Like an agent under Canadian corporate Iaw, the legal representative in China (Le.
the chair of the board) is Iegaiiy authorked to act on behaif of the c~rporation.~"But the

Legai representative is subject to greater personai risk than an agent in Canada typically is.

In addition to fiduciary duty, Chinese laws impose upon the chair various civil liabiiities,
administrative sanctions (like waniings, reprimands, and probation) and fines in case the
corporation violates ~aws.~"
The administrative liability Unposed by Chinese Iaws on a chairman reflects

vestiges of the enterprise management mode that prevailed under the planning economy.
During the planning economy period, the person-in-charge of a state-owned enterprise
usuaily was a govemmentd officer who acted as the aate's representative in managing the
enterprise. Imposing administrative sanctions on persons who are in charge of state assets
was one of the ways used to deter the potentiai abuse of managerid power since a

govemment oficer norrnally would not abuse enterprise managerial power at the risk of

hislher political status. The additional administrative tiability for the chairman to some
34t

Fan han. The Recording Items of the ArticIes of Association of Joint Stock Company: Comment on
Article 79 of China's Corporation Lad' (1997) Nanjing University Law Journal No.55-61 @413
Economic Law and Laour Law) 35 at 37 (Chineseversion).

* M e r to Articles 38.43,19 and 1 LO of the Generd Prirtcrples of CivilL m of the People 's RepubIic of
China (adopted at the Fotuth Session of the Sixth Nationat PeopIe's Congress and effective as of Ianuary
L, L9aT). It provides in detaii the liabîlity that a Iegai reptesentativehas for a le@ entity
Articles 43 and 49 of General Principles of Civil Law of the Peopk s' Reptiblic of China (Adopted at
the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promdgated by Order No,37 of the President
of the PeopIe's RepubiÎc ofChina on April12, f 986, and eflèctive as of Jannary 1,1987)
Engtish version is availabte: MaryIand University School of Law,ChinaLaw Website:
ehttpf/lwww.qissnet/chinaiawAawtran1 - h m (date accessed,-Jime 3, 1999).
Practîdy, because the iiabiiities of the chaitman are sa severe, foreign imrestors in a Srno-foreigu joint
venture usnaiIy Ieave the position to m e s e parties whüe a foreign imtestor wilL hoId the position of
general manager (correspondhg to the position afchief execntnreofücer in Cana&)WJ

extent reflects China's incornpiete economic reform and the socialist roots of its
managerid culture.

4.3

Outside Directors in Canada and SupervWory Boards in China

Canadian corporations empIoy a single tier board structure while in China, except
in the case of FiEs, corporations adopt a two-tier board structure, one for management
and the other for s ~ ~ e ~ s i o nThe
. ~monitoring
"
fùnction in the Canadian single her board
is maidy exercised by the outside d i r e c t ~ n . ' ~ ~

4.3.1 Outside Directors under the CBCA

A

The Function

The CBCA provides that, in the case of a distributing corporation, at least two

directors who are not officers or employees of the corporation or its a i a t e s should sit on
the board.'* These directors are referred to as "outsidedirectors".

The primary reason behind this provision is that inside directors (Le. directors who
are employees or ofncers of the corporation or its af'filiates) are potentidy unable to
effectiveIy and objeaiveiy evduate the performance of managers or officers because such

Y" IL
is noted that for closely-held corporationsin Chha, the two-tier structure is not mandatory. See
i@a note 357-

It is noted that Stnctiy spealùng in theory, a i i diredors shodd be pdorming the management
monitoring fwictÏon, not simply the outside directors-

CBCA S. 102 (2).

an evaluation codd jeopardize the employee-dùectors' own career progress withui the
corporation.347Therefore, the main purpose of involving outside directon is to effectïvely
and objectively monitor corporate management348and provide a check agahst abuse of

managerial power by corporate decision-rnaker~.~"Thus, outside directors may perform a
discipline h c t i o n over the management

In addition, outside directors may play a

role as advisors or counsel to corporate management."'

B

The Reaiity

In redity, the efficiency of outside directors is doubtfbl given the high number of
overlapping directorships in Canada. The concem over such director ties has focused on
their anti-competitive potentiai in cases where the corporations on whose boards the
s . ~ is,
~ ~if a director is on the board of directors
directors sit are competing c ~ r n ~ a n i eThat

"

L. Lin "The Enectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Govermance Mechanism: Theoria and
Evidence" (1996) 90 Nw.U.L. Rev. 888 at 900.
348

RL Daniels & R Morck, Camdian Corporate Governance Poiicy Options (Discussion Paper)
(Ottawa: Industry Canada, k996) at 24.
E. F. Fma & M. C. Jensen, "Separaiionof ûwnership and Contml" (1983) 26 1. L. & Econ. 30 1.

'"

ïhe requirement of appearance and presentation Won the outside directors serves as some son of
discipline for management oficers. See supra note l1 at 40.
" Since outade directon n o d y are top managers in their indusaies, their generaI or specific
expen'ences can provide inside directors and manageriai officers t'additional windows to the outside
world"_ See note 8 at 40, supra352

Penriings has argueci that interlocking directorateshave positive Muences on corporations. Please see
J. M. Pmnhgs, I'erfocking Directors (San Francisco, Washington & London: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1980) 135 -187,
Theoreticaiiy, interiocking directors eaabIe corporations to obtain better Urteiügence about their
defiaencies in their transactions wÎtb other corporations, HorizontaL intertocks help corporations to cope
with the cornpetitive uncertaintiesthat prevaü in oiigopolistic indusüÎeses Vertid interIocks contriïute to
snperior effectivenesi by circmriventmg the situation that one corporation in a market is comparativdy
better infomed than its cornpetitorsabout the matket's parametersparameters
It Is not ~UOWIL,ho-er,
how ofteu dhctors actuany da or can sit on the boards afcompetitors

of two or more competing corporations, the interfochg director may use one corporation

as an instrument of command and as a means of communications with other corporations
on whose boards he or she also sirs. Such intedockkg directorships exacerbate the
potentid conflict of duties and interests to which al1 directors may be subject. Over a
century ago, Lord Cransworth pointed out the broad equitable pnnciple relating to such
confiicts as fo~lows:'~~
[N]o one, having such duties to discharge, shdI be allowed to enter
into engagements in which he has, or cm have, a personai interest
conflicting or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of
those whom he is bound to protect.

Moreover, a study conducted by Lin shows that requinng outside directors on a
board does not always bring good corporate performance.3" Thus, there has been a longstanding controversy in the business and legai cornmunities in North Amerka in respect of
the effectiveness of outside

direct or^.^^' That controversy might explain Parliament's

cautious attitude toward amendment of the CBCA in this respect.3s6

C

Improvement

''' tlberdeer Raiha-v Ca v. Blatkie ( 1954). 2 Eq. Rep.. 1281.
'* Supra note 347at 966.
355

The effiectiveness of ouiside directors k t mntroveniai issue. Two opposing schwis of thought ex&,
"manageriai hegemony"and "flectnremonitor". According to the theory of "manageriaï hegemony", the
board is dominateci by management because of the b k in the nomination and sekction pmcesss of the
outside directors, the consvaints on outside directors' abiIity to monitor or discipihie the management,
and the weak incentives of the outside directors to monifor- According to the theory of " & i e
monitor", outside directors are motivated to protect sha&oIdersT interests and usuaïiy they are apa in
decison making becanse they vaiue thar reptation+or have a direct incentive to monitor if they bave
equity ownershrp, or businessties with the corporation
See supra note 347.
It iS acknOwIedged that whelher or not outside directors are naPsarily a gwd 16uig is a matter of
some controversy- The aaswer may vary h m case to case

The CBCA-styie definîtion of outside director has been criticized by the Toronto

Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Govemance (TSE Comminee) in its report
regarding improved corporate govemance in Canada (Dey ~e~ort)."' The TSE
Committee goes beyond the traditionai definition of directors as inside or outside directors
and proposes a concept of "unrelated direct~r".~~*
The major differences between an

outside duector and an unrelated director are: first, an employee or representative from an
investment bank, law firm or accounting firm which provides seMces to the corporation

rnay be considered related under the Dey Report, while according to the CBCA's
definition such person is not related; and second, the Dey Report niggests that, in addition
to a majority of unrelated directors, a board should also include individuals who are not
In this regard, the TSE
digned with either the corporation or a significant shareh~lder.~'~
Cornmittee's recommendation is sensitive to the intereas of minonty shareholders and
addresses the reality of high ownership concentration in Canada.
it seems that whethet the CBCA will follow the recornrnendation of the TSE
Committee on "unrelated directors" largely depends on whether the Canadian legal
357

Supra note 20.

to the Dey Report (supranote 20), an imrelated director is "a director who is independent of
management and is free fiom any interest and any business or other relatioaship which muid, or codd
nasombly be perceived to. rnateriaiiy interfere with the ducctocs' abiIiiy to act with a vtew to the best
interesîs of the corporation, other rhaa intercstr and rdationships arïsÏng h m shareholding... if the
corporation has a ngnificant sharrholder, in addition to a majority of unrelateci directors, the board shoutd
indude a number of directon who do not bave interests in or reiationships with eÏther the corporation or
the signincant shareholder and which fairy reflects the investment Ïn the corporatox by shareholders
other than the signifiant shareholders. A corporation with a significaut simehoIda shodd have the
appropriate number of directors wbich are not related to either the corporation or tiie Ei@cant
sharehoIder,"
Paragmph 5.7 md 5.8 of Dey Report
3s8 According

359

GuideiUie 3 of Toronto Stock Exchange Guideli~es
for Inproved Corporatle Goventance in Crmrda
C'adim Direcforshipfractices 1995: A New Era in Coprate Governioncp (Cana& The Conferenœ
Board of Canada,1995)at 5 and 19,

120

community and commercialcommunity can reach a consensus in response to the Canadian
commercial reaiity.

4.3.2

SupeMsory Board under C C L ~ ~ *

Comparable to the outside directors under the CBCA in China is CCL's
supe~soryboard.

A

The Function

CCL provides that corporations36'shouid have a supervisory board composed of
no less than three people inctuding representatives of shareholders and an appropriate

proportion of the workers."'

Directors, managers, staff in charge of financial &airs of

the corporation and aate servants cannot act as s u p e ~ s o r s .The
~ ~ ~proportion of the

workers who are on the board is determined by the

of association of the

corporation364

The major bction of the s u ~ e ~ s o rboard
y is to rnonitor the interests of the

<> are not required to have supervisors or a mpMsory board hbüc corporations are recpred to
set up a supervÎsory board In closely heId corporations, a mpembory boardis reqrrired if the corpotation
is a large- Ptease seé Articles 52 and 124 of CCL.

"' SmalI cIoseIy-heId corporations cari have one or two supervisors instead of a supervisory boani
Artide 52 of CCL. However, C U does not provide its dekitiorr ofl'maH sizen.
Articles 52 and 124 ofC U .

Artides 52 and 58 of CCL.

corporation.365 In exercising such monitoring timction, supervisors have the rigtit to
examine the finamid affars of the corporation; monitor the performance of the dûecton

.

and managers; demand the directors and managers correct their acts in any case where

their behavion damage the Uiterests of the corporation; propose interim shareholders'
meetings; and other nghts if provided by the articles of association of the corporation. In
addition, s u p e ~ s o r should
s
attend the meetings of the board o€diectors with non-voting
stat~s.~~~
Introduction of supervisory boards under CCL foilows Continental practice and in
particular the practice in West Germany where the two-tier board structure has been
highiy d e v e ~ o ~ e But
d . ~CCL
~ ~ did not completely follow the German model. The two-tier
board structure adopted by German companies requires a s u p e ~ s o r yboard to control the
basic business policy of a corporation and a management board to manage corporate

affairs. In 1976. pressured by trade unions, worker representation on the boards of larger
German companies was increased to 50 per cent. The German example was widely
followed by Holland, Sweden, and

rance.^^'

The provisions regarding the s u p e ~ s o r y

board under CCL, however, does not give the s u p e ~ s o r yboard the power to controI

"Supra note 86 at 214.

Articles 54 and 126 of CCL.
It is pmvided under ANcIe 53 and Artide 125 of C U that the term of the office of the supe~sor
shonld
be th= years. Consecutive terrns are albwed ifthe supeMsor reeiecîed upon expirationof the tern
366

'" For a brief of Gnmany A u ~ c h t s m(supeMsory
t
board), ree W.CC.Kester. "Gover~ance.Contracting,
and hestment Horizons A Look at hpan and Germanywin D, EL Chew eb Shcdies in InterncationaL
Corporare fiance and Gavemance Systemx A Compmson of the US.Japan and Europe (New York,
Oxfordr Mord University Press- L997) at 236.
WhiIe the Canadian one-tier board structure ccdects the Engiish approach, the Chinese two-tier board
smicture d a t e s the Conthentai Etzropean Approach which is adopred in Gamanyf Anstria, Koïïand
and is permitted in France,
368

Supra note 3 4 at 71.

fimdamentai business policy of a corporation nor does it provide a specific compuIsory
ratio for worker representation on the s u p e ~ s o r yboard.

B

The Reality

The provisions regarding the rights and responsibiiities of the supe~soryboard
under CCL do not result in supe~sors'active involvement in corporate &&S.

A number

of reasons account for the passive role of corporate s u p e ~ s o r sin China

Fust,

representatives of workers have employment relationships with the corporation.
PracticdIy it is Ïmpossible for worker representatives to rnonitor directors or managers
given their concerns for their own job securïty. Second, the independent status of the
supervisory board is problematic since the supervisors are employees or shareholders of
the corporation.

Third, the efficiency of Uivolving workers and shareholders as

supervisors is doubtful since most of them Iack the tirne, expertise, and training necessary
to evaluate corporate managers. Fourth, CCL does not provide that the supe~soryboard
has the right to elect or remove directors, or to take actions on behaif of the corporation
against management. The right of the s u p e ~ s o r yboard to demand that directors and
managers correct their misbehaviors does not have any effect due to the absence of any
effective legai remedy. That is, if directors or managers fail to correct their acts in
accordance with the stxpervisors' advice or if the board ignores a proposai from the
supe~korsto convene the interÏm shareholders' meetings, there is r d y no legai recourse
avaiIable to the supe~sors.FdUi, in cases where the state is a majority shareholder, it is
observed that the supemÏsors Iack incentive to monitor the management team since such
supervison do not have eq*

ownership in the corporation nor does the corporation

provide any incentive de vice^.'^^ Sb&, in reaiity, rnost supervisors are working part time,
have no office facilities in the corporation and generally foff ow the instructions of the
board of directors or the general manager of the corporation. It is said that the working
reports of sorne supervisory boards are dictated by the chairman of the board or the
generai manager!37o

C

Improvement

The monitoring tùnction of the Chinese supemkory board wîII not be effective
unless s u p e ~ s o nare vested with substantiaI powers to act as a check against managers
and directors. The Issues listed in the preceding paragraph must be addressed if the

supe~soryboard is expected to play an active role in monitoring corporate decision-

makers in China Only when the business cornmunity and/or Iegal community in China is
aware of the defects contained in the existing supe~soryboard structure under the CCL

can fùrther improvement of China's two-tier board structure be expected.

4.3.3 Recomrnendations

As has been seen, the one-tier board structure adopted by the CBCA with outside

directors perfiorming the h c t i o n of oversight of corporate attairs is the same board
structure found in US corporations. rn China, however, except Ïn the case of foreign
Lei tr<lR 'Improving the Corporation Law on Mechanisms of ChcdBng Po- mder Corporate kgai
Person institutionm(t997.6.4 47) Legai Science (Northwestern Potitics and Law Coiïege lournat)(in

36P

Chinese) at 32,

-

investment enterprises, corporations adopt a two-tier board system, one for management

and the other for supe~sion,a system similar to Germany's two-tier board ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ' ~
A board with outside directors performing oversight of corporate management bas
certain advantages.

First, outside directors may objectively andyze corporate

performance since outsiders wiil be Iess dependent on the inside directors (who are usually
members of senior management) and iess infiuenced by the presence of senior
management."

Second, outside directors tend to provide neutral counsel and advice.

This is based on the assumption that inside directors are committed to Company tradition
and old ideas. Through the uuluence of and the perspective provided by outside directors,
corporate management can adapt to technological advances, cornpetition, and econornic
change as well. On the other hand, it has been argued by some that outside directors
cannot actudly perform nich effective oversight at ail given that outside directors devote
tittie time and energy to their monitoring duties. They may not have suffitient knowledge
to effectively oversee management since they do not have access to the same detailed
corporate information as managers have.3n
However, theoretically, a number of reasons support a split of the board into a
managing board and an oversight or supemDsoboard. First, with a clear personai and

institutionai split between management and monitors, a distinct distriiution of
nt The hostile British reaction to Gennan's two-tier stmc~tfeheips to e x p h why Canadian corpomte
law did not adopt the concept of the supervisory board The EngineerÏng EmpIqers' Federation in
London stated thak "the idiction of such a theory wodd be d e s t n i h of the genmü efficient operation
and wealth-creatingactivïty of private enterprise in Britainw Cited by L. C. B. Gower. Gower 's Prkiples
nfiMorem Company Law. 4h ed (London. Stevens & Sons, L979) at 71 h m hployee Pctrticipution

(1974)at 3.
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Supra note 19 at L IO,

m C. J-Meier-Schatz, "CorporateGovemance and Legai Rnles: A Transnationai Look at Conceptsand

Problems of Intenial Management Control" (1988) 13 J- Corp. L 43 1 at 469.

responsibüities and powers is created which in tum, may promote effi~iency~"~
Second,
such an institutional separation allows the board of directors to act more independentiy
without being intluenced by senior managerial officers (e.g. the Chief Executive OEcer).

For instance, the management and m o n i t o ~ gdivisions wili separately prepare the board
meeting agenda to discharge their respective responsibilities. 'ïherefore, the two-tier
board system provides the basis for an explicit funetional specialization of monitors and

managers.
However, the two-tier board system is not without weakness in praaice. Fust,
because of the split between management and supervision, the members of the supeMsory
board, reiïeved of operational responsibilities and focused on Mlling their monitoring
duties, may arguably have less time to invea and have less corporate information. The

split of management tiinctions into two boards may itsetf have an impact on the corporate
data ffow. Monitoring corporate management, especiaily in a large public corporation,

requires a considerable amount of time, information and cornmitment. Part-time outsiders,
haIf-hearted in commitment, and with severe Iimits on their access to data do not
necessarily enhance the monitoring tùn~tion."~Second, the Iegislative concept of a two-

tier structure, which creates an independent monitoring organ to controI the executive
management. is difficult to convert into corporate reality since a mandatory two-tier

structure in public corporations is not able to break up the "natural"internai power circles
of large ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n s . ~ ~ ~
No matter whether a corporation has a singIe tier board structure or a two-tier

374

Ibid at 464,

nsSupra note 373 at 465.

Ibid at 366 - 467,

board structure, the fùnction of monitoring (as a checking and balancing power) shouId be
exercised independently From the management. The principal objective of a corporation is
to pursue corporate profit and enhance shareholder gain through its business a~tivities.~"

ui achievhg this objective, the board's role requires it to be accountable for the success of
the corporation by taking responsibility for management.37s ui this sense, it is advisable to

split the function of monitoring and management within a Company regardless of whether
it has a single tier board or a two-tier board structure. There is no universai structural

model for achievhg an optimal division of these two bnctions since every country has its
unique statutory and cuItural traditions and its own business redity.
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Ever since the appearance of the modern corporation, the= has been a long-term controversy reiating
to the proper objective of the corporations. Though the earIy public corporations were set up for public
purposes ( e g ton bridges), the capitaiist theory of rnaximizing capitaiists' w d t h Ied to corporations
organized For the enrichment of the corporations. As the Nobel Pnze-winning economist, Milton
Friedman stated, "A singie. objective goai Iike profit maximization is f x more easily monitored than a
muItipIe, vaguely defined goal Iike the fair and reasonable accommodation of ail affied interests. It is
easier, for exampie, to teII if a corporate manager is doing what she is supposed to do than to teii if a
university president is doing what she is supposed to do." (cited by A k Sommer Ir. "lt Ai1 Cornes Dom
to Money ,Face it: A Board's Main Goai is Corporate Profits" online: U A Section of Business Law,
Business Law Today (JanuaryIFebniary 1999 <httpYf~.abanetorg/busIaw/8-3rnoneyhtml~(date
accessed June 14. 1999).
The Organization for Economic Co-opemtion and Deveropment (OECD) in its Aprii 1998 Report -tes
that "Most industrialized societies recognàe that generating long-term economic profit (a meastm based
on net revenues that takes into accoant the cost of capital) is the corporation's primaiy objective. In the
bng nm, the generation of economic profit to enhance ~ h o ~ k v d uüuough
e ,
the pursuit of sustained
cornpetitive advaotage, is necessq to attract the capital reqmnd for prudent gmwth and perpetuation"
Supra note 18 at 27.
Within the academic
professor M M Blair in her ûwnersir'i, md Contml: Rethinhng Corporate
Govemmce /or tihr Z r Cenmty (Washington D.C.: Bmohgs Institnte, 1995) argoes that the
corporation ought to take into account the interests of empIayees, suppliers, customers, cornmunities,
long-term interests of sharehofdersas well as short-term intethe intensts of the state and so on,
nuSupra note 22 at 28. C i h g Report of the National Association of Corporate Dlrectors Commission on
Director Professlonalism at f (November 1996).

The comparative examination of the power and duties of the board of directors,
the roIe of the chair of the board and the monitoring h c t i o n performed by boards under

the CBCA and China's Corporate Laws as well as in the business ceaiity of Canada and

China reveais that, though China introduced the stnicture of the board of directors based
on models used in capitalist c0untries,3~the traditionai management mode1 Ieft by C h a t s

planning economy is stiU codified under China's Corporate Laws. Rather than granting the
board of directors actual decision-making power, CCL vests the board with a hi& degree

of influencing power in corporate strategic matters.

Compared with Canadian Iaw,

China's Corporate Laws have not seriously addressed the issue of duties of the directors.
But the distinctive provisions deaiing with personai Iiabilities of the chair of the board
contained in China's Corporate Laws reflect vestiges of the enterprise management mode
under China's planning economy. As to the monitoring tiinction of the board, the
comparative audy indicates that China's two-tier board structure under the CCL does not
seem to enhance corporate efficiency to any grater degree than Canada's single tier board
structure.
This comparative examination of the roIe of the board in corporate internai control

hrther indicates that, adhering to a sociaiist regime, China's Corporate Laws try to meld
the western management mode whh the enterprise management mode ori@dy developed
under a planning economy.

4.4

-

Managerid Of'ficen Controt through Manageriai Expertise

379 ~ o t that
e there was no structure Like the board of direaorr in state-oumedor coiiectidy owned
enterprises

There is no general dennition of the term "officer" under the CBCA Officers are
those people designated as such by the directors.

The role of managerial otficers in corporate operations under the CBCA and
China's Corporate Laws is often not paid much attention in the statutes themselves.
Praaicaily speaking, managerial officers in the larges and most financialiy important
corporations in Canada enjoy virtually free reign in determinhg the corporation's destiny.

4.4.1 Power of Otticers under the CBCA and in Reaiity

Although the board of directors is vested with the statutory right to manage
corporations according tu the CBCA, the business redity of modem corporations is that
day-to-day management has been delegated, to a nibaantid extent, by the board of
directors to manageriai ofticers, panicularIy in large widely held public corporation^.^"
But it should be noted that under the CBCA, not ail the powers of the board can be

deIegated to the officers. The powers that cannot be delegated relate tu tiuidamentai
corporate changes and major business decisions, such as making changes to the by-laws
(which are subject to shareholders' approval)~" approving hanciai staternents, a

management proxy circular, a take-over bid cirdar or directors' ciradar, issuhg
securitles (except on terms aiready approved by the board); d e c h ~ gdividends; and
purchashg or redeeming shares of the corporation-3"

The extent of such deiegation Mnes depending on the siP and circmnstances of the corporations The
boardof large corporatioosmay deïegate more authority and fespo~lsl'biiityto the management The board
ofmaîi or dosely-heId corporations may becorne involved wnh more detaiied bo9aeJs of the corporation,

The reason directors deIegate daiIy manageriai power to the M-time officers is
Iinked to the officers' professional managerid skilts and knowledge about the corporation,
and to the fact that the officers work hl1 time for the corporation, while the directors do

not. Corporate officers' powers may aiso be expanded as a result of the workings of the
proxy system.

The proxy systern can either be employed by dissenting minority

shareholders or by the management for accumuiating votes. Most shareholders of large
public corporations do not have an interest in attending and vohg at the shareholders'
general meetings. The management thus seeks to have a management nominee appointed
as the shareholdds proxy with dl proxy solicitation expenses borne by the c~r~oration.~"

The result usually is that the passive majority of shareholders simply endorse the doctrines
of management. This creates the oppominity for management (that is, senior corporate
officers) to control the corporation's strategic business.
Therefore, in a Canadian widely held public corporation, the managerid expertise
of corporate officers allows them to control corporate daily management. Further, the
existence of a sip-ficant number of passive shareholders and a management controUed
proxy system permits this same group to direct corporate arategic business. AccordingIy,
the senior manageriai officers are more Iikely to be the uItimate corporate controllers of a

widely held public corporation. Appendk II - A üIustrates this business reality.
It is found that in a high ownership concentration public corporation in Canada,
the presence of a single shareholder or a srnaII group of shareholders (exercising either
regal or effective controi) and the fact that such "coutrohg sharehoIders" have

contniuted substantiai capital to the corporation mean that thek concerns over the

corporate business are more likeIy to b e addressed by corporate managers at least with
respect to strategic management of the corporation. It is even possible that the controllii
single or group of shareholders are also managers

Appenda II

-

B illustrates this

business reality.

In terms of closely-held corporations in Canada, since managerial officers are often
also its shareholders. shareholder-managers are the uitimate controIIers of these
corporations as well. Please see Appendk LI - C.

In recognition of managerial otticers' power in managing corporate matters, the

CBCA extends fiduciary duties to otficers. Therefore, the corporate officers ninction as
agents of the corporation and at least at the level of senior management, owe a fiduciary
obligation and dut. of care, diligence and ski11 to the corporation and are treated in the

sarne way as directors in this respect.'"

4.4.2 Powers of Officers under CCL and FIES Laws and in Reaiity

CCL provides the sarne powers to officers of closely-held corporations and
publicly-held corporations.38sin addition to the right to attend the board meetings as nonvoting attendants, and other powers stipulated by the articles of association of the
corporation or delegated by the board of directors to the o E c e q CCL provides in detail

that managers in Chinese corporations have to be in charge of the d d y operation of the
corporation, implement board resolutions, organize the irnpIernentation of the annual
-

3w CBCA

s 122 (1).
See also, Cmadia~i
Aero Service Ltd v_0'hfaIf.qet al,, f 19741S C k 592, JO DL& (3d) 371 (SCC-).
ArticlesesSO
and L 19 of CCL

jS5

business pians and investment plans of the corporation; fornulate plans for estabIishment

of the internai management organs of the corporation; formulate the basic management
system of the corporation; fomuiate specifïc d e s and regdations of the corporation;
recommend the appointment or dismissai of the deputy managers and ofpersons in charge
of the financiai &airs of the corporation; and appoint or dismiss management personnel

odier than those to be appointed or dismissed by the board of directors. It seems that CCZ.
provides a hi& degree of inffuencing power to managers and expects them to give
suggestions to the board in respect of daily corporate management. in the meantirne, CCL
requires the managers to be responsible for daily corporate operations.
As to managers in foreign investment cornparies

in China, FIES Laws provide that

the general manager and vice generd managers together are responsiile for the day-to-day

management of E s . But uniike CCL, the FIESLaws do not detail the responsibilities of
the managers.386
In each of the three types of public corporations in China, as shown in Appendix
ELA,

B, and C,in generd, manageriai officers are not ultimate controlIers. Mead, their

principal d e is to impiement corporate decisions.
In tems of closefy heId corporations in China, nrch as foreign investment

companies, as demonstrated in Appendk iII

- D,

only the general manager (or vice

general managers) will be in charge of corporate daiIy management:"

other junior

managers wÏIi impIement management decisions.

Farna and Jensen have defked the decision-making process k terms of four

m6 Amde 38 of UnpIementation R d e s of W Law and Artide 32of Implementation Ruies of CN Law.

The d e of generai managers and vice g e n d managers wü£kaddressed in 4-43 bdow.

Institution

- generation of proposais for resource utiIization

and

smicturllig ofcontracts;
Ratincation - choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented;
hplementation - execution of ratified decisions; and
Monitoring - measmement of the performance of decision agents
and implementation rewards.

Managers in Chinese public corporations and closely-heId corporations (except the
generai manager or vice general manager in FiEs) are handling the implementation
process.
With regard to the duties of managerial officers, they are subject to the same

fiduciary obligations as are the directors under CCL.~*'

4.4.3 Chief Executive Officer in Canada and General Manager in China

Managerial officers are able to influence the board through insider directors Sitting
on the board. The influence of managerid officers can reach its pinnacle when the
corporation's cchif executive officer (in the case of Canada) or generd manager (in the
case of Chùia) aiso takes the position of chair of the board of directors. It has been found

that in Canada the combination of chef executive officer and chair of the board of
directors is more Iikely to be found in smail corporations than large corporation^.^^
OveraiI, 34.5 per cent of Canadian corporations have the chief executive oEcer as the

'

EI.Fama & MC. Ieweh "Separationof Ownershipand Cornln (1983) 26 1. t. & Econ 301 at 303.
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See 4.2.2.B-

'"

Supra note I3 1 a1 235.
ûne interesthg phenornenon is that corporations with a combined CE0 and diairmeen have a r & W y
iarge percentage of insicle ditectors, while corporations with iodependent Caanmerr are found to have a
reIativdy Iow percentage of inside directors.

chair of the board. In over 83 per cent of Canadian corporations, the chief executive
onicer is also a member of the corporation's board of direct or^.^^' The combination of
generai manager and chahan in foreign uivestment companies in China is rare.)" The
reason is that there are greater risks associated with the position of chairman (Le. legal
representative) in China, as has already been addressed in 4.2.3 B.

However, the

combination of general manager and director is the nom in Chinese corporations.
There have been suggestions in Canada to split the positions of chief executive
officer and chaiman of the board.'"

The rationaie behind such proposais is relatively

straigh~owward:the board of directors can oniy effectively exercise the tùnction of
monitoring senior management to the extent that it is independent from management. It
wouid seem, however, that the benefit of splitting the positions of chief executive officer
and chairman of the board wouId Vary from case to case. Currently there is no uniform
answer to the question of whether there two positions should or should not be held by the
same person.

4.4.4 Summary

The role of managerid officers in corporations varies with different types of
corporations in both Canada and China. The comparative examination of manageriai

"' Supra note 127 ai 13.
'" No detaiied dam howwer, is available393Oder*Hoslain & Harcourt (Barristem & Soiicitors, Patent and Tradefnatk Agents)

Boardmorn
P e n p t b s Corporate GowmanœUpdate, "Chair and CE0 Shouid the ROIS be Spiit?"
<hnp:l/www.oder.comIpublicatio~OardfOOmmPerSpective/gavfebW-2.
html(date accessed. M y 15,
1999)-

otficers' powers of decision-making in Canadian and Chinese corporations demonstrates
that in Canada, the senior managerial officer (such as the Chief Executive Ofncer) very
Iikely wields ultimate decision power in widely-held public corporations and shareholdermanagers may be corporate controUers in public corporations with high ownership
concentration and in closely-held corporations. In China, managerid officers in public
corporations more ofken play a role confined to Unplementing corporate management
decisions and the general manager in closely-held corporations is the decision-maker in
terms of corporate d d y management.
The relatively modest role of manageriai officea in China is closely connected with
the enterprise management mode that existed under the planning economy in which

managers were not cailed upon to decide enterprise strategy or daily planning but rather
were expected simply to carry out state plans.

The hi& degree of influencing power granted to corporate managers of Chinese
public corporations represents a hdf-way management mode1 between Canadian
managerial discretion in the direction of corporate business and the Chinese sociaiist
management mode1 which does not require mangers to make management decisions.

4.5

-

Employees Control through Collective Influence

Employees' influence on corporate control can be effected in two ways. One is
that employees can become shareholders of a corporation by purchasing shares of the

corporation This point has been addressed in 4.1.3 above. The other way in which the
empIoyees can exert thek intluence on corporate decision makuig is through unions or
through theu representabves on the s ~ p e ~ s o board
r y (in the case of Ch). The second

point is to be examined in this sedon.

4.5.1 Under the CBCA

The fa& that workers form an integrai part of a corporation is essentiaily ignored
by Canadian corporate laws. The CBCA is dent on the issue ofemployee participation in
the corporate decisionmaking process. Canadian law-maken seem to be reluctant to

provide for workers' participation in corporate management.
The reason for this rehctance to provide for employee participation by statute

might be related to the refatively low level of union involvement historicaüy in corporate
decision making in Canada. In 1994, Dr. Wagar conducted a survey of Iabor unions
across Canada examining their involvement in employer decisionmaking and strategy,
human resource policies, and the Iabor-management climate. The survey indicated that
"there was strong evidence that organizations were not integrating quality management

with a culture focusing on employee

The survey demonstrated reIatively

low support for the statements th& employee participation in mategic management

detisions is encouraged and that top management was committed to employee
Therefore, neither under Canadian corporate law nor in business rrality
inv~lvernent.~~~
do employees, as a collective, have a substantiai power of innuence over corporate

management-

T.K Wagar, Ldor-Management Retarions in C m a d ~
A Suney of l'non Oncers (Canadaindustriai ReIations Center, Q u m ' s University. 1996) at t.

%
'

From a legal theoretic point of view in Canada, the relationship between

employees and the corporations that employ them is governed by the employment
contract, rather than corporate Iaw. But the reality is that the tme relationship between
employees and their corporate employers goes beyond contractual relationships.
Employees depend upon their employen for their livelihood, and the existence and success
of the corporation, in tum, depends upon their Iabor. They are, in fact, "members of the

Company for which they work to a far greater extent than are the shareholders whom the

law persists in regarding as its proprietors. *

3%

4.5.2 Under CCL

The right of employees to be represented on the supewisory board and to
participate in corporate decision rnakuig is codined in the CCL.~''

Aithough workers do

not have the right to vote at board meetings, it is cleariy provided by the CCL that when a
corporation decides issues reIating to saiarÏes, welfare, working safety, working
conditions, labor insurance and so on, the corporation should solicit in advance the
'%Supra 3 4 at 10-1 1.

Professor C.C. Nicholls of FacuIty of Law OFDaihousie University has f i e r mggesteci that there is a
fùndamentai idedogicai issue here In Canada, it seems h t the ody proprietaxy right that has thus far
been clearly sanctioned by the IegisIators and the comts is an ownership right fiowing h m acquisition of
property with capitai. Canadians Iitwmakers do not get appear to recognize propn'etary or quasipropnetary rights ffownig h m the contribution of Iabor, rather than cipitaï. to an enterpise.

'"

The duai board style and labor paniciption in corporate decision making in China folIow the mode1 of
Germany. HoweverZthey are différent fiom the German system,
According to Codetennination Act of 1951, one half OFthe duectors an the corpomte board in the c o d
and steeî industries is to be eiected as employee representatives, The Works Constitution Act of 1952,
which appties to all o k r ütdusûies reqtrires that one-of the directors kemployee representa*
See K I. Hopl "New Ways in Corporate Gov-ce:
European ExperÏmmtswith Labor Representation
oa Coqmate Boards'' ( ( 9 8 4 ) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338 at 1350, and I. P.
Keeping Gwd
Company: A Sh<dy ofCorporate Gmrnance in Fie Cmtries (United States: M o r d Unniemty Press
Inc N.Y.,1994) at 15.

opinions of the union and workers. The union and representatives of workers3" shouid be
invited to attend relevant meetings as non-voting participants.399 When management
studies and decides "major corporate issues" and formulates "important corporate rules",
opinions and suggestions from the union and workers should be heard."'

CCL however

does not provide what constitutes "'major corporate issues" and "important corporate
des". It is obsewed that, in reality, ody those maners relating to job security, salaries,
weüiire, and wocking conditions are to be CO-determinedby the workers (through their

union or representatives of workersM1)and the board.

4.5.3

Under ETESLaws

It is provided under REs Laws that while the board of directors decides issues
relating to rewarding or disciplining employees, the salary system, we~fkre,~*
labor
protection and insurance, representatives corn the union should attend the relevant
meetings without voting rights to express the concems and opinions of the ~orkers.*~

" In China, the union is an organization organized according to laws and reguiations ~Iatingto unions
and participated in by Iabor. See Artide 7 of Labor Law of rhe People's Republic ofChina ( e f f i e on
lanuar). 1, 1995). The fimd contributed by corporations and the function of unions are governed by the
Trade Union Law of the People's Republk of China.
While representatives of workcrs are elected by all workers of an enterprise according to corporate
i n t d rutes- Such eiection may or rnay not k hdd reguiariy. Worker representatives once eIected can
negotiate with management any matters that pmposed by ai1workers' meetings.
399

Article 55 (for closcly-held corporations) and Anide 121 (for pubtic1y-held coiporatious) of C m

*a

Article 56 (for dosely-heldcorpontions) and

122 (for publicly-heldcorporations) o K ( Z

Supra note 398.

"WeUare"is a generai term under Chioa's Corporate Lam It may indude medicai Mare. houhg
subsidy, andloi-chiIdren's education subsidy, etc.
For example. Artide 98 of the ImpIementhg Reguiations for the Law of the People's Repiblic of
China on Sino-foreign EQnity Joint Venture Enterprises (Zhong HM Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhong Wai

GeneraiIy, emp1oyee.i colIectct?re influences on the corporate management of both

FIES and corporations under China's Corporate Laws are modest. These influences are

usually related to employees' interests Oike salary, welfare, labor protection, etc.) in the

corporation^.^^ Theoreticaily, employees in CCL corporations have greater influence
over the management than do employees of FIES. The reasons are connected, first, with
the very fact that REs do not have supe~soryboards, and thus employees of REs lack

an institutional check on the power of the board of directors, that employees of CCL
corporations enjoy, and second, with the fact that Chinese employees can never be owners
of FiEs under current ETEs ~aws."'

4.5.4 A Comparative Anaiysis

The mode1 that the CBCA adopts, with essentidly no labor involvement in the
corporate decision-making process, appears to retlects an underlying philosophy that the
involvement of workers in corporate aiTiairs wouid likely jeopardize the long-term finire
of the bus in es^."^ On this view, labor unions and management should be separated in
He Zi Jing King Qi Ye Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li) (prnmulgated by the State Corncil on September 20, L 983 and
amendeci by the State Council on Jmuary 15, 1986 and on December 21, 1987) and Anide 71 of the
Impternenting Rules for the People's RepubIic of China on WhoIIy Foreign~wnedEnterprises (Appmved
by the Stafe CounciI on October 28. 1990. pmmigated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade on December 12,1990 and effectNe h m December 12,1990).
It is pmided under the FEs Laws that in order to enniti:the union has fiuids to operate, FiEs most
aiiocatecertain h d s to the union each month,
Article 99 of Implementation Replations of EJV Law. Article 72 of Implementation Ruies of WFOE
Law-

-

Neither UV Law nor U V Law provides that Chinese iiimduals may be a party to sino-fore@ equiry
joint ventures or sino-foreign cooperativejoint ventures.
ArticIe I of EN Law and Artide 1 of CJV Law.
A b m d igOe arises h m this statement, That is, whether or not it Q pmper for the board of directors
to express@consrnsrder
the mterests of employees (amoag ohers) in making deagons" in the best mterests

order to maintain the integrity of the collective bargaining process.

The rigtas of

employees and managerial discretion should be preserved by ami's length negotiation
conhed to the terms of employment.
The mode1 that CCL and FIES Laws adopt including labor participation in the
corporate decision-making process tends to ensure that the ïnterests of employees are
taken uito account in management of the corporations and that empioyees share some
responsibility in corporate decision r n a l ~ i n ~In
. ~the
~ eyes of Chines law-makers, the
interests of workers in the corporation, though different Corn the interests of shareholders,
are as important as the interests of investors. The Chinese labor market is Iess liquid than
the capital markets, so that switchingjobs is not as easy as selling stock (especidly in the
case of those workers who have developed firm specific

skills for whom the chance of

~ dso hoped that such a regime can, to some
mobility in the labor market is ~ l i r n ) .It~ is

extent, curb manageriai dishonesty and dirninish disharmony between labor and
management. [t is expeaed that, through Iabor representation, employees will become

more productive and have a strong sense of cornmitment to their corporations.
The provision of labor representation under CCL and FIE Laws is deepIy rooted in

of the corporation". In the case Teck Corporation Limited et ak v, MiIIcv, Price, Harmbowe, Gibbeson,
Cmudiarr fiphration Lfd and @on Mines Lrd (N.P.L.), 119731 2 W.W.R 3 85 (B.C. Sup, CL),the court
stated, in obiter, that direetors shouid not bc found in breach of their fiduciary duties if they consider the
interests of employces: "If today the directors of a company were to consider the intercstr of its employees
no one wodd argue thai in doing so they were no< acing bona fide in the intemas of the tompany
itseKw(at425).

Since the Iabor market is not as [iqpïd as the capital marke~eqxcïaiïy for those w o h who have
deveioped some specific skiiis, the chance of mobilitg Ï n the Iabor market is s h On the other hand, a
tradicioaai poht of view is that a company in China amally pmvides an employee a Hé-long job.
Thefefore, the mterests of empfoyees are specïficaiïy addnssed by China's Corporate Law.

"

The otha side ofthe eqtration, thougb is that ifworkers bave devdoped ski[S they cannot be replacexi
by the corporation arcept at high CO& AccordlngIyv managers wüî h m an mcentive a> voIuntariiy
accommodate someemployees' wishes to prwent them h m @tting

this country's politicait historicai, ideological, economic and cultural values. Wth a long
period of a d h e ~ gto a socialist system, and statdpublic ownership dominance in
economic Iife, a management mode characterized by codetermination with workers in
state-owned enterprisesag is maintained under CCL and FIE Laws.

Such

CO-

determination with workers has been deemed a type of socialia democracy. Socialist
ideoIogy has for a long time advocated that everybody has a right to work and a sociaiist
country s h d have fiil1 employment. These have become deeply rooted assumptions in the
minds of Chinese workers and managers alike.

On the other hand, the social

unemployment benefits system in China is not well deveIoped. Therefore, employee
interes& especially job security, are given much greater aîtention by the Chinese
govemment through China's Corporate Laws.
[t shouid be noted that aithough employee participation rights exist under CCL and

FIES Laws, the role that employees play in corporate policy making in Chinese

corporations is modea.

Firstly, the laws €d tu eaablish quaiification standards,

procedures for the election and removai of workers' representatives and a ~amework
under which workers can provide input on important corporate matters on an ongoing
r y is provided in ambiguous
basis. Labor's right to representation on the s ~ p e ~ s oboard
statutory wording and without any real means of enforcement.

representation in corporate management

Secondly, Iabor

efficiency concems because moa worker

representatives Iack managerid knowIedge. Thll-dIy,since the s u p e ~ s o r yboard exercises
its rights coiIectively, hthe absence ofany provision as tu the ratio of labor representation
oa the supenisory board under the CCL, it is doubtfbi whether the workers' mterests can
409

Grticie 16 of 1993 Constitution of the People 's Reprr6Iic of Chinn:

be meaningfùily addressed by the s u p e ~ s o r yboard in reality."'

Fourthly, the narrow

nature of employees' concems implies a modest role for labor representation4''
A comparative examination of empIoyeeg coflective influences over corporate

internai control in Canada and China indicates that employees ofCCL cornpanies and REs
generally have greater innuences than their counterparts in Canada

It fiirther

demonarates t hat corporate control practices under China's Corporate Laws maintah
certain socialist doctrines.

4.6

-

Summary: Corporate Control From An Interna1 Perspective

Corporate intemal control is a complicated issue. Legally speaking, corporate
internai control depends on what a country's corporate law provides in respect of
corporate intemal structure, the powers vested with corporate participants by the
corporate Iaw and the provisions of a corporation's constitutionai documents. Pradcally
speaking, corporate intemal control is complicated and varies widely from corporation to
corporation.

The rationaie underlying those features of a counuy's corporate Iaw deaiing with
corporate structure is closety connected with that country's histoticai, poIiticai and
economic development, Iegd tradition, ideology and the culturai values of its people. As

"State-owned enterprises practice democratic management through congress of workers and staff and in
other ways in accordance with the law."

Fan,lian & Jiang, Daxing, On Corporate L m (Nanjing, Cauia: Nanjing University Pubüshmg
House: 1997) at 483, (Chinese version).

4t0

"'

Generaily, workers are concemeci about theirjob semrity, saIary and
and wodring conditioag
whether their ski& are transferabIe or not, and whether more training or edncaîïon are avaiIa61e. But
these issues constitute oniy a portion of the issues that m m be adchseci in corporate poky making

to the provisions under a corporation's constitutional documents, they are a f'unction of the
degree of strictness of corporate law, the expectation of investors at the M i e of
establishg the corporation, and the professionai skiIIs of the drafters of nich
documents.J12 On the other hand, business reaiity is in a aate of flux. Corporations, in
order to survive within the modem competitive commercial environment, have to improve
their performance. Proper corporate intemal control can be one means of achieving
improved performance.
Legal provisions under the CBCA provide for the possibiiity of a unanimous

shareholders' agreement as a method for tailonng a corporation's management structure
and providing shareholders with direct control over a corporation.313 However, in the

absence of a unanimous shareholders' agreement, the board of directors is given the
statutory power to manage a corporation."'

Moreover, the CBCA permits the board to

delegate part of its manageriai power to corporate officers. This corporate intend power
distriiution is iIIustrated in Appendix Il- D.
Though this "one-sizefits ail" corporate intemaf control structure under the CBCA
fails to recognize different corporate decision-making modes in different types of
corporations in business reality, it acknowledges the shareholders' position in corporate
internai control.

SharehoIders, as capitdists, have absolute power in rnanaging

corporations provided they act unanimously. It appears that the CBCA's corporate
internai control mode1 is based on capitai. However, the corporate internai control mode1

"'Waere the coprate

Iaw of a country p h d e s specinc prcsnÏbed f o m for a corporaîÏoaTs
constitutionai documents, the professional skiIIs of cirafterswilt not be a factor.
4'3

CBCA s.102 (1).

is not an absolute capitalist modei, especiétily in terms of legal remdes provided by the
CBCA for p r o t e h g mïnority shareholders (and other stakehoiders dso) during the
course of corporate decision-makÏng Therefore, on the whole, the CBCA adopts a
modified capitaiia model of corporate intemal control.

Legal provisions under the CCL provide for the shareholdeh meeting as the most
poweA1 organ in a corporation4" and recognize the board of directors as the highest
authonty within a foreign investment c ~ r n ~ a n ~China's
. ~ ' ~ Corporate Laws m e r
recognize the p ~ c i p l of
e one share, one vote and majority rule. It seems that, in terms of
corporate intemal control, Iegai provisions under China's Corporate Laws adopt many
features of capitalism. However, in addition to a number of legai provisions based on
capitalist doctnhe- China's Corporate Laws also emphasize protection of state interests
within corporations even at the expense of disregarding independent corporate persondity.

Further, minonty shareholders (particularly individual shareholders) are discriminated

against by China's Corporate Laws. Moreover, the modest positions of boards of
directors and manageriai officers in Chinese public corporations indicate the vestiges of
the enterprise management model from China's sociaiist planning economy. Nevertheless,

labor participation in the corporate decisionmaking process typicdiy refleas the impact
of sociaiïst doctrine upon corporate intemal control.

nie mix of caphdist and socialist doctrines in the Iegai provisions regarding
corporate internai control under China's Corporate Laws reveals a modined sociaiïst

jt5

Articles 37 and 102 of CCL.

'"McIe 34 of ImpIementatïonRegulations of ETV Law and Artide 24 of hpiementation Rules of U V
Law.

mode1 of corporate internai control a mode1 combining sociallst enterprise management
under the planning econorny with features of modem western corporate management.

CHAPTER 5 CORPORATE: CONTROL FROM AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIW

The preceding chapter has offered a comparative examination of corporate control
in Canada and China 6om an intemal perspective by examiring determining/controlling or
iduencing powers exercised by shareholders, directors, managerial officers, and
employees under the CBCA and China's Corporate Law and in Canadian and Chinese
business reality.
As the definition of corporate control indicates (see Chapter 1),

these

determining/controlIing or influencing powen over policies or management of a
corporation do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in, influenced by, and in tum
influence, the societai values of a country.

Therefore, in this chapter, the issue of

corporate control will be addressed from an extemal perspective through a comparative
examination of the role of the state, market, creditors (focusing on banks) and culture in
influencing corporate management in Canada and China.

The State

1

State Control over Incorporation

By abolishing the notion of incorporation as a grant nom the prerogative powers

of the Crown, the presem CBCA adopts a regime of hcorporatioa as of ~ght.J'7This

regime eliminates any discretion on the part of the registrar to refùse to issue a certincate

*'?

Svpm note 12 (Dicicesson Report) at 18 - 19. See also CBCA r 8.

of incorporation provided that al1 necessary filings have been made in accordance with îhe
CBCA. Therefore, govemmentai control over the creation of corporations is restncted

and the incorporation procedure has become effective and convenient to business people.
Uniike the incorporation practice in Canada, in China, the govemment tightly
controls the establishment of corporations through approvd procedures specified by
China's Corporate Laws and other administrative regulations. To incorporate a publicly

held corporation (a Iiaed or unlisted corporation), approvais from both the local
govemment and the central govemment are required.'Ig If incorporating a listed public
corporation* stricter pre-conditions (relating to such matters as minimum asset
requirements and a history of profit-making of the enterprise applying for listing) are
required.

In addition, an annuai quota ~~stern*'~
for issuing shares to the public is

employed by the central govemment for the purpose of strictly controlling the shares to be
issued to the public each year. The issuing shares quota system will be discussed in 5.2.1 B
beIow.

With regard to setting up a foreign investment enterprise (a sino-foreign equity
joint venture, a sino-foreign cooperative joint venture, or a wholly Foreign owned

"*

LiSted corpontions refcr to corporaUons l i s t a i on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, or Foreign stock cuchangesArtide 77 and Article 151 of CCL.
Article 73 of CCL provides the prcconditions that a public corporation must s a t i e More it can be
incorporated.

m e r to 5.2-1 B below
in terms of incorporating domestic closely-heid corporations (ie Iunited liabïüty corporations under
CCL), the incarpontntg procedure is more Iike that ofthe mCA Upoa meeMg conditions pnM& by
the C U and registration with the state registration authority- the limited Iiability corporation is
established

enterprke), examination by, and approval fiom, an authorized state organ is required and
this requirement is strictly adhered t ~ . ' ~ '

The approval procedures for incorporation in China make the process of gettbg
incorporated uncertain and unpredictable. Approval largely depends on administrative
officers' discretion. M e r getting approvals, every corporation has to register itself with a
state organ, the state administration of industry and commerce or its local branches,

order to obtain a business license. The business license of a corporation will spe*

in

the

business scope of such corporation as approved by the approval authorities. Any business

activiaes beyond or in violation of the specified business scope are prohiited and a
corporation engaging in such prohibited activities will be penalized by relevant Chinese
~aws."'

The incorporation style under the CBCA indicates the Canadian govemment's
efforts to facilitate business people's use of the corporate rnechanism4* and its reliance on

the market to exetcise quality control in the creation of corporations. China's strict
control over the creation of corporations reflects this countiy's fiagiIe market which Iacks

The pre-conditions For cstablishinga closeiy-hefd corporation are set out in section one of Chapter Two of
CCL; for a publicly-he1d corpontion, section one of Chapter Three of CCL; for a listed corporation,
Anicle 152 of CCL;fior a sino-forcign cquity joint venture, Chapter Two of hplernentation Reguiations
of E
W Law. for a sino-fore@ cooperative joint venture, Chapter Two of ünpfementation Ruks of C N
Law. and for a wholly foreign owned corporation. chapter two of Impkmentation Ruies of WFOE LawArticIe 3 of UV Law.
ArticIe 8 of rmpfementing Regdations ofWV Law.
Article 5 of CJV Law.
Artide 6 of Implementing Rulcs of CJV Law.
Artide 6 of WFOE Law.
Article 8 of Implementing RuIcs of WFOE Law.
Anide IL of CCL Artide L I OC IqIementaaon Regdations of WV Law.
implementation Ruies of CJV Law.
Supra note 42 (Diderson Report) at 2. Citing K
(Chicago: CaiIaghan and Company. 1946) at (Ci42,

*CL

Artide 8 of

W. Baüantine, BuIIantrine on Corporations

the strength to screen out misuse and abuse of the corporate mechanism by investors. The
Chinese system relies upon prohibitive legd provisions rather than facilitating corporate
Iegislation to protect the interests of the public. The incorporation approach under
China's Corporate Laws is similar to the pre-CBCA system of incorporation by letterspatent that provides public officials discretion in determining the contents of a
corporation's constitution. Whether the regirne of incorporation by aate approvai can
achieve the goals of minimizing fraud and abuses, protecting public interests, and ensuring

heaithy development of corporations as stated by Chinese lawmakers remains to be
appraised."

But it is without doubt that Chinese state power over the creation of

corporations is much more signiticant than Canadian govenunent power in this area.

5.1.2 The RoIe of the State in a Corporation's Life

There are two means by which a state can exert controlling or iduencing power
over a corporation. First, the state may directly participate in corporate decision- making
by establishing state-owned shareholding companies or purchasing shares of a corporation.

Second, the state rnay exen influencing power indirectiy over corporate policy through
domestic iaws, regulations, policy and international agreements (especially

in connection

with tax and trade) to which the nate becomes party. This seaion will focus on the state's

The Law Cornittee of the NationaI PeopIe's CongressCRepart of Examination and Diffosson on the
Chinese Corporation Law (M)
(QuanGuo R a t Da Fa Lu We Yuan Hui Guan Yu "Zhong Hua Ren Mm
gong He Guo Gong si Fa (Chao An)" Shen Yi Iie Go De Bao Gao) mec- 17,1993) stated tbat the regïme
ofÏncorporatÏonby approval is for preventing h u d and abuses ofcorporations.
See aisot Supra note 59 at 18 and Supra note 60 at 465: a dkussion of abuses af the corporation form
during 1986 to t 992 before the promu1gatiorr of China's CorporationLaw.

influencing power over corporate policy *ou&

domestic corporate law in Canada and

Canada principaily adopts a capitaiist system."

Capitaiism as a system involves

constraints on govemment, and these constraints are determined in large part by the
requirements of business since, ideologically, capitaiism is based on the recognition of
private property rights. Adhering to many essential capitalist principle~'~~
and a belief in
the protection of pnvate property rights, the Canadian govemrnent aims in its corporate

law to provide a "fiamework policy" that ailows Canadian business to thrive within a
proper legai and institutional enviror~ment.~~
According to Michael Porter: "
. ..[g]ovemmenttsproper role is as a pusher and challenger. There is
a vitai role for pressure even adversity in the process of creating

national competitive advantage.. . Sound govemment policy seeks
to provide the tools necessary to compete, through active efforts to
bolaer Factor creation, whiIe ensuring a certain discornfort and
strong competitive pressure.

It is noted chat othcr laws. For instance* tax laws. may have significant influences over corporate
business. In the casc of China the Chinese governrncnt has employed tax incentives and designeci tax
holidays and concessions to attract foreign capital to China's Swai Economic Zones and other opening
areas. For a description of the SpctiaI Economic Zoncs that attract foreign capital Mi to Supra note 72.
asIt is not dear. however. that Canada is a purely "capitaiût"counw. More often, it is descfibed as a

mixed economy which blcnds cIcrncnts of capitaiism with eIements of k a l i s m . The Canadian
heaithcare synem. for euample. seems to embody more socialin that capitalin principles.

"

In Canada. the corporation was designed primuily as a vehide for raising and using capitai in the
pumit of profit. Thcrefore. it rv;is primarily intmded to serve the interof capitaiists (Le.
sharehoIders).
However. it is increasingly rccognizcd that the corporation may aIso need to take accunt of other
"stakehoIders".
I@a note 429 at 3. It is noted that though the govemment of Canada rnay not intedere sipificantiy
with individual business strate= through the CBCA, nmrtheless, many other forms of governent
regdation, iike enviconmental rcgulations, heaith and sfety regitlations. and prodnct safety ceguiationg
have a signifiant impact on business conduct In this sense, it may be said that Canada has adopted a
m&ed capitalkt -stem in its politicai and economic Mi

C"

"

Michael Porter* The Cornpetifive.4dvmtage ofMatiom (New York The Free Press, 1990) at 681.
Cited by R J. Danicis & R Mo* supra note 348 at 3 -

The Canadian government puts the promotion of prosperity and employment at the
heart of the govemment's agenddW But the Canadian government uses other methods
(rather than administrative interference) to achieve its goals. The Canadian govemment
seeks to build "a supportive domestic economic policy framework", works for improved
access for Canadian products abroad, and aims to develop "an open, f ~and
r predictable
. ~ ~ this aate policy, the govemment of
set of rules governing trade and i n ~ e a r n e n t " Under
Canada hopes to pave the way for expanded opportunities for Canadian business so as to
prornote the country's goals of low unempIoyment and rising prosperity. Thus, direct
administrative intervention fiotn the state in Canadian corporate affairs is minimal.

socidist system involves
China basically adopts a socialist ~ ~ s t e r n . ~The
'
constraints imposed upon the private sector rather than upon the govemrnent. Adhering
to a sociaiist system and a beiief in the protection of public property rights, the Chinese
govenunent's policy for corporations is to regulate and "standardizeir .432 The purpose of
standardizing corporations is to integrate the ptivate sector economy iato the socialist
system.

China's Corporate Laws embody the hope of the Chinese government of

providing an econornic structure for this private/sociaIist integration and so utiiize private

and public capital to pursue the sotialist aim of &Il empIoyment and prosperity.

"Canada Canada in the IVorid: üovemment Statcment (Ottawa: Goverment of Canada. 1995) at IO.
"'

Since the euinomic d o m beginning in 1979. and the adoption of "sociaiistmarket economf. it rnay
be hardto describe China as a purely sociaiist country-

=Anide 1 of CCL

"This law is fornulateci in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Repubtic
of Caina in order to meet the needs of establishmg a modem entqrise system, to srandwdiite the
organization and actMties of companies, to protect the Iegitimate rights and intet.estsof cornpanies,
sharehoIders, and creditors. to maintain the socid economk order and to prornote the devdopment ofthe
soÜaiïst market economy." (emphasis added)

For instance, employees' interests within corporations have been paid parûcular
attention by China's Corporate Laws. In addition to Iabor-management CO-determination
provisions under China's Corporate Laws, as mentioned in section 4.5 above, China's
Corporate Laws further provide cornpulsory provisions for corporations to fund unions
every month in order to ençure that unions in Chinese corporations have fiinds to organite
certain activities relating to colIective weifare.'ln The state policies are more ofien

expressed through corporate laws and reguIations in a compulsory, prohibitive and
negative way and often expressed in a way that limits the corporation's business freedom
so that the state can align the corporate business with state policy. Thus, to comply with
aate policy, corporations must frequentIy promote employrnent at the expense of
corporate efficiency.
As an economic structure, the corporation plays a key role in detennining whether

the Chinese govemment can achieve its socialist aims. Therefore, the aate is eager to
exert its will on corporations for the purpose of achieving aate policy goals. [t is without

doubt that in China the state exerts more state policies to iduence corporate decisionmaking than does the state in

anad da.''^ This leads to corporate control practices under

""Collectkcwelfare". i.e Ji Ti Fu Li.

No definition is provideci by Chinese law. PractidIy, it r e f i i co
faciiities pravidcd by a Company for its employas for enhanmg employees' interest in work or imptovùig
employees' h d th erg. mding room. gym and so on used by emptoyees.
Article 72 of lmplementation Ruies of WFOE Law and Article 99 of hptementing Regdations of UV
Law. Thesc articles provide that a forcign invernent company shaU activeiy support the work of its
unions and in accordance with the Iaws of the People's Repubtic of China on Lahr Unions, pmvide them
with the nacssary premiscs and facilities for office work and meetings and for use in orga-g
coiiective welfarp culturai and athletic activities for staff and workers A foreign imestment company
must each month alIocate Iabor miion h&
at the rate of 2 pet cent of the total pay cf their staff and
workers. Such b d s are to be used by their rabor unions in accordance with the measures for the use of
Iabor union IWids fonnulated by the AIE Chha Federation of Trade Unions.
4~ It is noted that in China, when corporations seek to amend certain provisions in their cunstitutional
documents, in addition to o b t d n g the consent of their sharehoIders, they must aIso obtain the apprwal
of the reievant state organ This cequi~mentfor appof amendments correspondsta thé reqziirement
of incorporation by statc a p p d in China

China's Corporate Laws that embody a combination of modem corporate control features

of western countries' corporate laws (in order to attract private capital into China's equity
markets) and elements of the traditional socialia mode1 of enterprise management (in
order to maintain continuity with s o d i s t doctrine)."'

5.2

The Market

Extemally, in addition to the state, the market is also one of the vital factors that

influences corporate control. However. it was not untii the 1970s and 1980s that law and
economics scholars realized that markets also played important roles in disciplinhg
corporate conducts and influencing corporate decision making.u6 These markets include
the capital markets (debt and equity markets), the corporate control market (Le. takeover

"'

Another argument made to support statc interference with corporate business in Cbina is that to some
extent, a relativciy strong staic influence in a corporation's Me d e s sense in today's China. The fess
efficient the underlying market mcchanisms to rcgdate corporations, the greater the need for govcrnment
rcgutation. Thus, thcrc 1s a srgnificant rolc for the state to play in Chinese corporate Ife during the period
of building China's market cconomy. Such a strong mie for the state dso maka sense considering the
fact that China has a large numbcr of unsophisticated indMdu&s buying and seiIhg shares. These naive
investors (who gcnerdly lack profcssionai investment advisors) are unabIe to assess the nsks involveci
with investing in China's immature market Many individuaI Chinese imestors are uriaware that themay jeopardizc their financial Future by placing their IXe savings in schemes o f f i g highiy voiatik
returns and fail to give e c i c n t wcight to the pom-bility of thetr imrestment becoming worthless. They
are more easiiy infïuenced by mcdia and. thus. are apt to take a stake in corporations that wii1 never resdt
in adequate returns on their investment, These facts contn'bute to an environment in wbch the state has
considerable room to inteivene in the marketplace. The state, by regulating or rometimes over-reguiating
the marketplace is capable of discouraging inchiduais fmm dewioping schemes dai*gned to mislead
unsophïstiuted investors, prevcnting artficiai market manipulation and helping to channe1 private
investor firnds to I e s rïsky investmcntsc
a6

See cg R Gilson, "The Case Against Shark RepeIIant Amendments: Strnctural Limitations on the
Enabhg Concept" ( 1982) 34 Stan. L, Rev- 775
See
L A Briddey. "Managcrid Goals and the Comt System: Some Econoxuic uisights* (1988) 13
Crut - US,LJ.77 at 81.
E,F,Fama "A g e n q Probterns and the Thcory of the Fim"(1980) 88 J. POLEcon. 288 at 295.
Actuaiiy, the argument rclating to the d e of rhe takmver market (or the market for corporate conml)
emerged eariier See, KG. Manne- "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Controiw(1965) 73 J- POL
Ema I IO and AA B e r k T h e Primof Power. Sale of Corporate Control" (1965) 50 Corn& LQ.628.

market), the product/seniice market, and the manageria1 seMce market. In addition to
these markets this thesis will dso address the infitxence of media coverage upon corporate
decision-making.

5.2.1 The Capital Market

The capital market conmas of the market for equity and long-term debt."'

The

capital market can discipline managerial behavior. Management has to consider the tems
on which capital will be supplied to the corporation. No corporate managers want to take
aeps that will increase the c o s of financing the c~r~oration."~

This section focuses on the equity markets in Canada and China and their
respective impacts upon public corporations in the two countrïes. Debt markets, and their
respective influences upon Canadian and Chinese corporations, are addressed in section
5.3 below.

A

The Equity Market in Canada

The equity market in Canada is composed mainiy of Canada's five stock exchanges
and an eaablished "over-the-counter" market. Among the f i e stock exchanges (that is,

the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Montreai Exchange, the Vancouver Stock Exchange,
the Alberta Stock Exchange and the Wmipeg Stock Exchange), the Toronto Stock
It is noted that the market Tor short-iem debt is usuaiIy tefened to as the money market
S. Pn,w% Finunciut iCla*kets, ï/nsrutïons t I m m e n t x Corporate Govername in an Ijxwnationaf
Perspective: A Survey of cbqmrate ConrroI ~MechanisnrsdmongLmge Firms in the US, Ci-K.Juparr m d
Gennony (Cambridge, MA & Odord
Blackwetl Pubiishers, 1995) at 6-

Exchange (TSE),is the most influentid stock exchange in Canada The TSE is the 9"
largest securities exchange in the world based on market capitalkation, accounting for
over 80 per cent of the value of shares traded on Canadian stock e ~ c h a n ~ e s . ~ ~ ~
Nomithstanding that the TSE's principal b c t i o n is the listing of cornmon shares, it aiso

permits investors to make equity investments through listed proprietary derivative
produas, t m t units, closed-end funds and other equity-linked products.w

Canadian

investors purchase equities directly and dso mdirectly through mutuai funds."'

Unlisted

shares of public corporations may also trade actively in the so-called "over-the-counter"
market in Canada.
The Canadian equity market principaily involves trading in shares of two types of

corporations. The first type is the public corporation, the shares of which typically trade
in markets characterized by a large Boat of publicly traded securities, hi@

liquidity and

significant institutional shareholdings. The other type is the smaifer public corporation
which typically has a much smaller Boat of publicly traded securities, relatively low

liquidity, and low institutionai o w n e r ~ h i ~ Canadian
.~'
equity markets are dominated by
the

Most trading in the shares of illiquid public corporations with few

1. R Lloyd (from Blake. Cassels & Graydon). "Canada's Capitai Markets" online: World Legal Fonun.
~http://www,worldegalfo~~~llco.uk/canaWartid&
O
183.htrni> (date accessed- Jme 28, 1999).
Ibid.

" Ibid As of Decembcr 3 1, 1996. there were m a 950 fiin& in Canada imresting in a bmad range of
domestic and foreign equities as welI as debt and otber finanCid instruments. The Zmestment Fun&
Wute of Canada recentIy reported that totai assets under management by lnstitute members amounted
to C M 2 7 3 biiiion, and that these assets were held tbr0ug.hover 30 miIlion accounts-

"S u p note 124 at 817.
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insatutional shareholders occurs between retaiI i n v e s t ~ a .nie
~ predominant role played
by such corporations in Canadian equity markets is consistent with observed patterns of

corporate ownership concentration.

As pointed out in section 4.1.3, one of the

characteristics of Canadian corporatioris is high ownership concentration. As shown in
Appendiix II - B, a corporation with highiy concentrated ownership is normdy govemed
by a single shareholder or a small group of shareholden or thek nominees. The fact that

many Canadian corporations have controlling shareholders implies that the market for
those corporations' shares will be relatively illiquid since the tme public Boat wi11 be
relatively small.
However, one c m o t overlook the large sources of capital represented by
chartered banks, life insurance companies public and private pension funds and mutual
funds in the Canadian equity market."'

The very existence of institutional shareholders

and their large interests in public corporations has attracted the attention of Canadian

tesearchersM6 Since institutionai shareholders have access to sophisticated in-house
market professionals, they have the expertise and ability as well as the incentive to monitor
the corporations in which they have invested. Their presence, accordingiy, offers a very

real hope for the effective monitoring of large public corporations. (Please refer to 4.1.7 A
(3) above.)

The equity markets may generalty provide some discipline over corporate decision

making through the share pncÏng mechanism. In a welI finaionhg equity market, the

544

Supra note 265 (IG-Machtosh).

R M. Tory ( h mToq Tory DesLamiers & Binnington), 'Corparate F i c e in Canadam,onIine:
Worid Legai Fonun, ~httpYi~~~.worldlegalfo~co.uklcanadalaRicIes/I
997 t O0167-hûuP (date
accessed: Iune 28, 1999)US

*Supra note 133.

prices of shares of corporations shouid reflect the reIative operational efficiency of such
corporations.4J7 A mature equity market is the ideai instrument through which to transIate
the effectiveness of corporate management into the pnces of a corporation's shares. Share
prices, then, fiinction as one of the indicia of managerid perfomiance, and cm be used as a
benchmark by which to motivate corporate controllers to maximize corporate profits.
Stock exchanges aiso play a regulatory role by requiring publicly-held corporations
to adopt sound corporate govemance practices. The TSE, in order to promote sound
corporate govemance in Canadian public corporations, published the Dey Report, a
iandmark midy on corporate governance, in 1994.u8

The TSE requires iiaed

corporations to disclose and explain any merence between their corporate govemance
practices and the guidelines in the Dey Report, though it does not expressly require listed

corporations to adhere to these guidelines. Five years after the publication of the Dey
Report, in order to assess the extent to which the corporate govemance practices of listed
public corporations reflect these guidelines. the TSE and the Institute of Corporate
The TSE has thus
Directors issued a follow-up study on 635 TSE-listed corp~rations.~~

been helping to define proper corporate intemal control standards for corporations,
investors and the Canadian equity markets.

J4f

A neœssary pre-condition for nich direct re£ïectionof operationai alciency in share pricing is that aii
materiaï information reIathg to the corporation is rapidIy and propedy disciosed without distortion,
Supra note 20.
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Supra note 21,

It appears that institutional shareholders, the share pricing mechanism and stock
exchanges dl perform a disciplinary fiinction in influencing corporate coatrol practices in
Canada.

B

The Equity Market in China

It was not until the 1990s that an equity market in China was established. Ln 1990,
China established the first national stock exchange - the Shanghai Stock Exchange. At the
end of the year 1990, there were 13 tisted public corporations in China. Later, in 1991,

the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was set up. Shortiy thereafter, the two markets were
unified and tùrther standardized through a sophisticated over-the-couder cornputer
network - the National Securities Trading Automated Quotation System (NSTAQS).

Through NSTAQS, more than five thousand brokers and dealers scattered across China
are able to buy and sel1 both equity and debt securities. Though at the end of 1997 there
were 10,000 publicly-held corporations in

China, only 745 of those were publicly listed

and traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock ~xchan~es.'"'

The introduction of a secunties market into China was not without controversy.
As andyzed in 3.2 above, unlike the refoms undertaken in Russia and moa of Eastern

Europe, which saw social ideology relinquished during the process of privatization,
economic reform in China has had as its distinctive feature the presenmtion of sociaiism.
Sociaiism is characterized by the dominance of the statdpubiic economy. However, the

secUnties markets in the West are dominated by the private sector. The conceru of the

Chao Feria "ShehoidîngSystem: Basic Organàatioa Fom of Modern Enterprises" (1998). Chma
Secirrities, chttpY/www-chinasecnritl~~.corncn/enp/IiCneng~mwe~4htm>
(date accessedr Apnl 3,1999)-

Chinese govenunent, in permitting the introduction of eqyity markets in China is obvious:
that private economy may graduaily erode the statdpublic economy in China
Prompted by the shonage of capitd and the lack of incentives to improve

enterprise management, the governent finally introduced the corporate form of business
organitation in the 1980s and an equity market in China in the early of 1990s. From their
inception, these expenments with the corporate foim and the establishment OFa securities
market were based on the officiai presumption that date enterprise management couid be
upgraded simply by adopting modem corporate foms and diversifjing shareholding while
preseMng the state's controliing stake. In order to employ the devices of corporations

and of securities markets found in the West while at the same time prese~ngsocialism,
the Chinese people created equity markets with "Chinese characteriaics". In other words,
the public economy plays a dominant role in the Chinese equity market.

As anaiyzed in 4.1 above, Chinese corporations have a high concentration of
statdpublic shares. The unique share classification structure in China reflects the state's
concem over the position of the aatdpublic economy. The extraordinary shareholders'
rights provided by CCL and the nedect, conscious or unconscious (see 4.1 above), of
minority shareholders' interests, strengthen the power of the majority shareholders (i.e.,
the state or other public sector actors).

With regard tu the equity market in China, the dominant position of the public

economy is maintained through the shares isstring quota system and the restrictions pIaced
on trading.

(1)

Issuïng Shares in the Primary Market: The Quota System

The Chhese govenunent maintains high state/public ownership of shares tbrough
its shares issuing quota system. In briec relevant national authorities set a figure, or
quota, for the aggregate offering pnce of issuance of al1 shares in the whole country
during a year.

The quota then is ailocated to provinciai govenunents, ministerid

authorities, and municipalities directly administrated by the centrai govemment,"' usualIy
on the basis of local economic development. mer receiwig its issuance quota, the local
authority wi11 conduct an examination of ail applicants for incorporation of a public

offering corporation or for a public offenng of secunties accordhg to China's Corporate
Laws and other laws and regdations If the local authority determines that an applicant is
quaiified to issue shares, it then agrees to assign the applicant an issuance quota and
approves the application for offering. This local approval is then submitted to the central
govemment for a finai approvai. Upon receipt of approvais Eom local and central
govemments, the applicant may, if it wishes, appiy to have its shares Iisted oii the
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Mer examination and approvai by the stock
exchange, the corporation can then make a public offiering.

The weaknesses of the shares issuhg quota system are obvious: employing
approvai procedures for incorporations and pu& offerings tends to be highiy politicd

and unpredictable. The quota system provides a mechanisin for administrative control of
the seninties market and accentuates the market's political c o n t e ~ t AU
. ~ ~these offerings

" Four cities, Beijing (the upitai of China), Sbangbai Tianjing and Choug@g, are the municipalities
directiy administratedby the central government.
*n

W.D.Hoimes, "China's FÏnanüal Worms Ïn the Globai W

at 752-

e t " (1997) 28 L & P o 6 kt?Bus- 715

are subject to plans formulated and admllustrated by the govenunents.4"

A number of

state authonties jointly decide upon the plans for annual shares issuance and the totd

number of corporations to be listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchmges.

Each province is given a quota of new listings. The selection at the provincial Ievel is in
p ~ c i p l ebased on local industrial bureau' recommendations and the overd balance
between industrial sectors. The finai decision then lies with the cennal govemment. In

this regard, which corporations can be incorporated and Liaed is decided by the state plan.
Actually, on average, 70 per cent of every corporation's shares are owned by the state and
Therefore, owing to the state policy of cornmitment to sotialism, the

legd

maintenance of the dominant position of statdpublic ownership in the equity market, and
the carefui administration of the share issuing quota system, the primary market for

Chinese equity secunties is strictly controlled by the govemment and maintains a socialist
character.

(2)

Share Trading on the Equity Market

China's capital market to a large extent is illiquid. The reason for this ilIiquidity is

that aate shares and Iegd person shares cannot be mded (unless approvai fkom the
relevant state authority is obtained) on the secutities market under m e n t Chinese

By restricting access «, the r0rma.i nationai share markets, the quota system actuaiiy pushes nonquota
Uito ather venues, for example, securîties trading centers set up in major cities ami sponsor& by
locai governments and the tocai PeopIe's Bank of China.

4n

aaMÏes

Fang, Liufang, "Comments: China" (L997)28 L. & Poly CntT Bus. 897 at 897For the defrrrition of
person*, see supra note 108-

regulations.J55It is estimated that around 70 per cent of shares in China's equity market
are owned by the state and Iegd persons."s6 This means the tme public float for Chinese

corporations is relatively srnail.

Moreover, regdations provide that an individud

shareholder cannot purchase more than 0.1 per cent of the outstanding shares of a Iisted
corporation.J57 Further, capital markets in China are characterized by an absence of

institutionai shareholders.

Insurance companies, for example, are prohibited fiom

investing in the securities market:5g as are pension f u n d ~ . ' ~ ~

The secondary market is overwhelmed by household individual investors. Moa of
them Iack sophistication, knowledge, time and investing sawy, and are less likely to

monitor the corporations in which they invest.

[nstead of engaghg in long-terni

investment, many of these individuai investon are engaged in short-tem speculation.

"'Article 36 of Provisionai Reguloriohs on the Ahinisnarion ojlsuing and Trading ofStoch (issurd
by the State CounciI of the People's Republic of China on ApnI 22, 1993).

iM Anothef estimation made by Vandegrift is kt,of the outstanding shares for any corporation. oniy 20
percent can actuaity k traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange A shares
and B sharcs mpectïvcIy account for 18 percent and 2 percent within that 20 percent of traded shares. Of
the remaining non-uading se-ties,
nationai, provinciai and I d govments hoid 30 percent, stateowned enterprises and domestic institutions own 45 percent, and issuers and their emp1oyees hoId 5
percent. See supra note L f 8.
It has also been estimated that more than 98 percent of Chinese public corporations' shares are not
tradabie in the market @en the Iargc mrmber of non-tradable -te shares and employee shares. See supra
note 122.
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Supra note 207.

"'Article 104 of Insurance Lm o f ~ h ePeopIe's RepuMc ofChirra (Ratdieci at the LJfh Session of the
Standing Cornmittee of the EÏghth National PeopIets Congress on Iune 30, 1995, and promdgated by
Presidentiai D-e
No. 5 1 for ùnplementationcommencing on Octokr L, 1995).
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Article 4 of 1990 Notice oflabor hfinistry Concerning Shngthening th@Papent and Mimagement
ofPension (LaoDong Bu Guan Yu Jïa Qiang Lao Bao Xian Ji h De Zhen Guan He GuariLi Gong Zuo
De Tong Zhi),

The highIy reguiated equity markets for both primary offerhgs and secondary
trading ensures the continued controlling position of public ownership in China's equity
market. The predominant position of the state/pubtic in shareholding corporations and in
the equity market ailows the managers of former state enterprises O: continue to operate

without effective nipe~kion. ln the meantime, the illiquid eqpity market is volatile and
wlnerable to manipulation for reasons reIated to its smalI size and the extent of
administrative controls. The government sometimes directly intervenes to prevent a

collapse of the securities market given that it is a source of capital that helps drive China's
economic g r o ~ t h . ~ O
The highly regulated equity markets not only increase agency costs but also

facilitate officiai corruption. The share issuing quota system makes public offerings
depend on the discretion of oficials. The unjustüied prohibition againa individual
shareholders hoiding over O. L per cent of the outstanding shares of a listed public
corporation is a sign of discrimination against private shareholders and private economy.

560

The fotlowing example iIIusvates state intervention in China's stock market:
"In Juiy 1994, the Shanghai market sank to a record Iow dose on M y 29 to finish at 32834 points. The
Shenzhen A index crashed through its [O0 starting Ievd for the second time in its fow-year history,
dosing at a record Iow 95.34 points, On Friday, h i y 29, a€teran emergency meeting in Beijing among
CSRC (China Securities Rcguiatory Cornmittee) oEciaIs, State Council aides and o&aaIs h m the two
stock exchmges, the goverment decidcd on a rcscue plan, The CSRC's rescue plan measnres, ptastered
on the fiont pages of the officiai press the next day, included a freeze on ail new shzue issues hdd mr
h m 1993 for the remainder of the year, They dso hinted at allowing joint Chinese-foreign liuid
management firms limiteci access ta the market on a trial basis, T o address the proôlem of a la& of
institutional investors, Ive have opted for the creation of Chinese and miued invesunent hnds capable of
attracting foreign capitai,' said Liu Hongm. chaimm of CSRC. A third measure was to ease credit to the
govement's most important d t i e s and imestment firms-B&ed up brokerag= another aspect of an
empowered investor base, wouid be able to intervene in the market, "
See I- Ma,"China's Economic Reforms in the 1990s" onüne:
< h t t p : / ~ m e r n b e r s . a o I . ~ 0 m / ~ e w / htm>
c ~ p 3(date
~ accessed: June 26, 1999).
HoweverZto some extent, intervention in tais new-bont hi& risk capitai market is necessary in teof
protecihg investors For instance, in order to pment fiaud and corruption in the capitai market, in
November 1996, China SecUnties Regdatory C O ~ (CSRC)
O issued
~
a set of d e s nquking
brokerage firms to obtain Iicensesto participate
in stock bmkering activities. In the meantime, tüe CSRC
punished several brokeragcs for iii@ securities transactions. Now the issne is to what extent the
govermuent may exercise its power to intervene in the capitai market

Through the share isming quota system and restrictive regdations on the share
trading market, the Chinese govemment controls China's equity market. This state
intervention together with the relatively small size and illiquidity of the equity market,
means that the share pnce mechanism which pIays a disciplinary h c t i o n for Canadian

corporations may not exercise the same fiinaion in China. China's infant stock exchanges

and lack of institutional shareholders fiirther suggest that the influence of equity markets
upon corporate control in China is not significant.

52.2 The Corporate Control (takeover) Market

TheoreticalIy, a weU fllnctioning corporate control market serves to encourage
strong managerial performance since weak management will cause share pnces to f i and
Iead to a takeover bid followed by a replacement of management. The corporate control
market, therefore, provides a mechanisrn for displacing inefficient corporate controllers
and rnaintaining a high share price."'

The corporate controi market in Canada is not active compared with that of the
US?* The main reason for this merence may be that Canada has a high ownership

The predominance of controlling shareholders rnakes
concentration in coq~orations.~~
hostile take-over bids f u tess l i k e ~ ~Mergers
.~
and acquisitions are, accordingiy, more
Iikely tu b e completed by negotiated transactions. There are a number of other means by
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Supra note 436 (KG.Manne) 1IO rit 112-1 13-

a S u p note 124 at 887.

*~

e ftoi4.1.3 of this thesis

Supm note 124.

which takeovers may be thwarted as an effective mechankm of corporate control. Fust,
existing corporate management is well equipped to take strategic actions to hinder hostile
take-over bids such as putthg in place poison pills, arnending constitutionai documents of
the corporation, initiating Iegai challenges to bids, and so on to. Second, it is costly for
prospective bidders to conduct the research necessary to determine which corporations are
under-perfomng relative to their potential. But once the research is done, any takeover
bid made on the basis of such research immediately signais to other potential bidders that
they should dso take notice of the target corporation. Thus, the inability to keep take-over
bids secret may create an obstruction to the market for corporate contro~."' Third, it is
observed that small shareholders of target corporations have an incentive not to tender

their shares unless the value of the bid sufnciently reflects the expeaed increase in
profitability under new management."6

China also has an inactive takeover market. One reason for this is the hi&
ownership concentration of Chinese corporations.

In addition, restrictive legal and

regdatory provisions which prohibit individuai sharehoIders from holding over 0.1 per
cent of outstanding shares of liaed public corporations make it impossible for any private
investor to take control of a public corporation. The regdatory requirement that state
shares and IegaI person shares must be non-tradable aIso conmiutes to an inactive
takeover market.

Finaily, the small size of the capital market in China and direct

Supra note 438 at 48.

*Ibtd

admùiistrative intervention in the market operate to prevent an active merger and
acquisition market fiom developing in ~ h u i a ~ '

5.2.3

The ProdudService Market

The producthe~cemarket cm affect corporate control due to the fact that a

corporation's share pke is closely connecîed with the price, quality and marketability of
its produas and s e ~ c e s .Moreover,
~~
if a corporation is not run efficiently and able to
s cornpetitive pnces, the corporation will face
produce marketable products or s e ~ c e at
the danger of insolvency or bankruptcy.

Cornpetition in the produa or service market varies Eorn case to case. Big

corporations with strong brand names built over a long corporate history may dominate
the specific product or s e ~ c emarket temporarily even though the corporation, at any

particular point in time, is not effectively

nui.

Under Chinese state policies which

encourage corporations with controlling aate shares to expand their market shares and
discourage them from becoming banknipt, ineficientiy operated corporations may

ïhe nate governmcnt from time to time issues notices to bar transfii of a controlling interest in some
state-owned corporations. See supra note 352 at 764.
It appears, at first bIush, that takeover transactions are prohibiteci in China's eqmty markets. However,
mergers and acquisitions do exist in China U d y such transactions occur between state-owned
enterprises upon approvai of the reIevant sute authority,
a In stating this criterion. 1 have exchdeci certain cooditions~Le. perfiormance of the whole industry and
the assumption that the coeng
behavior of most people or end-users is static. That is, one c m ody
draw a ihk berneen praduct QuaIity and share priœ if consumer prefefences are assumed to be constant,

To use a simple example, a Company m;ry produce the worId's most hi& guality prodnct, for instance,
widgets. But ifconsumers suddeniy stop bnyiag widgets, h m anyone, that corporation's share price wiIi
f
aevea though the quality of its products Îs e x d e n t 'Terfiormance ofthe whole Inditstryn is getting at
a d a r point, If a cornpany is nt a dechhg Ïndustry, s6are prias may faIi even if that partidu
company's products are e x d e n t

continue to occupy the market. Such policies, then, act as impedunents to the discipline
fiinaion that might otherwise exia in product/sem*cemarkets.
In Canada, product/se~cemarkets have always been competitive, and in recent
years have become increasingiy so.

Adoption of the NAFTA has pushed Canadian

corporations hto a broader competitive market in North Amenca and forced them to
improve corporate performance by exposing them to greater international competition.

China, on the other hand, needs no trade agreement to provide Chinese companies access
to a large market. !ts population of over 1.2 billion people makes China the biggest
consumer market in the world. For now, however, competitive forces in China are
primarily domestic.

China is still waiting outside the door of the World Trade

Organization. Therefore, temporady, the threat of cornpetition from the global
product/service market is generally much less than in

5.2.4

The Managerid Sewice Market

To professionai managers, the market value of their services within and outside the

corporation is decided by their ability to maxiMze the profits of the corporation. Outside
the corporation., the extemai managerial service market assesses the vaiue of managers by

o b s e ~ n gthe performance of the corporation with which they are currentiy associated.
Professionai managers may be motivated by the prospect of increasing the market value of

their seMces to other corporations that may seek to empIoy them, and thus have a stake
in maintaining their reputation as profit generators.

Inside the corporation, junior

a It is mted that th- is considerabledomestic competithe pnsnnc in Chma, cspeàaIIy among foreign
imrestment compgnies and behnreen sate-owned companies and foreign imrestment companies

mauagers monitor the performance of senior managers by utilking their "firm specinc
information".J70 Because top management positions in corporations are usuaily filled
interndy, ambitious individuais seek to climb higher hthe corporate hierarchy. However,
the competition of the manageriai Iabor market mÏght not have such effieas in companies

Thus, in public corporations with high
where managers hold substantid voting share~.~"

ownership concentration, if controffing sharehoIders act as managers, the managerial
s e ~ c market
e
might not have an effective discipiinary fùnction for them.
The Canadian managerid seMce market is not very cornpetitive (especidy in the
new knowledge-based economy penod) compared with that of other developed
countries."

But, as a developed country. the Canadian managerial s e ~ c market
e
is

likely superior to that of China, a developing country.
The manageriai seMce market in China may not act as an incentive for improving
corporate intemal control in Chinese corporations because first, there is no real fear of job
Ioss for under-perfoniiing Chinese managers because of a shortage of managerid talent in

China;second, because most Chinese managers are only beginning to l e m how to manage
profit-making businesses and accordingly, are far from havhg the skills needed to

"O

Supra note L28 at 19.

n' There are two issues herc Fim, in corporationswhere there is a large contmUhg shareholder. who is
aiso a senior manager, junior managers wiîi have Iess incentive to monitor senior managers with the hope
that they cm outperform those managers and therefore be prumoted, because no matter how weU they
perform, if the senior mangers are aiso the controiiing sharehoiders, no such promotion is pos4'bk The
second issue is that if senior managers are (wedthy) controlluig sharehoIders, they may have Iess
incentive to perfarm since (1) they have plenty of money and are not as attracted by the possriiiity of a
betterjob at another fÏm; and (2) if they hold substantiai sbares, they are not ai risk of king "fÏrednby
the shareholders-

The 1994 Wodd CompeiitMness Report fanked Cimada 19th out of 4 1 atmaies (23 deweloped and 18
fess devefoped) on the management factorindustry Canada, ~tlimagementSkiII Deveio~menrin Cmda (Canada: Occasionai Paper Number 13,
Decemûer 1995) at 5.

distinguish themselves fiom other managers:=

and third, because an ambitious manager

wodd not necessarily bs promoted in China since the state has contrai in corporations and
the state is currentiy more concemed to see managers prevent corruption than to

maximize profits.

5-2.5 Media Coverage

Media coverage aiso plays a role in disciplining corporate controiiers' business
behaviors and affects corporate decision making &en

that corporations compete for

favorable media coverage, and reputation ef5ects or embarrassment may serve as an
incentive to corporate decision-rnakers for avoiding poor corporate performance and
disciplining their misbehavion. The threat of adverse media coverage might be a more
significant deterrent to the Chinese since the traditionai culture of "saving face" has been
deeply rooted in the Chinese peop~e.474
Chinese managers and corporate controuen are no

exception of this.
The concept of "saving hce" in Chinese cuIîure is not just avoidmg embarrassment

in public situations. In China, face is a complex r
e
m tbat is associated with trust, with
f d y members, wîth respect and socid status."

Once it is destroyed, the person might
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Most Chinese managers, piaced dongside western managers ofeqnhdent &cial rank, piay mote the
rok of a first-Iine supenrisorin a western manufacturing plant in terms of their managerÏai discretion,
See M. Boisot, "The Lessons h m China" in U Boisot ed, Emt-west Business Collaboration: The
ChaCienge o ~ v e m a n c in
e Post-sociaht fiterprises (Londonand New York: Routledge, 1994) at 30.

An amde diicnssmg dohg business in China and Chinese cuiture, incIudÏng "s;rvMg &cewcan be
retn'eved h m W-Gertmenïaa, "CuitUral Insights on Dohg Business in Chma, Concepts of 'Fa& and
'Trust' are Just the Beghîng, The Graziadio BusinessReport, û n h U~ M t y of Maryh&, Schooi
of Law, China Law Site: < h t t p d / w w w W W W q k n e t / ~ a w ~ d(date
. h taaeseck
m>
Iune 26,1999)475

not have value in Chinese society. For shareholders, crediton and employees, corporate
failure is an outcome which entails devastakg financial hardship, and in the case of
directon and managers, profound personai embarrassrnent and detriment to self-esteem-

The detenent power onginated fiom traditionai culture cannot be underestùnated. In
order to maintain respect, managers and other corporate controliers wilI have strong
incentives to discipline themselves.

5.3

-

The Creditor Bank (the Debt Market)

A bank usuaily has two reasons for intervening in the business of a corporation.

One is that the bank may have equity ownership in the corporation. The other is that the

bank may be a creditor of the corporation.
corporation's debt market?

ui other words, banks serve as the

In this section, I will address the latter situation in the

context of considering the issue of corporate control from an extemai perspective.

5.3.I

In Canada

The interests of a creditor and a corporation conflict if the corporation pays
unlawfitl dividends to sharehoIders, or improperly reduces capital so as to render the
corporation insolvent, or purchases its own stock out of capitaLm

Of course banks are onIy one source of debt capitaL Corporations cm aiso bomw moaey fmm othcr
institutions or in the capital markets by way ofpubic issnes of debt i n m n t s such as debennrres
m

Supra note IO at 175.

For a profit-making corporation, the infiuence of bank creditors in the form of
intervention in corporate affàîrs is slim Firsuy, for banks, the r e m on their loans to
corporations is fixed according to certain contractud arrangements. Secondly, banks'
debt claims would rank above the interests of shareholders in the event of insolvency or
bankruptcy of the corporation. Thirdy, banken lack the expertise and time to be involved

in corporate business. Participating in corporate &airs, udess the corporation is in

financial distress, in a banker's eyes, is too c o ~ t l ~ FinaiIy,
. ~ ' ~ for banks, the risk of defauIt
wii1 be largely reduced thtough diversification because usudy banks [end money to a large
nurnber of c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n s . ~ ~
To a corporation with serious financiai problems, banks might be wiIiing to take
interventionkt action to prevent corporate controllers tiom gambiing with creditors' hnds
and pursuing a hi&-risk and hi&-retum strategy which could be good for shareholders
(who, after ail, have nothing to Iose once a corporation is on the brink of insolvency and
have the possibaity of recovering some value) but potentidy contrary to the creditors'
hterests."

"'B.R C h e f f i . Company Law:

Theow Structure and Operation (Great Britain: Clarendon Ress,

Oxhrd, 1997) at 76.
Ibid at 75. The pmbIem with the diversificatiou argument m the case ofdebt as op@
ta equity is
ihat, at best, it mcans that Ienders c m be insulateci fmm complefe finaniai coiiapse by Iendirrg to large
n u m h of b o m m who are not Iikely to aii default on th& obiigations at once However, dehttits are
stiii costiyvbecause unlike the case of diversitied eqyity hoIders wha m-ghtIose money on one imrestxuent
but make txp for it on another, the maximum return for de6t-hoIdets is fixed So debt-6oIders. even if
divefsified, stiE need to be more concen~edabout ÎndMduai defauits and insolvenues than diversiiied
eqyity holders

However, there is no good reason for wanting to see banks take a significant
interventionist role in the aEairs of a corporation with no serious financiai problems. First,

banksl rights to intervene in the management of a solvent Company wiU be iimited by the
te=

of their Ioan arrangements. Banks might perform a usetirl monitoring function

during the iife of a loan arrangement; however, not every strategy that banks favor would
necessarily be a good management strategy Eom the perspective of shareholders and of

corporate growth in generai. Second, the reai weapon banks have in their fight against
irresponsibie corporate borrowers is the thereat of demanding repayrnent, r e n d e ~ g
borrowers insolvent or placing them hto bankmptcy. But the risk of such bank discipline
on managerial performance is that it could cornpel managers to become more
conservative, that is, less interested in pursuing profit-making strategies and more
interested in preserving the company's assets. Such conservative attitudes of management
might not ultimately be desirable for either sharehoidea or bankers since, in the long nin,

both shareholders and bankers benefit fiom the prevdence of a weU run corporations

which are generating profits suficient to s e ~ c ebank Ioans and dimibute dividends to
shareholders.
The influence exercised by banks over corporate management varies fiom case to
case, with the extem of such iduence generally being proportionate to the amount of a
corporation's outstanding Ioans and the financial situation of the borrower.

In generd,

however, there is no good reason for wantkig to see banks take a significant roIe in

interferhg with corporate management either in weii nm corporations or in corporations
with serious hanCid problems. Research conducted by Industry Canada in 1996 f m d

no convincing evidence to support a broader role for banks in Canadian corporate
govemance."'

China's banking market is an oligopoly with the state banks occupyùig the most
prominent position.Jn During China's planning economy penod, since al1 the banks were
owned by the state. and al1 the enterprises were either state owned or collectively owned,
there were no commercial Ioans between the state banks and state enterprises. The banks
simply allocated hnds to enterprises according to certain state plans. With the recent
economic reform and the diversification of business ownership, financial reforrn, including

bank reform, has begun in China starting kom 1995.
Briefly? the function and responsibility of the Chinese central bank - the People's

Bank of China

- was established in

1 9 9 5 . ~The
~ People's Bank of China, under the

leadership of the State Council, is equipped with indirect tools for the conduct of
monetary poiicy and for the exercise of its supervisory fbnctions over other banks and
non-banking financiai institutions in f hi na"" Other state banks in China were required to

et

Supra note 348 at 57.

1993, China's banking -stem mainiy consined of the fioiIowing speciahd banks and non-bank
institutions: (1) the Agridture Bank; (2) the Bank of lhina;(3) the Construction Bank; (4) the indnstriai
and Commercial Bank; (5) Rurai Crcdit Cooperativ~~
(6) Urban Credît Cooperativw* (7) the Bank of
Communications, ((8 the China Intcrnationd Trust and liivestment Corporation; (9) Guangda F Ï Ï c e
Corporation; and ( 10) the PeopIe's 1-ce
Company.
' ~ 2%y

"i995 Law of the People's Republic of Chinaon PeopieZ Bank of China (Mopted at the 3" ses si or^ af
the grn~ationaiPeople's Congres on March 18.1995, pmmoIgated by Order No.46 of the Ptesident of
the PeopIersRepublic ofChina on March L8,1995, and &&ive as of the date of promulgation),

UU

Article 2 of 1995 L m of îhe People's Republic of Chino on People'sBunk of Chtntz-

be commercidized and capitdized beginning from 1995.-

The four state speciaIized

banks (that is, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, China Industrial and Commercial

Bank, and China AgïcuIturaI Bank) have been required by Iaw to vansform themselves
into commercial banksf6 Three policy banks were established in 1994 for separating
policy Iending fiom commercial

end in^?^

In June 1995, the first commercial bank aimed

at providing financial s e ~ c e sfor private corporations, Minsheng Bank, was set up in

China.

Under China's planning economy p bas$ since the needs of people and enterprises were met by direct
aiiocation from the statc the= was no device required for the management of savuigs and investment.
People's Bank of China was in charge of the state financial systern- Its department, Bank of China,
managed China's foreign cxchange transactions. The Ministry of Finance used the oniy other bank, the
Bank of Construction, for the management of long term credits to finance the state-planncd projects. No
stock market and other financial intermediaries were available at that tirne. There were some reforms of
institutions fonising on cndit control during the 1980s and earIy 1990s More the promulgation of the
1995 People's Bank of China Law.
For a bnef introduction, sec D. WaiI, -Financiai Market Reform" (1998) 11 China Review, Online: Great
BritaÎn - China ccntcr, <http:f/~~~~.gbcc.orguk/WalID.htm>
(date accessed: A p d 23, 1999).

" 1995 Law of the Peoplr's Republic ofChinu on Commercial Banks (adopted at the 13" Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the 8" National People's Congrest promuigated by Order No47 of the President
of the People's Republic of China on May 10, 1995. and effective as of Juiy 1, 1995)The four speciaIized banks were handling around 90% of total bank assets and two thirds of al1 furancial
assetS.

A phenornenon that 1 cannot ncgiect in addressing China's banks ts the high personal savings rate in
China, The vaditionai Chinese cuIture of high swings in househoIds and of avoiding persanal debt l a d s
to a high accumulation of private deposits in state banks. nie swings rate in China is about JO per cent
of incorne TOM savings dcposits in China cxcced 8 trillion Renminbi (about USII triifion). See A
Neoh, "China Strengthens Ets Markcts" (January 14 1994) Oniine: Far Eastern Economic Retiew

<httpY//www-feer.com/Rcstrictcd/ind~-business.html> (date accessed: Jme 17, f 999).

The high savings rate @ v a the Chinese private sector the ability to produce high leveis of ixtvestment
capital. It is the wealth represented by these private savings that the Chinese govenunent waats to tap in
order to fuod Chinese Uu(ustrics- High private saving is also one of the reasons that Ied to the incepiion of
faws rehthg to the incorporation of enterprises and the establishment ofa secmities market.
For the brief, refer to "Decision of the Communist Par& of China Central Committee on s o w b e s
Conceniing the Estabiishment of A SoQalist Market Economic Structurew (adopmi on Navember 14,
1993 by the ï'hïrd PIennary Session of the L4t.h Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese CommuuÏst Party)
(1993) 36 Beijing Review No.47,Nov.22-28 12 at 20,
Policy banks were established during China's hanciai refonn to take over the aIIocation of state credits
which were carrïed over fmm the old-nyle pIarutbg mechanisn The three poiiq banks are the State
Devdopment Bank, which was created by merging the six inmitment companiesnnderthe State Plannmg
C ~ ~ s s î o the
n ; AgrïcuïtUfiU D~leiopmemBank of çhiaa: and the Export-hprt Banlt Tneg werr to
base assumed a i i the poiicy basedIending actiuitiesformerIy handIed exciusnrely by the speaalized banks,

By 1998, more than one hundred foreign banks had established branches or
representative offices in China. However, few of them have been permitted to access the
Renminbi (Chinese currency) inter-bank market.

AU of them are

subject to tight

restrictions on the scope of their business. The first sino-foreign investment bank in China
was approved for establishment in 1995.'~~

With the transformation of state banks into commercial banks, the oid capital

allocation systern has ended and loan agreements must now be signed between corporate
borrowers and their banks. But actually, the disciplinary influences exerted by banks upon
corporations are slim given that in China commercial banks are largely owned by the state
and most corporations dso have a high concentration of state ownership. Refonn in the
banking area, to some extent, just means that aate commercial banks wiii not help rescue
insolvent corporations because they are now making loans on the basis of commercial
considerations only.

5.4. I

In Canada

As mentioned in Chapter 2 above, the evoIution and refinement of Canadian

corporate Iaw have been iduenced by British company law and American corporate Iaw.
However, it is uncertain whether Canadian courts have had a strong or modest infiuencing

power over corporate governance.

-

-

"This bank was ajoint venture behveena Chinese finanaai institution and Morgan StanIq.

Influenced by English and US judgements, the traditional approach of Canadian
courts was that business decisions were internai management matters for the directors and
the majority shareholders, and the coun would not interfere with them as long as the

decisions were made honestly and in good &th
While the "intemal management nile" or "business judgement d e " is stiti very

rnuch alive in Canada, the CBCA affords courts great discretion when hearing cases
retating to the oppression remedy. The Dickerson Report envisioned that the judiciary
should have a relatively broad role in corporate matters: 493
... the ben means of enforcing a corporation law is to confer
reasonable power upon the dleged aggrîeved party to initiate le&
action to resolve his problem, making the Draft Act Iargely selfrnforcing, obbviting the need for sweeping administrative discretion
and harsh pend sanction, and, at the same tirne, forcing resolution
of the issue before the courts, which have the procedures, the
machinery and the experience that enable them better than any other
institution to deal with such problems.. . (emphasis added)

The Dickerson Report hrther clearly identified the stanis of courts in protecting

minority interests in the c o r p ~ r a t i o n : ~ ~
...the rernedies provided in the Dr&
Act recognize that
corporation law - and particularly the duties of ofticers, directors
and dominating shareholders of corporations - is in a very fluid
state, reflecting the uncertoin roIe or identity of the business
corporation in contemporary society. For this reason we have
fiequentiy estabIished ody very broad quality standards of conduct,
... permining the courts to determine whether there has been &Iure
to comply with those standards, that is, to c o h u e to develop the
common law of responsibility of corporate management
unhampered by the Iegd fetters created at a t h e when courts were
-

41

Supra note 42 (Dickerson Report) pam476 at 158.

preoccupied with enforcing "democratic" structures - particdarly
voting power - as the one reai object of the Iaw. (emphasis added)
It seems that Canadian courts' influence upon corporate management generaily
arises fiom their decisions taken to protect minority shareholden (or stakeholders) and the
Iegal precedents such decisions establish.
Thus although the "business judgemenf' and "internai management" d e s are
based upon a principle of judicial non-interference in intemal corporate affars, the
oppression remedy has actually been drafted to encourage judicial solutions that can be
extremely intrusive. The oppression remedy is stilI, relatively speaking a new innovation.
It remains uncfear at the moment to what extent Canadian courts will be prepared to
"rewrite" the business judgment or intemal management rule over time, through their
aggressive use of broad oppression remedies. Thus, whether the Canadian courts will

have a significant or relatively modest influence over corporate control has yet to be

detennined.

5.4.2 In China

~ ~ ' under a civil Iaw
Broadly speaking, China adopts a civil law ~ ~ s t e r n .Iudges

system are not allowed to make law through the h c t i o n of interpretation. In addàion, a
judge is not bound by earlier j u d i d decisions in similar cases.

The Civil Iaw system historicaily was deveIoped in continentai Europe. h is a kgal rystua wÏth an
anphasis on detaiIed stanitoxy codes. Iudges in civil law countrks scttIe disputes acnirding to principIes
laid d o m in a country's ~Mittenstatutes- The writtert statutes ofien specifY in detaiI the Iegal rights lad
obiigations of citizens and tegai persons. in cases where written statutes do not specfncdy cover the
point in dispute, thejudge wiU tiry to appty generat principles a n d m e set out therein
4*

China's Iegal system is also intermingled with its sociaiist doctrinal requirements.

The Chinese Constitution stipulates that the people's courts are the judicial organ of the
state and are responsible to and report to the National Peoples' Congress and its Standing
The Standing Cornmittee of the Nationai People's Congress has the power
~ornmittee.'~~

to interpret ~aws.'~' In pradce, the Standing C o d e e of the National People's
Congress either promulgates regdations to interpret laws or delegates its interpretation
power to the Supreme People's Court to interpret questions involving the spedic
application of laws and decrees in court trials. The interpretation made by the Supreme
People's Court regarding the specific application of laws and decrees in court triais is
called "judiciq interpretation."JgYludiciary interpretation is different fiom case law in
Such interpretation does not involve citing or relying upon judgments in
eartier cases. [t is rather like a sumary of certain legal principles. Except for the
Supreme People's Court, no other lower courts in China are authorized to issue judiciary
interpretations. They may use, however, many avenues of receiving advice and direction
from the Supreme People's Court on questions of law.
The specific function of Chinese judges is not enumerated by the Chinese Iaws.

Practicdy, the major function of a judge is to collect evidence and examine witnesses so

as tu fhd out the facts. The duties ofjudges are to hvestigate, mediate and adjudicate by
5%

See Artides L
U and 128 of the 1993 Coh.iilution of the People5 Repubk ofChino.

"See Article 67(4) of the 1993 Consritutio~iof the People's Republic of China.
'-ùiChinese, Si fa jie shi.
For a comparative study of Chincsc judiciûl interp~tationand the pfecedent syaem of c o m m 1aw
countries, please d e r to G.Keqiang and T.Kasuaq "chinesJudiciai uiterprebtioa and Its CornpanSon
with Reoedent of Common Law CountrieS (1995) 1 I. of Chinese and Comp. L at 128 - 141 aad S.
Zongllng, wJudiciaiPrccedents in China Today: A Comparative Study of Law" in (1994) Ana P a S c L.
Rev, at IO9 - 115.

a hearingSw R

way:

C.Brown has briefly desmied the Chinese legd system and judges in this

"'
WhiIe certainly there are Chinese traditions, sociaiist doctrinal
requirements in the legd system, the fact of its system behg more
inquisitorial than adversarial, its 'trials' not being recognized as a
single event, its judges playing a larger role in collecting evidence
and exarnining witnesses, the dierent role of lawyers (with Iittie
cross-examination and littie pre-trial discovery) no jtries, merely
describes the traditional civit law approach as much as in Chinese
approach.
Under this legai system, the courts in China naturally have littie influence in China's

corporate matters. In addition to China' s IegaI system, other factors account for the fact
that courts have little involvement in resolving corporate disputes.

First, China's

Corporate Laws Iack legal remedies (such as the oppression remedy or appraisal remedy
provisions round in the CBCA) for shareholders or stakeholders. Lack of defhed legai
remedies discourages parties from submitting corporate disputes to the courts. Second,
the courts in China lack a tradition of being involved in resolving corporate disputes.

China has had a reiatively long period of a planhg economy. State enterprises were the

nom within the planning economy, and there was no need for state enterprises to

MO It i
s noted that rnediation ody exists in the contcxt ofàvil ows. ui terms of niminaI cases*judges are
not alIowed to mediate.
The conciliatory d e played by the peopIe's c o r n during the process of a civi1 action is a unique fanire
of the courts' fiinctioa Though the pnrnary hction ofthe court is to conduct a triai to settie disputes
submitted CO it, the court is also empowered to act as conciliator at different stages of the pmeedîngs.
Thediore, a potential iitigant who approachs the people's court with a view to trial may end up with
conciiiation by the court. Please see Chapter Vm Mediation of Law of C i d Pmceduro ofthe People's
Repu6iic ofChina (Adopted by the fourth session of the seventh National People's Congres on 9th ApriI
199L)
AvaiIabte online: MiiryTand University School of Law, ChinaLaw Website:
<httpY/www.qis,net/c hinaIm/iawtnn I -htm, (date accessed: fune 7.1999).

"' R C. B m m , DndersrMdig Chinese Courtr and Legai Prucesx L

m wirh Chinese CharacteriSn-CT

m
eBgue, London& Boston: Kiuwer Law hternational, 1997) at m i

approach the courts for resolving enterprise matters. Instead, the govemments (centrai or
local Ievels), through their administrative organs, served as mediators. niough under
current economic reform there is increasing diversity of corporate ownership in China, the
continuing dominance of state intereas in corporations rnakes significant changes in court
attitudes unlikely. Third, the lack of a tradition of court participation in corporate dispute

resolution in turn Ieads to the phenornenon that the judiciary in China is not
knowledgeable about business matters and corporate management. Fourth, according to
China's traditional culture, Chinese people are shamed from accessing Iitigation. The
concept of judicial process hi~toncallywas almoa unknown and a Confucian preference
for harmony made Iitigation a shamefd undertaking for parties to a dispute. hstead,
mediation was viewed as the better means to settie civil disputes.5o2 0 2 s point wiii be
firther explored in the 5.5.2 below.

5.5

The Culture

Corporate control does not operate in a vacuum It is shaped by, and in tum
contnbutes to shaping, specific culturai and historïcai forces. The purpose of this section
is to expIore how culturai values in Canada and China shed light on corporate controI

mechanisms in Canada and China

5.5. I
-

Canada
-
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Confiitianism is rooted in Chinese cuitme- Confucius, the founder of the doctrine (Le, Coafucianism)
advocated ihat people should not access Ltigation Pe-on,
meciîatio~compromise and negotiation
are the means to settie disputes. Plmse see Confbcnis, Conficius Anaiecrs online: UnivetSity of

MaryIan& SchooI of Law, Chïnalaw Web Site, <httpff~~~.qisnet/chinaIaw/Search1~htm~
(date
acœsxt June 26, f 999).

For historïcai reasons, Canadian culture shares certain sùniIarities with the CuItures
of other countries mainly Great Britain, France and the United States. The European

people, particularly the British, and Arnericans, have been remarkably successfiil over the

last two hundred years in the fields of economic development, industrialibation, science,
and prornoting the notion of a European mord order (whether this was advanced in terms
of law or trade practice). The spread of European languages, and the predominance of

European conceptual analysis in both the physicd and social sciences greatly shaped the
Canadian cuiture. The Canadian case law system was no exception, and was greatly
influenced by judiQal decisions in Bntain and ~mexica.'~~
Capitaiism is the main economic
ideology shared by Canada, Western Europe and Amerka It is an ideoIogy based on the
recognition of private property rights.

A social system based on capitalism therefore

places a high priority on the protection of private property rights and recognizes
"nonaggressive contractual exchanges between private property ~ w n e r s " . 'The
~ business
corporation by its nature is a capitalkt instmition. It is the private property of investors
that is fundamental to the structure of the corporation. Therefore, the existence and
development of corporations are iinked to the objective ofpurming profits and expanhg
shareholders' weaith. The duties and Iiabilities imposed on boards of directon and oEcers
by the CBCA reflect, among other things, lawmakers' desire to irnprove corporate

It is noted that ai the time of Confedention. dechions from Canadian provincial c o a couid
~
be
appeaied to the judiciai Cornmittee of the Privy Corncil, in London, UK, For a fbd dechion, The Judïcial
Cornmitteerssupenor appeltte~dictionover Canada did not encf mitil 1933, for nimma[ appe;ils-and
1949, for civil appeafs The Supreme Court of Canada stands today as the hnaIarbiter af Iegd disputes in
the Canadian@diaaisystem, and now enjoys the status &court of Iast cesort,
See The EarIy Begirmings of the Courtn,The Supreme Corrrt of Canada <httpYbww.scc-

csc,gc.~rochdengIisMitmYBe~htrn>
(date accesst& August 2 1,1999)-

performance and increase shareholders' value.5o5 The operation of corporations folows
the rule of capitaiist democracy: majority d e .

Closely c o ~ e c t e dwith capitdism is individualism. hdividualism regs on the
premise that society does not have the right to restrict the individual's freedom to pursue
happiness as he or she chooses to define it, subject to necessary constrah to prevent one
individual Eom encroaching upon the rights of other individuals. The individuai has the
right to ~el~fulfillrnent,
to self-actualization, and to the seeking of a personai identity.'"

Influenced by this individualkt idedogy, the CBCA, by abolisbg administrative
discretion and reducing state intervention, creates a Eee and flexible business environment
for people who inteod to maximize theu own property interests through business
corporations.

In addition to sharing a cornmon cuiture with Europe and the U.S., Canadians,
over many generations, have built a distinctive and unique Canadian cu1ture that
distinguishes Canada tom other countries. Based on a cosmologicd conception of

Schafer has summarized the characteristics of Canadian culture as:
the intimate ecoIogicd relationship that Canadians have with the
naturai environment; the need to continuously create new communications
technologies; the need for public-private cooperation; the abiliry to make
coricessFions. comprom~sesand work colIaboratrve&y the willingness to
Y>S It is noted that the CBCA dm imposes certain üabilities upon diRetors in comection with employee
wages and in cekition to atficr mtters such as improperiy reducing capital or paying dividends and for

providing unIawfirl financial assistance.

-

h4. M Patricia, ideologtcuiPerspectives on Canada (Tomnto: McGraw W Pyemn Limiteci, L975)
at 12.
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D. P. Schafer. The C h a m e r ofCrnadian Cuhre (nkkhaq Ont: Wodd Cdtnre Project, 1990) at

55,

The cosnologial conception of cuItua &ers to "the ordemi wholeW-"''ChewhoIewd
e
r
s to eveqthing
that
in the cosmos - animai. vegetabk mineral and bnmarr; and "ordered" Mers to the specinc way
in which the component parts of the whoie are woven together around a central organizing prinapIe or
mut to produce an inkgratcd entity,

search for mity fhroug. eqziatity and diversily rather t h through
assimifationund homogenzzation; the cornmitment to a caring society with
a high degree of materiai prosperity, human compasion, and social
secunty; and etched on a much Iarger canvas, the capacity for cultural
creativity and innovation."* (emphasis added)
Canada in part because of the sparseness of its population and the vastness of its

temtory, and in part because of the cejection of the Amerkm econornic and social
rn~del,~'~
has developed a Iiberai democracy in which government initiatives in the
economy have been more readily accepted than they have been in the US."' One of the
characteristics of Canadian culture, as summarized above by Schafer, is "the need for
public-private cooperation".

In Canada, the creation of virtually every significant

communications, economic, engineering, and social endeavor has arisen Eom
collaboration between govemments and private commercial ~or~orations.~"Such
cooperation both manifests and cultivates the ability of Canadians to compromise, make
concessions, and demonstrate flexiiility and collaboration. This may explai& at least in

part, why Canadians tend to access Iitigation less than the U.S. people do and why the
case law system in the area of corporate matters in Canada is less developed than that of
the US."^ This may also explain why it has been said that Canadian people can "search
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lbid at 64- Schafer hirther cq~lainedthat although these characteristics are discemile in other
societies, no other country possesses uiem ai1, or possesses thern in the same degree as Canada does. Ixt
this sense. they may be said to consitute Canadian cuitmai values.
M9 The American mode1 here refén to a system in whîch private enterprise, rather than state enterpris, is
principaiiy reiied upon for the creation and dcvciopment of virtually al1 signiflcant commurücations,
economiq engineering and social endemors.
"O

Supra note 506 at 45.

"' Supra note 507 at 68.
nz

T'ha are, of course, many othcr msons that Canadians may appear to be less litigioas For instance,
mitil recentiy, Iawyer contüigency fies have been forbidden in Canada (butnot in the US); more-,
În

for unity through equality and diversity rather than assimilation and homogenization", and

why Canadians have historically demonstrated a cornmitment to recognizing the rights,
values and traditions of othen.'13

The high degree of human compassion in Canada, as pointed out by Mr. Schafer, is
reflected in the fact that Canada has one of the most advanced systems of medical
insurance coverage, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, equarizaîion payments.
regional subsidies, and fmily allowances in the world.'"

And this same hi& d e p e of

human compassion in Canada may also help to explain Canadian lawmakers' concem
about minocity shareholders' interests within the corporation. By equipping minority
shareholders with legai weapons such as the oppression remedy, appraisai rights and
cumuIative voting, Canadian legislators have provided such shareholders with the tools
they need not only to protect their own interests, but ais0 with which they can influence or

indirectly direct, corporate business.
In bnef Canadian culture, with capitdism and individualism at the centre, has

corne to value concession and human compassion. These values. in tum rearict the
development of an absoIute (or pure) capitaiism in Canada With regard to corporate
control in Canadian corporations, generally shareholder democracy based on capital is stiIl
the findamental basis of corporate internai controI.

But at the same tune, Iegd

protections for minority sharehoiders provide an important baiancing force which acts as a
check against absolute majority rule.

Canada, unsunesshil Iitigants must pay the cmts of the s
the US)5
1
'

Supm note 507 at 69 - 70.

u

d party (that is not generaiiy k case Ï n

5.5.2 China

China is a country with a long history. The influence of China's long past and the
present state of flux during this reforming age al1 interminde with some western concepts

of capitalist democracy in today's Chinese culture. The language, the folklore, and the
praaices of government, business and interpersonal relations, and shareholdmg practikes
together become a part of today's Chinese culture and influence the way that corporations

are contmlIed.
Coficianism is a distinctive feature of traditional Chinese society advocated by
Confucius almost two thousand five hundred years aga."'

The philosophy of

Coficianism deepiy influences the behaviors OP today's Chinese pe~ple. In addition to

China, the East Asian countnes and areas like Japan, Singapore, Korea, Vietnam, Hong
Kong and Taiwan, ail absorbed and refined Confiician values and concepts of auth~rity."~

The characteristics of Confiicianism c m be surnmarized as foUows:
(1)

nie respect for age and hierarchy and an emphasis on obligations rather than rights
within a society;

51 5

Corrfucius was an itinennt Chinese scholar, phüosopher, and tecnuer over 2,500 yean ago, in a time
known as that of the Spring and Autumn period- The China of thïs time was not rmited, but was a
colIection of mail nates, at rvar or in dispute with one another, or suuggiing with barbarian uiba.
Confucius set out with hwnility, rcsoIution, and energy to find a d e r for whom he couid work to adciras
the great politicai questions of al1 ages - stability and order- However* his enthuskm and success as a
Icaurrr did mt immediately yield the resuits he sought It was not untiI the end of the 2"6 Cmnay BC,
that Confbcianism won recognition as the officiai creed of the nation
He emphamed vimie. leaming and rituai as the means of enniring that people iived in harmony with the
natwI order. whtch was a150 a moral order. China's long history Iargeiy detefmmes the reputahou of
Corrfitciris today- Those wrîtings, howwer. which are a s c r i to him or his influence have set a number
of parameters tvhich have been the dominant philosophica2 sogal and politid force in the evolntion of
Chinese civilbation over more than two thousand years* His thoughts were coiïected in the book
Anatects*
Mer to i n - Onote 5 17at 3.
5T6

L W. Pyç risia~t Power md P~fitics: 7 % ~Culnuol D i m e ~ o ~ zofs Aurhoriiry (CambrÏds
Massachusetts& London: The BeIknap Press of Harvard UxüvefSity et.ess, 1985) at 55.

The orientation towards groups;

The importance of personal relationships;

The preservation of face; and

The emphasis on mle by Wtue (with an emphasis on humanity), rather than the
law.

The Confucian philosophy of respect for age and hierarchy cultivates the Chinese

to respect authonty and favor centralized decision making. The Chinese people have a

high acceptance of hierarchy. This acceptance is embodied in China's administrative
system. It also can be reflected in models of corporate control in China. A major feature
of corporations in China is the high degree of statdpublic ownership concentration. ï h e
state or public institutions, at the top of the corporate hierarchy, are well protected by
extraordinary shareholders' rights and majority rule under CCL. The state's interests in
corporations are well secured. Minority shareholders, on the other hand, most of whom
are individuai shareholders, lack legal remedies to protect themselves. They more ofien

have to comply with the majority shareholders' corporate decisions. However, the
unbalanced reIationship between majonty shareholders and rninonfl shareholden in
corporations has been accepted by the Chinese people. Most Chinese people seem to be
accustomed to respect this corporate hierarchy and do not appear to fulIy appreciate that,
as one of the capital contributors,

a shareholder has the right to protect his or her own

hterests against possible infigement by the corporation.
The respect for hierarchy Ui turn leads Chinese peopIe to place greater emphasis on
obligations within a society rather than upon rights. A conse<[uenceof a sophisticated

emphasis on obligation developed over many centuries is a complex network of those
obligations which crosses al1 IeveIs ofthe society. The emphasis on obligation becomes a

major currency which faditates political, social and community actMty. In some ways
this currency is more vaiuable and powefil than the monetary currency."' It is one of the
reasons that the awareness of private property rights has been so slow to develop in
Chinese society and why Chinese lawmakers neglected minority shareholders' Uiterests in
corporate decision making dunng the time of drafting the CCL.

The orientation toward groups educates the Chinese people to have a
consciousness of mutualiy interacting pressures to ensure that dl rnembers are caught

within the network of obligations and share both responsibüities and rewards. This
emphasis makes it dificult to develop systems to iden*

and reward performance on an

individual basis. Such orientation toward groups favors labor participation in management
and sharing responsibility for corporate decision making

This orientation swely

contnbuted to the decision by Chinese lawmakers to borrow the German two-tier board
strucnire for corporations.
The importance of personai relationships is the heart of Confucian philosophy. It

emphasizes that one exists in reiationship to others. The western starting point of
individuaiisrn is alien to the traditional Chinesc people. F i e relationships were recognized

in Confùcianim, namely, relationships between sovereign and subject, father and son,
oIder brother and younger brother, husband and d e , and fiend and tnend.s'g As with the
order of nature itseIE these relationships, even those between fnends, were constructed in
hierarchicai terrn~."~The importance of personai relationships, especiaüy the relationship

*' R Little & W.R e d The Corficta~cRenaissmcce (Sydnq

The Federation Press, 1989) at 55.

Note that in anùent Chinese society? women did wt bave any social natus. That is why the
relationshipsdescriid by Confucius are centred npon men,

M H Bond ed The Psychofogy of the Chinese People (Hong Kong, Oxford & N. Y.: Mord
University Press? t 986) at 2 15.

outside an individual's immediate family, within the context of business relations, binds
people together both within and between business orgaNZations and connects business
people with govemment agencies.s20
The preservation of face (that is saving "face" as mentioned in 5.2.5 above) causes

the Chinese to attach much greater importance to the views others hold of them than is
found in other cultures. That is why the media may have some fûnction in the disciplining
of Chinese corporate managers. To some extent, however, the preservation of face

restncts individuai initiative and the evduation of personai performance.
The emphasis on rule by v h e rather than by law is deeply refiected in the

wording of Conkcius, "lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties and the
people will try to keep out of jail but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by
virtue and restrain them by the rules of deconun, and the people will have a sense of

shame and moreover, will become good.""'

Such phiIosophy is oriented toward shame

through its ernphasis on socid noms and by reference to ideai types as models of
behavior. The emphasis on d e by virtue maximizes the harmony and cohesion in society
and tends to ensure that cornpetition is pursued within a fiamework of estabiished

ceremony and courtesy that preserves social consensus. Such a major weakness in the nile
of Iaw may be little understood by westerners. in western legal professionais' eyes, the
Chinese Iegd system is relativeiy backward. There is a complete absence of case reports,
few judges, arbitraton and lawyen in proportion to its large population, few statutes, few
-

-

-

I. Child & L. Markoczy, Wost Country Manageriai BehaMor in Cbmese and Hungarian Joint
Ventures: Assessmerrt of lompeting Expfanations" in M. Boisot ed Emt- West Business Callaboration:
The Chaffenge of Grnemance in Post-sociaht Enterprises (London and New York Routiedge, 1994)25
at t36,
ID

"' The wording was collecteci into AnaIectsects
Sec note 519 at 205, supraQ

Iaw schook and littIe Iegai fierature. Mediation and compromise are the traditional
channeIs for dispute settlement. Since Confircia'sm

is basicaily a phiIosophy of harmony,

peace and conci~iation,~
the influence of ConfÙcianisrn upon law for several thousand
years has made the Chinese people reiuctant to approach courts for asserting their rights.

Mediation and compromise not only prevent one's "face" 6om being destroyed, but
maintain tiendship and other invisible advantageous business relationships.

Unlike Canadian culture, Chinese culture is grouporientated and essentiaiiy hostile
to individua~ism.~"This group-orientation and essential hostility to individualisrn finds its
setting in socialism. Conhcianism and sociaiism both emphasize the aate and society and

minirnize the merits of individuais, compared wÎth the ernphasi-s upon the individuai
favored in liberal-dernomatic capitdist States. The non-development of capitaiism in

China aiso means that there has been no alliance of merchants or trades to baiance the
state authorities.

Fifty years of socia~isrn~~
in China have woven a fabric of values and beliefi that

can only be called cultural even though Chinese sociaiism was built upon a pre-existing

" E. Lee, Commercial Dtspurrs SettIernent in China (London, N.Y.. Hamburg, and KK: Lloyd's of
London Press Ltd) at 2.

See L. W. @e. "The Statc and the Individul". in B. Hook ed The bdividuuf cmd the Stute in China
(U.S.:Ciarendon Press, Oxfiord, 1996) t6 at 17.
s24 The Ïxnbalancc in the cclattonship bctwccn the state and Ïndividnals pmvides both the nnicîurai and
the cnltural bases for the human ri@& pmcticcs which
now the most contentious issues betweext
Chnia and the ~vest,espccialIy the U.S.

Zt3

When faiking about socialism, it seems that 1 cannot avoid Marx and Manasn, Manr made a great
contniution CO the socid sciences by e m p M g the relationship between the distnintion of power and
weaith in a socicty and that socicy's pmailing ideas and vaIues. Max emphasized that owuership of
property is the most important eIcmcnt scparating the cIasses in a society. The ripper classes,th@ few
in number*coniroIIed most ohmIth in a society- Thdore, the means of liveIihood and the very üves of
the workers are controiIedby the uppcr cIass. The le@ mechnian of the state operated in Iarge measure
for the benefït of the upper dass. The only way to change t h situation, in Marx's vicu, was through
vÏoIent o v d r o w of the upper cIass by a workers'moIution See K, Mim, CüpituL (London: IM Dent
Sons, Ltd, 1934).

base of compatibte values and expectations. One of the key functions of a corporation
(even a private corporation) in China is to fùlfill, on behaifof the aate, the sociaiist pledge

of full employrnent. Although it is within management's power to hire and fire employees
under China's Corporate Laws, managers of China's corporations and foreign investment
companies find it almost impossible to exercise the nght in practice without a Iengthy
haggle with either the local Iabor bureau or the industrial supervisory bureaucracy. Job
security is a reward for loyalty rather than for

The practice of democratic

centraiism and the CO-determinationstyle in China's Corpocate Laws have promoted a
passive, responsibility-avoidance style of corporate intemal control. Local managers and
directors avoid making individuai decisions and accepting responsibility for their actions.

While Confùcianism educates the Chinese people to nay in a social context
composed of a hierarchical goup and emphasizes the importance of obIigation, socialism
continuously teaches the Chinese people the philosophy of collectivism, as opposed to
individudism. These philosophies Iead to the aatus ofcorporate control in today's China:
individual shareholders never can hoId majority shares and thus never cari be the ultimate
corporate controllers. That is to say, the private sector economy can never hold a
predominant position wi t hin corporations under current Chinese Iaws and reguiations.

Not surprisuigIy, Professor Hoppe regards socidism as "an instinitionalized inteference
with or aggression against private pmperty and pnvale propexty c ~ a i r n s . " ~
-

-

Under the gnideline of Marxism. the Chinese Commimist Party overthrew the gaveniance of the
Nationalism Party and eslabtished socialism in today's China in its e6om to apate a classIess Jociety in
Chma in fiitnre, that is no upper CI= soaety- Ail things in a communist Society are owned in cornmon:
there is no private propew and no formal government Marxïst theory helps exphin the Chinese
peopIe's Ilidifference ta pnvatc pmperty rights,
lZb Supm note 3 L
7at 35.

Supm note 504 at 2.

During the process of diversifjing ownership, China c m Ieam and benefit Eom
Canadian cultural values wÏth regard to the ability to compromise and make concessions

without loss of recognition of the rights of others, in particda. the rights of private
property owners. Confùcianism and socidkt theory about compromise between the state
and its people require individual private interests to be assimilated by date interests. This

kind of compromise can be a huge impediment to building a credible capital market and
attracting hnds from the private seaor in China. China is moWig toward recognition of
private economy in its public economy system. But such recognition shodd be based on

equality rather than assimilation and homogenization. In this regard, China's Corponite
Laws will help prevent the state and its public economy from encroaching upon the private

economy by enhancing the protection of private property rights. For this reason, legd
remedies proteaing minority shareholders should be included in the CCL.
Confucian theory conceming hurnanity and socialist theory c o n c e k g fÙii

employment in a society a b can be enrkhed by incorporating certain ideas from the
Canadian culture regarding human compassion. Rather than eroding corporate efficiency
by requiring tùll employment in corporations, hmanity should be based on promoting

effective and efficient corporate control so as to improve social weffare as a whole.
However. leaming from Canadian cultural values does not mean an abolition of
this country's own culturaI values. B is beyond dispute that human fiiltiIlment is more

likely to corne corn the observance of obligations and productive actïvity than from an
indulgence in exploiting rÏghts coupied wÎth the consumption of the hits of other people's
acti~ty.'*~An over-emphasis on individu&=

Supm note 517 at 106.

negiects the fia that the natrnat order of

one's Iife is a progression from dependence in childhood and education in youth, to

productivity in adulthood, followed by more mature responsibility in age?

Maybe a

middle ground, half-way between ConfÙcianïsm and individuaiïsm; socialisrn and
capitdism, is appropriate to China.

The complex extemal environment in which corporations operate exerts
cornpticated influences upon corporate decision making. Each country has its own state
situation, markets, banking system, Iegal system, and cultural values. There is no one
mode1 for creating and facilitating an extemal environment for Unproving corporate
control that is suitable for every country without regard to those criticai distinguishing
characteristics and underlying values.

CEAPTXR 6 CONCLUSION

The cornparison of corporate conno1 practices under Canadian federal corporate

Iaw (CBCA) and Chinese national corporate law (CCL and ETES Laws) within
distinctively different poIiticai, economic and social backgrounds shows the complex
interpIay of intemal and extemal forces in shaping corporate decision-making in Canada
and China.

The hiaot-ical oveMew of the development of Canadian corporate law in the
context of Canadian economic development demonstrates that, refined in a stable social
environment, the CBCA has been much influenced by traditionai British Company law

doctrine and US modern corporate Iaw. China's Corporate Law, created during the age of
China's economic reform aimed at building a socidist market economy, has been much
infiuenced by the Chinese govemment's desire to employ the structure of the business
corporation to facilitate the pooling of pnvate capitai From foreign investors and Chinese

individuai investors under the socidist regime.
Using the CBCA as a touchstone, through this comparative study, a number of key
observations have been made. Firsf share structures provided by the CCL are s i d a r to

those provided for under the CBCA, however, the unique ~Iassificationof shares in China
according to an inveaor's identity reftects China's commitment to a socialia regirne by
providing a mechanism to monitor the amount of private capital in the Chinese equity
market-

Second, the Canadian and the Chinese corporate markets are dominated by
cIoseiy-held corporations, and public corporations in Canada and China both have hi@

ownership concentration. Hi& overlapping ownership and imeriockmg directonhip are

&O

characteristics of the Canadian corporate market China appears to tend to diversify

its corporate ownership market through employee ownership.

niird, with respect to shareholders' controlIïng or influencing power over
corporations, the comparative examination shows that sharehoIders' democracy, under the
CBCA, is based on capital without sacrüicing fair treatment for the min~rityshareholders.
Minonty shareholders are provided significant legal remedies under the CBCA. In China,

CCL provides shareholders extraordinary statutory ~ghtsto determine corporate matters
(particularly in the area of corporate strategk matters). ln this sense, it thus appears that

CCL accepts shareholders' capitalist democracy. But some specid provisions under the

CCL indicate that socialist doctrine cannot completely embrace capitdim withui the
structure of the corporation.
Founh. while the CBCA adopts a one-tier board structure, CCL adopts a two-tier
board structure for publicly-held corporations. Professionai managers on the board are
given a high degee of controlling power over corporate matters in Canada (unless there is

a unanimous shareholder agreement providiig other~ise),'~~
but managers can ody have
iduencing power over corporate flairs in China. The separate supemisory board in
Chinese corporations does not seem to resuIt in a more efficient oversight hction than
that performed by outside directors on Canadian boards. nie distinctive administrative

sanction liability for directors and chair of the board and the relatively modest role of
board of directors and manageriai officers in Chinese corporations indicate that the vwtige

of the enterprise management mode1 that prevded under China's planning economy
persists under China's corporate Iaw.

CBCA S. IO2 ( I).

FiRh, ernployees in Chinese corporations are influentid (particdarly in areas

relating to employee's interests in the corporation, like sdary, welfare, working conditions,
and safety protection) under China's Corporate Laws, while the CBCA seems to pay M e
attention to empioyees."L
Sixth, corporate intemal controL cannot be isolated from a corporation's extemal

environment. This comparative study has indicated that laws and administrative fadities
in China intervene more in corporate &airs than in Canada Through a share issuing
quota system, the Chinese governent controls the arnount of private capitd on the
Chinese capital market. Encorporation in China requires governrnental approvd while it is
a right in Canada. The reason for greater administrative intervention in corporate &airs
can be linked to China's fiagile capital market, p r o d u d s e ~ c emarket, and managerid

service market, and to the restrictive role judges play in the Chinese Iegd systern.

Traditional Contiicianism, emphasizing respect for hierarchy, obligations (rather than
rights), orientation towards groups, and a disrespect for private property rights dl
contribute to a corporate control practice in today's China which is totaiIy different from
that of Canada where the prevailing culture emphasizes private property rights and
individudism. In Canada, there is far Iess government administrative intervention in
corporate matters and greater reliance upon markets and other non-IegaI institutions to
regulate behaviors of market participants.
The above observations from both mtemai and extemal perspectives Iead to the
concIusion that corporate control practices under the CBCA refy more on contractual
arrangements than on mandatory statutory provisions, give professionai managers

SiE

An exception is in the CBCA s-119- Directors are jointiy and severdy tiable to empIoyees of the
corporation for ttnpaid wages (that is, not e x m g six months wages).

sigaificant discretion and equip minority shareholders with a high degree of protection
through formai legd remedies. Canada's corporate controI practices, therefore, represent
a modified capitaiist model, a model facilitating business without sacrificing equity and
f~mess.

China's Corporate Laws introduced the economic structure of the corporation into
China and borrowed certain corporate controt scperiences from western capitaiist
countries but without sacrificing China's socialist regime. China's corporate control
practices, therefore, represent a modified sociaiist model, a model merging modem
corporate control and traditionai socialistic enterprise management.
Corporate control practices vary across nations and cultures to rneet changing
conditions. There is no universai mode1 of corporate control available to improve
corporate performance within ail competitive environrnents. Nor is there an ideai mode of
corporate control that every country or corporation should emulate. Nevertheless, tiiis
general comparative study of corporate control under the CBCA and China's Corporate
Laws aims to further an exchange of ideas for improving corporate performance in Canada
and China.
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Chief Executive ORcer

Illustration:
Chief Executive Oficer holds the ultimate
deci sion power.
The mananerial ofticers, though employees
of the corporation, are hired professional
managers.
Board of Directors exercises no real decision
power and serves as "rubber stamp" for
the management.
Shareholders are passive investors. They
either sel1 out the shares they are holding,
or keep silent in case of di ssatisfaction to
the management.
Emplovees are implementing daily operation
of the corporation according to the instructions
issued by the officers and have no participation
in the corporate management.

Canadian publicly-hcld corporations:
Business Reality of Type A Corporations
(widcly hdd corporations)
This type of corporate intemal power distribution more oflen exists in Canadian largest and financially important

corporations. With Chief Executive Officer holds the final decision power, full-time managers effectively appoint
the board of directors and select themselves management positions. Shareholders are the constituency as the
r
in accomplishing managers' long-terni managenal goals. (NOW
"necessary ~ b b a stamp"
(Nota: B, Welling, Corpornte L
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Illustration:
Corporate decisi on-making power
i s in the hand of single shareholder
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Di rectors
Managerial

\

Other Shareholders

o
n
& shareholders.
The controlling shareholderlshareholders
either legally control the corporation (own
directly or indirectly 50% of voting
shares) or effectively control the corporation
(owndirectly or indirectly
20% 49.9% of the shares).
Board of directors note: a single shareholder
or a small group of controlling shareholders
very like elect themselves or their nominees as
directors and managers. If so, they have
controlling power over the corporation.
Managerial ofIlcers implement the strategic
planning issued by the controlling
shareholder/shareholders.
Other shareholders are passive investors
and generally have no real power.
m
s are implementing daily operation
of the corporation according to the
instructions issued by the officers and have no
participation in the corporate management.
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Canadian publicly-held cwporations:
Business Reality of Type B Corporations
(puM i e corporations with high ownership
concentration)

Illustration:
It i s the most numerws corporations in Canada.
Most of them are small family-nin corporations.

A distinct feature is that the role of
Shareholder?Director, and Mananerial Officer
is played by one personffamily . Such
persodfamily not only holds all the shares of
the corporation, but also el ects himsel fkerself
as director and participates strategic and
dail y management of the corporation.

The corporation may hire other people as
Employees. Employees generally have no
power at al1 in this type of corporations.(tw)
Canadian closely-htld corporations:
Business Roality of Type C Corporations
(particularly small suc closc corporations)
NO^:

B. Weliing, Corporale Luw in h a d a : The Governing Prlnciples (2nd cd.) (Toronto & Vancouvcr; Buticworths, 199 1 ) at 303.

CBCA S. 102 (1):
"Subject to any unanimous shareholder
agreement, the directors shall manage
the business and affairs of a corporation."

/ \
/

Board of
Directors

\

Managerial Officers

Employees

Canadira Corporations: Tho Legal Theory
Under CBCA

CBCA s. 121(a):
"Subject to the articles, the by-laws or
any unanimous shereholder agreement,
the directors may designate the offices
of the corporation, appoint as oficers
persons of full capacity. specify their
duties and delegate to them powers to
manage the business and affain of the
corporation, except powers to do anything
referred to in subsection 1 15(3).

(Shareholder ( ~ t a t e a
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Shareholders

Illustration:
Currently, most public corporations
in China are not purely private
corporations. This chart reflects the State
(represented by central or local people's
governrnents) legally controls (directly or
indirectly owns over 50% voting shares) or
effectively controls (own directly or
indirectly 20% 49.9% of the shares)
the corporation.
Other Shareholders like Leeal Persons Shareholders or Individual Investors as minority shareho1den have little controlling power.
Board of Directors generally has no mal
power and more often follow the state
decision.
Manaaerial Onicers play the function of
implementing corporate decisions.
Supervisory Board tends to be passive since
certain defects contained in the provisions
under CCL.
Emplovees have certain influences in the area
of certain labor related rnatters (e.g. employment, labor safety, salary and welfare, ect.)
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Cbincse Public Corporations:
Business Redity of 5 p c A Corporations
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Board of Directors is legally provided
as the highest organ in the corporation.
But in reality, since the structure of sinoforeign investrnent enterprises in China is
like a limited partnership in the west, it is
the investors, i.e. the Chinese and foraian
investors, who exercise power.
Board members are appointed by investors.
The number of directors that each party
can appoint is usually according to the
capital Chinese and foreign investors
contri bu ted,

Managerial Officers

ï
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Cbincst Closcly-held Corporations:
Business Reality of Type D Corporations
(sino-Foreign investinent enter prise in China)

Labor influences in the
area of labor related
matters

General M a n a ~as
r a head of Managerial
Officers i s responsible for day-to-day
corporate matters. Managerial Onicers
repon to the General Manager.
Employees generally have limi ted
influence power to corporate decisions.
Employees through the trade union in the
corporations to influence the corporate
decision in the area of labor related matters.
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Illustration:
In theory, according to CCL, Shareholders'
Meeting is the highest organ in the corporations.
According to CCL,the Shareholders' Meeting
handles corporate strategic matters.
Supervisory board, composed by the shareholders and employees, is the supeivisory
institution which supervise the board members,
managerial officers and their delegates.

Chines@Corporations:
Tbc Lcgal Theory Under CCL
(puMic and doilely-held corporations)

Board of Directors has recommendation power
to the shareholders' meeting in the area of
corporate strategic rnatters. Legally, under CCL,
Labor influences in the It is basically in charge of daily corporate
matters.
area of labor related
matters
Manaaenal Officers implernent the daily
operation of the corporation in accordance with
CCL.

Emplovees have certain influence power to the
corporate decision relating to Iabor matters.
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Board of Directors i s legally provided
as the highest organ in the corporation.

Board of
Di rectors

General Manager as a head of Manaaerial
Officers i s responsible for day-to-day
corporate matters. Managerial Oficers
report to the General Manager.

\

General Manager

/

Labor influences in the
area of labor related
matters

Chincm Corporations :
The Legal Theory under FIESLaws
(sino-foreign investmcni enterprises in China)

Emplovees generally have 1imited
influence power to corporate decisions.
Employees through the trade union in the
corporations to influence the corporate
decision in the area of labor related matters.
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